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SUMMARY

Examining funded relationships of three disaster relief and development INGOs
through the resource dependence and public policy tool choice frameworks, this research
explores the relationship between funding and INGO autonomy, with a primary emphasis
on government funding. The study adapts Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004)
conceptualization of organizational autonomy as the extent of an organization‟s decision
making capacity in matters concerning human and financial resource management, and
agency operations.
This research therefore finds evidence to suggest that relative to other funding
sources, government funding disproportionately constrains INGOs‟ operational and
managerial autonomy. This is largely accomplished through various ex ante and ex post
constraints such as, inputs, evaluation and performance controls, audit requirements and
various rules, regulations and conditionalities attached to government funding.
Notwithstanding government influence on INGOs‟ decision making and
activities, this research also finds evidence to suggest that relief and assistance INGOs
that receive USG funding are able to exert influence on USG funding agencies through a
number of strategies. These strategies include influencing program and implementation
designs, the art of contract negotiation, revenue diversification, due diligence, and simply
walking away from funding sources that constrain their autonomy.
And consistent with Salamon (2002a), this research finds that the funding tools
utilized by government to finance INGO‟s activities influence INGOs‟ autonomy in
varying degrees, thus steering and controlling INGO grantees‟ decisions and activities.

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The nonprofit literature cites the influence of government funding on nonprofit
governance (O'Regan and Oster 2002), and increased nonprofit bureaucratization
(Goyder 1994; Commins 1997). In addition, government funding is observed to leave
enduring effects on organizational culture and the nature of the services that international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) provide (Smith 1993; Smith 2006; Kerlin
2006a). There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that government funding influences
nonprofit organizational autonomy. For instance, in 2000, in order to increase its freedom
“by relying on less exacting funding sources,” Oxfam America turned down government
funding (Brown and Moore 2001). And according to its President and CEO, Direct
Relief International turned down USAID funding because of the “new requirement that
all aid be branded as “From the American People” (Crea 2006). The CEO stated that,
“when we [INGOs] get together we love to say we are NGOs, with an emphasis on the
„N,‟ but all we end up doing is talking about USAID” (Crea 2006).
Furthermore, following a decision by CARE to phase out federal funds for food
aid, a CARE employee interviewed for the New York Times went on to state that
“[W]hat has happened to humanitarian organizations over the years is that a lot of us
have become contractors on behalf of the government….It compromised our ability to
speak up when things went wrong” (Dugger 2007).
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Despite such examples, very little research has been done to measure or
understand the concept of “organizational autonomy” in the nonprofit sector. In turn, very
little has been done to empirically explore the relationship between government funding
and INGOs‟ autonomy. In order to understand organizational autonomy in the context of
international NGOs, this research adapts Verhoest, Peters, et al.‟s (2004)
conceptualization of organizational autonomy, as well as the autonomy dimensions
developed in the Public Management Institute at Leuven University in Belgium.
Using resource dependence theory, this paper explores the relationship between
the degree of INGO dependency on particular funding streams, especially dependence on
U.S. government funding (USG), and the effect such dependencies have on
organizational autonomy. The study also employs a policy tool choice framework
embodied in the „new governance‟ framework (Salamon 2002a) to explore the
relationship between different forms of government financial transfers and their
implications for international NGO autonomy
The government-INGO exchange relationship is embedded in a U.S. foreign
policy environment in which direct relief and development INGOs operate. Historically,
U.S. foreign aid policies have tended to be characterized by tension between “diplomatic”
and “altruistic or developmental” purposes (Stoddard 2002a; Lancaster 2007). For
instance, the threat of Communism during the Cold War elevated the significance of
diplomatic ends over developmental ones, such that even when “developmental” aid was
provided, the “diplomatic” objective was to prevent the spread of Communism in the
poorer parts of the world (Stoddard 2002a; Lancaster 2007). Following September 11,
2001, the fear of Communism was replaced by Terrorism, ushering in drastic shifts in the
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U.S. foreign aid policies. As noted by Kerlin (2006a), “…the National Security Strategy
introduced by President Bush in September 2002 underscores that, although poverty,
poor health and lack of economic opportunity do not lead directly to unrest and terrorism;
they can be their precursors.”
INGOs as the official implementing partners of government are therefore affected
by such shifts. A danger exists that such a policy environment may translate into
institutional environments where exchange relationships between government and INGOs
are primarily based on fulfilling national interests-oriented goals at the expense of the
altruistic goals and objectives of INGOs. As noted by Cho and Gillespie (2006),
institutional variations (e.g., changes in policies) and shifts in the political environments
(e.g., shifts in priorities) can influence the decision choices available not only to
politicians but also to nonprofit decision-makers. As a result, government policies may
negatively impact INGOs decisions, as long as INGOs receive government funding. This
is not to say that government cannot influence INGO behavior in the absence of a
funding exchange relationship.
In light of the policy environments within which INGOs are embedded and the
practical concerns that INGOs like CARE and Direct Relief International have expressed,
this research sets out to address the broad issue of whether the funding relationships in
which INGOs engage, in exchange for resources, have any negative impact their ability
to make mission-focused or need-based decisions. This is especially crucial given that,
INGOs at times find themselves unable to meet the emergent needs of the populations
they serve due to the specifications and constrictions of their grant or contract agreements
(Smith 1993; Smith 2006).
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The existence of the nonprofit sector has been explained by theories of
government and market failure (Weisbrod 1977; Hansmann 1980; Fama and Jensen
1983). Traditionally therefore, nonprofits have been viewed as entities that fall outside
the immediate domains of government and markets (Ware 1989; Lancaster 2007). From a
de Tocquevilleian perspective, this idealistic distinction and separation of sectors
represents a critical advancement for democracy characterized by citizen participation
through nonprofit organizations (Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992; Smith 2006; Lancaster
2007). However, in lieu of a three-sector economy with distinct differences between
nonprofit organizations, the government and the private sector, others have described a
“mixed economy” characterized by blurring sectoral differences (Young 1984; Smith
2006), especially when the ideological independence of nonprofit organizations is
threatened by the third sector‟s fiscal dependence on government and corporations
(Kramer 1985).
Within this context, government funding remains controversial. While some
authors have emphasized the dysfunctional dependency of INGOs on government funds
and thus recommend scaling them back, others have advocated for greater use of INGOs
as public service providers and as official implementing partners of government policies
and programs (Salamon 2003; Smith 2006).
This research draws on two theoretical frameworks, resource dependence and tool
choice approaches. While a policy tool approach suggests that different funding
instruments are selected on the basis of the kinds of behaviors they intend to induce
(Schneider and Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002a), resource dependence theory suggests that
INGOs adapt themselves to the providers of the particular resources they seek. The
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behavior of organizations is therefore explained not only as a function of the critical
resources that the organization needs in order to function and survive, but also as a
function of the different instruments used to transfer these critical resources.
Concerns for INGO autonomy therefore arise from the particular ways in which
the relationship between government and nonprofits institutions is manifested. Coston
(1998) points out that this relationship exists in an environment where government enjoys
greater power at the expense of and a resource advantage over the INGOs. As applied
here, resource dependence theory seeks to explain the funded relationship between
INGOs and their financial benefactors through resource exchange and the power
asymmetry associated with the exchange process (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik
2003). In addition, different funding sources exhibit different institutional patterns, which
result in different management requirements on the part of recipient INGOs (Gronbjerg
1993). As such, this theory helps us examine different funding structures (at least from
the INGO perspective) since they provide the contexts within which INGO decisionmaking occurs (Gronbjerg 1993).

1.1.1

Research Questions
Najam‟s (2000) foundational theory of strategic institutional interests asserts that

the nature of the relationship between government and INGOs is based on the
convergence or divergence of their institutional interests and preferences. However, the
theory fails to identify how these interests and preferences are articulated. This research
therefore draws the assumption that different funders such as the U.S. government
(USG), foundations and corporations articulate their development interests and
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preferences through the rules, regulations and conditions attached to funding. And with
respect to USG funding in particular, using Salamon‟s tool choice framework which
assumes that different tools such as grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, generate
specific kinds of behaviors from people and organizations, this paper posits that
government articulates its institutional interests and priorities by use of these funding
mechanisms. As such this research addresses two primary questions: 1)

How does government funding influence INGO autonomy?

2)

What strategies do INGOs employ to preserve their autonomy?

The first question allows one to understand how INGOs have experienced USG
funding relative to foundation or corporate funding, with respect to their autonomy. As a
result, one gains an understanding of the behavior of different funding sources and their
impact on INGO autonomy. Based on the assumption that autonomy loss is taking place,
the second research question seeks to understand the strategies that INGOs employ to
militate against this loss.

1.2 International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs)
Nonprofit organizations are private, self-governing, non-profit seeking or
distributing, voluntary entities that are organized separately from government (Salamon
and Anheier 1996). Such organizations are eligible for federal tax-exempt status. This
sector has also been referred to as the “third sector,” a term widely used in Europe and in
the United States to describe those entities that lie between the market and the state, or
those organizations that are constitutionally separate from government agencies and the
private enterprise (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Boli 2006).
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This research focuses on a subset of nonprofit organizations known as
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or private voluntary organizations
in the United States. These are “nonprofit organizations that make significant operating
expenditures across national borders and do not identify themselves as domestic actors”
(Anheier and Themudo 2004). Using the U.S. Agency for International Development‟s
(USAID) definition, INGOs are tax-exempt international private voluntary organizations
(PVOs) working in international development, receiving some portion of their annual
revenue support from the private sector, as well as voluntary contributions from the
general public.
The scope of INGO activities ranges from advocacy, education, and research, to
international relief and development assistance. Given this diversity, this research focuses
only on disaster relief and assistance INGOs, whose primary activities include economic
development activities such as long-term poverty reduction through education and micro
credit initiatives, as well as humanitarian assistance initiatives such as responding to
natural disasters (Forman and Stoddard 2003).
INGOs have also been described as part of a “global” third sector, one that
operates outside of the global economy – dominated by transnational corporations and
international organizations such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the global
interstate system – centered on the United Nations (Boli 2006). International NGOs
therefore, are operational organizations typically headquartered in developed countries
and carry out operations in more than one developing country1.”

1

http://docs.lib.duke.edu/igo/guides/ngo/define.htm
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Another defining feature of INGOs is that they have come to play a significant
role in the international arena of relief and humanitarian assistance (Forman and Stoddard
2003; Lancaster 2007). According to an annual report from the Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), over 70 percent of U.S. foreign disaster relief aid was
channeled through INGOs in 2000. And in 2008, 55 percent of all OFDA funding went to
INGOs, with 57 percent in 2007 and 2006, and 60 percent in 20042. A significant share of
OFDA funding is also channeled through UN agencies, the USAID and other USG
agencies. It is quite possible that some of these organizations ultimately channel some of
this money through INGOs. As a result, in addition to undertaking independent charitable
endeavors, INGOs also serve as the official operational arms of government, and
multilateral assistance agencies such as the World Bank, and IMF (Forman and Stoddard
2003; Lancaster 2007).
This heightened visibility of, and demand for, INGOs in the international public
policy arena has been attributed to a number of factors including the post-Cold War
proliferation of complex humanitarian emergencies, the failures of government-togovernment aid, and the ineffectiveness and waste associated with multilateral
organizations such as the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Stoddard 2002a;
Stoddard 2002b; Forman and Stoddard 2003; Grossrieder 2003). As organizations that lie
between the state and market, INGOs have historically been regarded as apolitical
entities, though their roles have had significant political implications for both
international and domestic politics (Ahmed and Potter 2006).

2

Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2006, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
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The concept of the third sector is also consistent with the de Tocquevilleian view
of democratic participation in that ordinary citizens voluntarily organize into selfgoverning, private associations that are seen to be separate from government, in order to
participate in the political economy. In this regard, INGOs are widely recognized as “the
chief representatives of and spokespersons for global civil society, and play an important
role in the global governance” (Boli 2006). In other words, INGOs are viewed as the
principal instruments or mechanisms through which “world citizens” act collectively, to
organize, shape, and express world opinion in the global public sphere, as well as foster a
global civic culture (Boli 2006).
The work of INGOs therefore, is seen to influence and shape the policy decisions
of nations, international organizations and transnational corporations. Consequently,
INGOs have come to be regarded as vehicles for „democratization‟ and hence, a critical
component of a flourishing „civil society.‟ Normatively speaking, INGOs are expected to
act as a counterbalance to state power by encouraging participative notions of democracy
and promoting pluralism. In other words, INGOs are viewed as distinctive institutions
that exhibit motivations and structural preferences distinct from government or the
private sector.
Another unique feature of INGOs is that they are funded through a variety of
mechanisms – some with a few funders and others with many, some with restrictive
contracts, and others with more flexibility. For example, in 2003, 71 percent of the U.S.
INGOs‟ revenue came from private contributions, 20 percent from government grants, 6
percent from program services and 3 percent was labeled as „other‟ (National Center for
Charitable Statistics as cited in Kerlin 2006). In 2005, based on the 496 U.S. based
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INGOs registered with the USAID, 80 percent of INGOs‟ total support and revenue came
from private support i.e., in-kind, and private contributions and private revenue, 10
percent from the USAID (which include freight, donated food, grants and contracts) and
another 10 percent from other support i.e., other U.S. government contracts, grants, other
governments and international organizations (USAID 2007).
The exchange relationships between INGOs and government have been
characterized by increasing bilateralization, that is, more and more funds being channeled
for specific countries and for specific purposes and less as unrestricted grants (Randel
and German 2002; Forman and Stoddard 2003; Lancaster 2007). As such, the concern
remains that government funders can “choose to dictate where and how their
contributions are spent” thus undermining INGOs‟ operational autonomy. The same can
be said about foundation and corporate donors as well. Such resource and power
asymmetry may adversely affect the flexibility of INGOs and their ability to distribute
resources according to their own conceptualizations of need (Randel and German 2002).
The impact of the delicate dance with government, especially on the autonomy of
INGOs is one that is not well understood. Much of the debate surrounding governmentINGO interaction has largely consisted of an ideological discussion about the ideal role
of government in responding to society‟s economic and social needs. Advocates of a
minimal government role in such matters have called for strict severance between
government and nonprofit organizations, thus championing the nonprofit sector as the
ideal mechanism for responding to social and economic needs. Proponents of a large
government presence champion the role of the welfare state, while downplaying the
significance of nonprofit organizations. As Gronbjerg and Salamon (2003) point out,
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neither side shows interest in the realities of government-nonprofit collaboration on the
ground.
The empirical side of government-nonprofit interaction is also fraught with its
own confusion and misconceptions given the range of arenas such interactions can occur
(Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003). For instance, the government spending arena is one
where its spending decisions indirectly affect nonprofit organizations by affecting the
need for nonprofit services, and directly – since government is a significant source of
nonprofit revenue. Other arenas include, direct and indirect influences through taxation
policies, government regulations and the broader policies that government pursues such
as the USG foreign policy (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003).
Thus a research focus on the influence of government funding on INGO
autonomy can contribute to the debate surrounding this “conflict that has long existed
between the ideological or normative perception of government-nonprofit relations and
the empirical or factual perception” (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003). Such a focus
provides some insight on the direct impact of government spending decisions on INGO
autonomy.

1.3 Dimensions of Organizational Autonomy
While the questions of INGO autonomy are not new, the nonprofit sector
literature fails to provide a concise definition of what organizational autonomy is. This is
not to say that the literature does not suggest potential descriptors or measures of
organizational autonomy. To cite one example, Smith (1993) states that inherent
government funding restrictions reduce the autonomy INGOs have in setting their own
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agenda, as well as affect their operations, especially with regard to the services they
provide and the clients they serve. This observation actually refers to what Verhoest,
Peters et al. (2004) have labeled operational autonomy.
The two-tier conceptualization of organizational autonomy postulated by
Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004), regards “organizational autonomy” first as, the extent of an
organization‟s decision-making competencies. This encompasses: 1) Managerial autonomy: This refers to the degree to which an agency‟s
decision making competencies about the choice and use of inputs are
delegated from a centralized location. In the case of INGOs, this research
considers the funding sources as the centralized location. Managerial
autonomy comes in two forms, that is, with respect to: a. Financial management – making changes to budgets
b. Human resources – making employees selection decisions
2) Operational or policy autonomy: This pertains to the extent to which an
organization can take decisions about processes, procedures, policy
instruments, target groups and societal objectives and outcomes.

Organizational autonomy is also defined in terms of the constraints that may
impede the implementation of an organization‟s decision making competencies
(Verhoest, Peters et al. 2004; Braadbaart, Van-Eybergen et al. 2007). According to
Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004), autonomy is also defined as the “exemption of constraints
on the actual use of decision making competencies. This formulation comprises four
types of autonomy: -
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1) Financial autonomy: The degree of an INGO‟s financial dependence on its
funders (e.g., the share of government, corporate, or foundation funding)
2) Structural autonomy: The degree to which an organization is shielded from
influence from funding sources through lines of hierarchy and accountability
or the board structure.
3) Legal autonomy: The extent to which agencies are legally protected from
government interference.
4) Interventional autonomy: The extent to which an agency is free from ex post
accountability requirements, and threats of sanctions.

Constraints therefore include ex ante controls such as the formulation of rules,
instructions, conditions or standards that provide direction for INGOs thus steering them
toward the desired policy goals of the funders. Such controls influence how the provided
financial inputs are to be utilized. Constraints also consist of ex post controls, which take
the form of accountability demands placed on INGOs to verify whether the a priori preset
goals were achieved. The existence of ex ante and ex post controls therefore provides the
thread used to trace whether INGOs fulfilled preset donor goals.
The above observations also highlight a key underlying character of the concept
of organizational autonomy which I believe is critical to this research. Similar to
measuring concepts such as “quality of life,” “organizational morale,” or “extraordinary
intelligence” (Borsboom, Mellenbergh et al. 2003), the concept of “organizational
autonomy” needs to be regarded as a latent variable, one that is unobserved but can only
be inferred from observing other variables or indicators that are observable and can be
directly measured.
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In this case, the presence of observable ex ante budget rules and regulations or the
fact that an INGO is 95 percent dependent on a single funding source, could all be
perceived as indicators of an INGO‟s loss of autonomy. As a result, a causal relationship
is assumed to exist between an observable variable or concept (e.g., ex ante rules and
requirements on the expenditure of federal funding) and an unobservable variable or
concept such as operational autonomy (Borsboom, Mellenbergh et al. 2003). For this
reason, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between “autonomy” (as having actual
decision making competencies) and the “mechanisms” that may influence that autonomy,
i.e., constraints on autonomy.
In light of these definitions, government-INGO exchange relationships can be
regarded as being concerned about “the particular objectives that an actor seeks to
achieve through interacting with others,” this is likely to include officially stated goals as
well as hidden ones (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Constraints on the other hand relate “to
the levers that an actor (e.g., funding sources) may use to control or influence [the
behavior of] other actors (e.g., INGOs)…” (Hulme and Edwards 1997), and these include
persuasion by the use of argument (Majone 1989; Salamon 2002a), and offering financial
incentives or direct coercion (Schneider and Ingram 1990; Hulme and Edwards 1997).
In some ways, the goal of ensuring that nonprofit organizations are accountable
has resulted in expanded monitoring, evaluation and reporting obligations; mechanisms
which could be regarded as types of constraints or controls. And by regarding
interventional constraints as ex post accountability requirements and threats of sanctions;
it is clear that INGOs‟ autonomy can be undermined through such interventional means.
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As a result, a discourse about INGO autonomy in the context of funding must include a
dialogue about INGO accountability.

1.4 The Complexity of INGO Accountability
Accountability motivates a scenario where “an actor is accountable when that
actor recognizes that it has made a promise to do something and accepted a moral and
legal responsibility to do its best to fulfill that promise” (Brown and Moore 2001). In
Goetz and Jenkins‟ (2002) words, “accountability describes a relationship where A is
accountable to B if A is obliged to explain and justify his actions to B, or if A may suffer
sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for it, is found wanting by B.” In light of the
notion that accountability is not only relational (Cutt and Murray 2000; Ebrahim 2003a),
it is also “a relationship of power” (Goetz and Jenkins 2002), where one party allocates
responsibility and another accepts it with an undertaking to report on or render on
account for that responsibility (Cutt and Murray 2000). Thus a conversation about
government-INGO relations cannot take place without at least a cursory glance at the link
between accountability demands by government and INGO autonomy.
Increased accountability demands on INGOs have been attributed to three factors;
INGOs‟ increased prominence, attraction of more funding from various sources, and
increased influence in promoting and shaping social, economic and political development
in the international polity, (Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003a; Bendell 2006;
Jordan and Tuijl 2006). As a result, different stakeholders place different accountability
demands on INGOs, which can pose challenges when the expectations and accountability
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claims of various stakeholders misalign, creating a situation where an INGO may have to
choose whose claims it can honor (Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003a).
For instance, in upward accountability, funders such as government, corporations
and foundations, expect INGOs “to be accountable for the integrity, efficiency, and
impacts of programs that they have funded,” that is, “for the proper handling of donated
resources” (Brown and Moore 2001). Funders expect INGOs to live up to their promise
in realizing the agreed-upon goals upon which the partnership is based. In downward
accountability, INGOs‟ beneficiaries expect INGOs “to live up to their rhetoric about
fostering locally determined development rather than imposing their own priorities”
(Brown and Moore 2001).
Closely related to autonomy is that INGOs cannot always challenge those who
provide the funds for their programs because they run the risk of alienating themselves
from their funders. In spite of such risks, Oxfam America refused to accept government
funding for fear that the latter would impose its purposes on the organization. This draws
our attention to the possibility of stakeholders like government exerting different degrees
of power on INGOs in an attempt to advance their own agendas (Brown and Moore
2001). In this case, INGOs‟ autonomy is compromised through a process sometimes
called “cooptation” – a deflection of the original purposes of INGOs (Kramer 1985;
Smith and Lipsky 1993; Young 1999; Cutt and Murray 2000; Najam 2000; Ebrahim
2003a; Young 2006).
While the above seems to suggest that accountability demands may vary by
funding source, accountability also varies by the type of tool used to transfer various
resources to INGOs. For instance, grants impose very general and broad accountability
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demands on INGOs, while contracts are usually far more exacting and precise. In
addition, accountability demands may also vary by other dimensions such as outcomes,
activities, or outputs (Cutt and Murray 2000; Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003b).
According to Ebrahim (2003a; 2003b), regulators and funders typically operationalize
accountability largely through external oversight, dominated by mechanisms of
accounting for funds allocation and utilization, and such accountability mechanisms are
usually biased in favor of the funders.
In organizational autonomy terms, accountability demands can be translated into
ex post or interventional constraints on INGOs. In other words, the requirement for ex
post accountability acts as a burden of proof placed upon INGOs to verify whether the
funders‟ a priori preset goals were achieved, that is, to account for funds allocation and
utilization with respect to the agreed upon goals (similar to functional accountability
described below). As suggested above, ex ante and ex post controls are thus utilized to
trace whether INGOs fulfilled or deviated from the preset goals.
The notion that accountability varies with different dimensions brings us to
question the normative assumptions upon which the practice of accountability is
predicated. Ebrahim (2003a) notes that heightened accountability concerns have resulted
in increased oversight and INGO regulation. Bendell (2006) regards accountability as a
bureaucratic hurdle, and at worst, a threat to the achievement of INGO missions.
However, how much accountability is sufficient and how much is “too much” remains
elusive (Ebrahim 2003a).
Similar to the concept of organizational autonomy, the concept of accountability
may have been narrowly viewed as one-dimensional concept of oversight. However, that
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is but one facet of a complex multi-dimensional concept of accountability (Cutt and
Murray 2000; Ebrahim 2003a; Ebrahim 2003b). Other dimensions of accountability
include: External accountability: When those outside the organization hold the
organization responsible for its actions, inspired by an obligation to meet
externally prescribed standards of behavior.
Internal accountability: When the organization takes the initiative to hold
itself responsible for its programs, inspired by a felt responsibility towards
mission accomplishment.
Strategic accountability: This is when an INGO accounts for the impact its
activities have had on other organization and the wider environment.
Functional accountability: This is concerned with “accounting for
resources, resource use, and immediate impact” (Ebrahim 2003b)

Chisolm (1995) also adds a legal dimension to accountability. This is concerned
with “either an obligation to meet prescribed standards of behavior or an obligation to
disclose information about one‟s actions even in the absence of a prescribed standard.”
This type of accountability presents threats of legal action should a nonprofit fail to meet
the legal obligation, quite similar to legal constraints defined under autonomy. For
INGOs such legal obligations arrive by virtue of entering into legal binding relationships
with funders.
With regard to government funding, the use of legal instruments such as grants,
contracts or cooperative agreements, imposes legal obligations on INGOs to meet
prescribed standards of behavior or goals stipulated in those agreements. There are other
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legal obligations that nonprofits in general have to meet without necessarily entering into
an exchange relationship with government. Such obligations include, filing a 990 tax
form annually, ensuring public access to 990 forms, and the requirement that nonprofit
organizations with a 501(c) (3) tax exempt status not participate in substantial political
campaign or substantial lobbying (Grobman 2007). Failure to abide by these regulations
may result in a loss of tax exempt status.
However, not all accountability demands negatively impact the autonomy of an
INGO; as Brown and Moore (2001) pointed out, as long as an INGO‟s structures and
accountability systems “are aligned with its mission [as defined by the INGO leadership],
the demands for accountability will neither reduce an [INGO‟s] autonomy nor alter its
purposes.” What remains clear is that, decisions by INGOs to embrace or resist a
stakeholder‟s demands for accountability can have profound impacts on their missions,
strategies, and operations. Overall, accountability demands seem to act as some type of
ex post constraints on INGOs‟ activities thus impacting INGOs‟ operational autonomy
and managerial autonomy with respect to financial management.

1.5 Theoretical Frameworks: Resource Dependence and Tool Choice
A number of theoretical lenses can be used to investigate the nature of the
relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy. For example, the neoinstitutional theory with its focus on institutional isomorphism, contends that the success
of an organization is based on the degree to which it responses and adapts to external
forces within its environment. This framework focuses on organizational field as a unit of
analysis, thus taking into account all the relevant actors in a given institution‟s life in its
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totality (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These authors define organizational fields as the
“key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other
organizations that produce similar services or products.” As a result, this theoretical
framework can be used to explain the homogeneity that may exist among organizations
operating within the same organizational fields.
This research however seeks to understand how different funding sources, and in
particular, the influence of one‟s level of dependence on USG funding on an INGO‟s
autonomy. As such variation in the degree to which funding sources impact the autonomy
of INGOs and not homogeneity, is of interest here, hence the adoption of resource
dependence theory. A fundamental premise of resource dependence theory is that,
organizations lacking in resources will establish relationships with others, in order to
obtain the resources they need (Pfeffer and Salancik‟s 2003). This theory allows one to
focus on the variations in the impact funders have on organizational autonomy by
focusing one‟s attention on the individual exchange environments within which INGOs
operate in. This is important given the belief that government-INGO exchange
relationships are dominated by repression and rivalry owing to the power and resource
advantage enjoyed by government (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smith 1993; Atmar 2001).
According to Pfeiffer and Salancik (2003) resource dependence theory characterizes
associations between organizations as a set of power relations based on resource
exchange.
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) define an organization as a “coalition of groups and
interests, each attempting to obtain something from the collectivity by interacting with
others, and each with its own preferences and objectives.” Hence both funding sources
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and INGOs have their own preferences and objectives. Of interest to this research is how
those interests, preferences, and objectives are articulated. Viewing organizations as
coalitions of groups and interests also draws our attention to the boundaries of an
organization, as being defined by the work it does, and most importantly, by the extent to
which the organization has discretion – influence and control over what it does i.e., its
activities (March and Simon 1958; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Somewhat resembling
DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) institutional isomorphism, organizations resemble
coalitions changing their structure and patterns of behavior to attract and maintain the
much needed resources, thus modifying their power relative to funding organizations
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). This suggests a disproportionate dependence of INGOs on
those organizations that control the strategic resources that they need to carry out their
missions (Gronbjerg 1993; Mudambi and Pedersen 2007). For example, funding sources
may influence the way INGOs delivers services (Smith 1993; Chang and Tuckman 1994;
Smith 2006).
As such, the funding environment of nonprofits, owing to the funding acquisition
uncertainties associated with responding to requests for proposals (RFPs) and agreements
(RFAs), may affect the power and autonomy of nonprofits (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).
In other words, responding to an RFA or RFP does not necessary secure funding. In
actuality, the funding environment is characterized by strong competition for grants from
other INGOs and competition for contracts from other INGOs, as well as corporations.
Resource dependence therefore, recognizes that the funding environment and context
within which organizations exist and compete for resources may influence how they
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operate by way of influencing INGOs‟ decision making competencies (Verhoest, Peters
et al. 2004).
Resource dependence also rests on the following assumptions; first, organizations
are assumed to consist of emergent internal and external coalitions. Such coalitions
emerge from social exchanges that are formed in order to influence and control the
behavior of others (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). And as indicated above, a second premise
is that, the environments within which organizations operate are assumed to contain
scarce resources which are critical for their survival, thus creating a measure of
uncertainty among dependent organizations. Disaster relief and assistance INGOs, like
other nonprofit organizations, operate in a resource-scarce environment such that they
rely on a variety of funding sources such as, individual, government, corporations,
foundations, other governments and international organizations (e.g., the UN and the
African Bank), to fund their missions. In light of these resource pressures, together with
the shifting nature of humanitarian problems and assistance around the globe, as well as
shifting policies governing their operations, INGOs face uncertainties and instabilities
which may impact their decision making.
Finally, resource dependency theory assumes that organizations work toward two
related objectives – that is, acquiring control over resources that maximize their
autonomy or independence from other organizations, or minimizing their dependence on
other organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Ulrich and Barney 1984; Pfeffer and
Salancik 2003). In this regard, one could argue that INGOs may choose to increase their
resource dependence on a variety of funding sources by diversifying their funding
portfolios, thus relying less on a single funding source (Gronbjerg 1993; Chang and
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Tuckman 1994). Alternatively, INGOs could maximize the dependence of those that fund
them by increasing their competitive advantage in a particular field.
Using this lens therefore, helps to appreciate the funding environment in which
INGOs exists, while allowing an investigation of the factors through which INGOs‟
autonomy is undermined, as well as the mechanisms INGOs use to maximize their
autonomy. Note that „interdependence” in and of itself does not automatically translate
into autonomy loss; it does however, impact “the ability of [an] organization to achieve
its desired outcomes” especially when that interdependence is asymmetrical (Pfeffer and
Salancik 2003). Resource dependence theory suggests that increased financial interdependency of INGOs on other organizations may reduce INGOs‟ control and decision
making autonomy (Provan 1982).
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) identify three critical factors that increase the
dependence or vulnerability of an organization to extra-organizational influence and
control;
1. First, the importance of the resources to an INGO determines its level of
dependence on a particular source. This is determined by;
a. The relative magnitude of the exchange or the proportion or share of
revenue coming from a particular source, measured by the degree to
which an INGO is dependent on a dominant funding source relative to
other funding sources.
b. The criticality of the resource, measured by the extent to which the INGO
can survive or function in the absence of revenue support from a particular
funding source.
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All these factors may determine the degree to which INGOs exist in asymmetrical
net exchanges where funding sources enjoy a power advantage over them. For example,
an INGO that is 100 percent government funded may not be in a position to challenge the
government since all its activities are government funded.
2. An organization‟s dependence on its environment is also influenced by the
availability of alternative funding sources. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) point out that,
access to alternative resources can be constrained through;
a. Rules and regulations that may restrict access to other sources;
b. The number of available sources; and
c. The size or importance of the alternatives.
As such, control over resource concentration or having input transactions made by
relatively few organizations or a single significant organization may facilitate the creation
of organizational resource dependence.

3. Organizational dependence is also determined by the extent of the funding
source’s discretion over resource ownership, allocation, and use. Having such
discretion, influence and control is based on;
a. Resource ownership: This is based on the assumption that whoever
possesses the resource has power over how that resource is allocated and
utilized;
b. The ability to control the actual use of the resources: This is concerned
with the degree to which an INGO has control over how donated resources
are utilized. In other words, controlling the actual use of the resource by
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the funder yield less INGO discretion over how those resources are
ultimately utilized and therefore what gets done.
Finally, organizational dependence comes about when
c. Rules are used to regulate resource ownership, allocation and use: The
presence and actual enforcement of such rules for example, determines the
degree to which an INGO becomes dependent on its funders.
For example, in an informal conversation, one INGO employee complained that
receiving U.S. government funding through what he referred to as the “Buy America”
clauses – (referring to The Fly America Act and the Eligibility Rules for Goods and
Services Clause); restricted USG-funded INGOs from utilizing cheaper or alternative
modes of transportation or sources of inputs (e.g., the requirement to purchase only U.S.
manufactured vehicles, or the requirement to use only U.S. shipping companies to
transport goods and other commodities). In light of these observations, the more an
organization is self-contained or self-sufficient i.e., less interdependent, the more likely it
is to influence and control its own activities. This is simply not the case with many
INGOs, let alone many nonprofit organizations.
Evidence from the literature suggests that funding sources have been able to exert
influence on resource allocation, and use through regulations and conditionalities
embedded within contracts and grants (e.g., Provan 1982; Schneider and Ingram 1990;
Salamon 2002a; 2002b; Shaikh and Casablanca 2008). Additional examples of such
rules, regulations, and conditionalities include the Anti-Prostitution Pledge, which
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requires that INGOs adopt explicit anti-prostitution policies and language in their
programming, and The Mexico City Policy (also known and the “Global Gag Rule3”),
which “denies U.S. family planning funding to any organization that performs, collects
data on, provides referrals for, or advocates legal changes for abortions” (Jacobson 2007).
There is also evidence to suggest that the broad policy language of such
regulations and conditionalities actually curtails INGO autonomy. For instance, INGOs
operating in Cambodia “discontinued plans to provide English language training classes
for people working in the commercial sex sector for fear that such programs would be
interpreted as promoting prostitution” (Jacobson 2005). And in Jamaica, health workers
working with men and women in prostitution expressed concern over the restrictions‟
capacity to limit their ability to support people working in the commercial sex sector, let
alone, gain their trust without exacerbating their stigma and discrimination (Jacobson
2005). These examples also indicate that attaching such conditionalities to funding
constrain INGOs‟ ownership over funding, which in turn undercuts the INGOs‟ capacity
to allocate those resources.
The second theoretical framework utilized in this research is the tool choice
approach postulated by Salamon (2002a). Although INGOs themselves can be viewed as
the policy tools of government (Salamon 1995; Forman and Stoddard 2003), the policy
tool choice view also offers an interesting framework for understanding the nuances of
the government-INGO exchange relationship. Of particular interest to this research is the

3

This legislation was first announced in 1984 by President Ronald Reagan. It was then rescinded by
President Bill Clinton in 1993, but reinstated by President George W. Bush in 2001. According to
Jacobson, the Bush Administration threatened to expand the Global Gag Rule to include international
HIV/AIDS programs, but withdrew the threat.
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proposition that government policy tools are selected on the basis of the kinds of
behaviors they intend to induce (Schneider and Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002a). This
approach assumes that public policies are designed to generate specific kinds of
behaviors from people (or organizations) who otherwise would not have exhibited those
desired specific kinds of behaviors on their own accord (Schneider and Ingram 1990;
Salamon 2002a). This „new governance” approach shifts the unit of analysis from
specific programs to “tools” or “instruments” used to achieve public purposes by
suggesting that regardless of programs, each tool would have similar effects (Salamon
2002a).
Salamon (2002a) draws a distinction between tools, programs and policies. For
instance, tools are embodied in programs, implying that a single tool can be used in
different programs, and policies are viewed as collections of different programs aimed at
some general objective or operating in a similar field (Salamon 2002a). A central
hypothesis of the tools approach is that particular tools convey similar pressures and have
similar operating requirements regardless of where they happen to be applied.
It has also been argued that policy tools such grants, contracts, food aid, and
cooperative agreements, also define the set of actors engaged in the crucial
implementation phase of programs, the roles they play, and the nature of the activities a
program involves (Brown and Moore 2001; Salamon 2002a). Tool choice, not only
influences the outcome of the process; it is also profoundly political in that specific tools
provide certain actors with an advantage in determining how policies or programs are
executed, how discretion is to be utilized, and ultimately whose interests will be served
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(Schneider and Ingram 1990; Peters 2002; Salamon 2002a; Stoddard 2002b; Schneider
and Ingram 2005; Lancaster 2007).
For example, although grants and cooperative agreements are essentially very
similar, a key distinction exists. The USAID‟s Glossary of Automated Directives System
(2009) defines cooperative agreements as legally binding instruments were the principal
purpose is to “transfer money or property, services or anything of value to the recipient in
order to accomplish a public purpose of support authorized by the federal statute and
where substantial involvement by USAID is anticipated.” As a result, such a funding tool
provides government with a discretionary advantage over INGOs.
Basically, “each …tool has its own distinctive features, skills requirements,
operating procedures, and asset of institutional relationships” (Salamon 2002a). This
suggests that the vehicles used to transfer funding to INGOs all “permit very different
levels of government authority and control” over how those resources are utilized (Shaikh
and Casablanca 2008). Shaikh and Casablanca (2008) also assert that the closer
development assistance funding is tied to the U.S. foreign policy, the more likely that
government will desire control over how those funds are spent and would prefer to use
the contract mechanism to achieve its objectives. As a result, contracts are deemed more
effective for financing programs where the government requires greater “control over
results; greater accountability and transparency; more opportunities for competition; and
an equally cost-effective result” (Shaikh and Casablanca 2008).
The tool choice approach also suggests that two layers of tools are at the disposal
of government. First, INGOs themselves can be viewed as public policy tools especially
when nonprofits are viewed from a privatization or contracting-out perspective compared
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to direct provision of goods and services by government (Salamon 1995; Forman and
Stoddard 2003). This is consistent with the “reinvention of government” (Osborne and
Gaebler 1992) and “hollow state” paradigms (Milward and Provan 2000) which argue
that the popularity of the nonprofit form as a policy implementing tool emerged in
response to government and market failures (Weisbrod 1977; Hansmann 1980; Fama and
Jensen 1983). As illuminated above however, not only is the nonprofit form a policy tool
in and of itself, but the different ways in which INGOs are funded represent yet another
set of policy tools available to the government.

1.5.1

Understanding Policy Tools: Contracts, Grants and Cooperative Agreements
INGOs are funded through a variety of sources, including, individual

contributions, foundations, government, corporations, international organizations (e.g.,
UN agencies; World Bank), in-kind gifts and other governments (Forman and Stoddard
2002; USAID 2007). While public funding in the 1960s and 1970s spurred the growth of
the nonprofit sector, there was also a notable decline in discretionary grants and contract
spending (Smith 1993; Gronbjerg and Salamon 2002). Coupled with these changes is a
notable growth in regulatory pressures from government to discourage nonprofit
advocacy, and “other mission-critical nonprofit functions” such as nonprofit commitment
to serve the greatest need, and values that emphasize quality and community benefit over
efficiency and responsiveness to market pressures (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2002).
Kerlin (2006a) underscores three forms of government financing for INGOs, that
is, contracts, grants and cooperative agreements. The USAID for example, tends to
provide funding to INGOs through grants more than contracts. Note however that USAID
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Volag reports lump grants and cooperative agreements together, perhaps credence to the
fear of a blurring of funding tools Kendall and Knapp (1997) suggested below. In the
1997 fiscal year, 61 percent of INGOs‟ funding was channeled through grants (compared
to 18 percent in contracts). In the 2002 fiscal year 86 percent of USAID support came in
the form of grants (compared to 14 percent in contracts). And in the 2004 fiscal year, 68
percent of USAID support came in the form of grants (compared to 8 percent in
contracts)4. This is in addition to other forms of government funding such as nonmonetary supports like food aid and freight.
Kelman (2002) and DeHoog and Salamon (2002) identify two types of contracts,
a procurement contract and one that entails the purchase-of-services for the recipients
rather than for the government‟s own use. A procurement contract is analogous to a
private sector business arrangement and is used to purchase or lease property or services
for the direct benefit of the federal government, in exchange for money (Kelman 2002;
Kerlin 2006a; USAID 2009a). Essentially, an INGO makes a promise to provide certain
services, in exchange for money (DeHoog and Salamon 2002).
Unlike “contracting for the procurement of products and services used directly by
government,” a purchase-of-service contract entails the delivery of government-funded
services by INGOs to external recipients (DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002). As
such, this is an agreement by which INGOs are enlisted by government to deliver
services to particular clients (DeHoog and Salamon 2002). Given their high level of
output specificity, contracts tend to be coercive, allowing less discretion in full and open

4

Source: USAID Volag Reports for 1997, 2004, and 2006.
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competition, and in some sense “involve a voluntary incursion of obligations in exchange
for compensation” (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002;
Kerlin 2006a).
Grants, on the other hand, are payments to INGOs by government as a gift to
either foster or support some activity (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002). They are
used to “transfer resources where there is considerable freedom for the recipient to pursue
an agreed-upon program and substantial involvement, that is, the participation or
intervention of the sponsoring government agency is not expected” (Kerlin 2006a;
USAID 2009). Unlike contracts, grants tend to be relatively non-coercive, leaving
considerable leeway over the operation of programs (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and
Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; Kerlin 2006a). However, “the increased specificity through
the replacement of grants with contracts, will threaten to undermine the autonomy” of
those INGOs receiving a substantial amount of government funding through grants
(Kendall and Knapp 1997). On the other hand, “cooperative agreements are a means of
transferring resources to recipient providers, though recipients can expect involvement of
the sponsoring government agency during project implementation” (Kerlin 2006a;
USAID 2009).
As a result, the relationship between each funding tools and autonomy is mediated
by the coerciveness and directness of the tool itself. A tool (e.g., grant) is said to be
coercive when it restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to discouraging the
behavior, and direct when “the authorization, funding, and execution of the tool are all
carried out by essentially the same entity,” in this case by government (Salamon 2002a).
For example, in reference to Table 1 below, coercive funding tools like contracts, tend to
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be associated with high degree of specificity in terms of the input use, programming, and
clients to be served (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; Smith 2006; Shaikh and
Casablanca 2008); as a result, they yield less autonomy to INGOs compared to grants for
example. There are two additional characteristics of tools – automaticity and visibility
which I do not address the in this research due to an inability to observe them.

Table 1: Taxonomy of Government Funding and INGO Autonomy
Degree of INGO Autonomy
Low

Medium- to-High

High
CONTRACTS
Constraints or
Controls on
Decision
Making

Medium

COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS
GRANTS

Low

Table 1 therefore posits a relationship between government funding and INGO
autonomy predicated on the constraints embedded in the different government funding
tools. This suggests that specific funding mechanisms yield varying levels of autonomy
because of the controls embedded in them. Bear in mind however that this taxonomy may
only be limited to United States government-INGO relations since government-nonprofit
relations vary widely across different countries. For example, funding from the
Scandinavian governments is less restrictive than funding from the U.S. government, in
terms of how and where funds can be utilized (ODI 1995).
Embedded in the above view is that, while government funding may be used to
attract INGOs to provide particular kinds of services or to implement particular kinds of
policies on their behalf, the variations in the mechanisms through which funding is
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provided (that is, contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, as well as other funding
mechanisms) in and of themselves, also serve as tools to coerce and determine specific
kinds of behaviors and relationships from INGOs. In this light, a double-layered
relationship exists in that, while the „willingness‟ of government to support INGOs may
symbolically foster a co-productive or participatory behavior or relationship (Edelman
1985; Schneider and Ingram 2005) on the part of INGOs, the very character of each
funding mechanism ensures that the strategic institutional interests and preferences of the
government are met, thus differentially influencing INGO autonomy.
Salamon (2002a) also underscores a very important observation, that in reality
any given tool is more of a „package‟ that contains many different elements, that is, a
type of good or activity; a delivery vehicle for the good or activity; a delivery system that
is, a set of organizations that are engaged in providing the good, service, or activity; and
a set of formal or informal rules defining the relationship among the entities in the
delivery system. So for as example, a cooperative agreement between an INGO and the
USAID would be regarded as a package in the sense that, first the agreement defines the
type of activity to be provided, that is, funding is transferred to an INGO to provide
support for a defined program (e.g., an alternative agricultural program in Afghanistan).
The INGO, with the substantial involvement of USAID would deliver these activities
through the vehicle of a specified educational farming program. USAID expects the
INGO to request approval for all its implementation plans and workplans, including all
revisions and changes made to this package prior to implementation. If the INGO
decides to sub-contact parts of the project, USAID approval would have to be sought
before this decision can be finalized.
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The description of contracts, grants and cooperative agreements provided above
suggests that government funding involves constraints that limit the spending discretion
of INGOs, as well as other operational decisions in unique ways. For instance, given that
government contracts are more exacting and that they are utilized to provide funding to
nonprofits through the purchase of specific kinds of services, contracts are less likely to
grant high levels of operational or policy autonomy (Kendall and Knapp 1997; Young
2000; DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002; Kerlin 2006a). As such, relative to
grants, contracts allow less autonomy (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and Conlan 2002).
The limited constraints or controls embedded in grants and cooperative agreements on the
other hand allow higher levels of autonomy since they leave room for INGOs discretion
over operational decisions (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kerlin 2006a).
As noted by Robinson (1997), “involvement in project implementation and
service delivery through contracting can [divert] INGOs from their primary objectives
and compromise their autonomy.” As such, because contracts involve more controls, they
are likely to yield less autonomy to INGOs, compared to cooperative agreements and
grants. Cooperative agreements are also presumed to yield much less autonomy than
grant due the substantial intervention and participation by government.
U.S. government funding however was not as strict and regulated as it is today. In
the 1950s, “federal and state contracts and grants lacked stringent guidelines and
regulations” (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; Smith 2006). In trying to
“rationalize” the size of service system the government was financing, as well as ensure
accountability for expenditure of public funds, did the regulations governing contracts
become stringent (Smith 2006). Beyond accounting for expenditures, government
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regulations have also had an impact on the internal allocations of funds by nonprofits in
that “contract requirements greatly limit nonprofits‟ flexibility in appropriately meeting
client needs and responding to unexpected developments” (Smith 2006).
It is also important to recognize that government typically provides funding on a
project-by-project basis and hence, INGOs may have a reasonable expectation of secure
funding from year to year, even in the face of the application-and-approval ritual (Smillie
1993). From an organizational autonomy perspective however, tedious application-andapproval rituals may exist as ex ante controls used to manipulate the processes, policy
instruments, outputs or outcomes and the performance of INGOs (Verhoest, Peters et al.
2004).
Perhaps a strong rationale for this research is provided by resource dependence‟s
underlying premise that the organization‟s external social context i.e., those in an interdependent relationship with the INGO, accounts for its activities and outcomes (Pfeffer
and Salancik 2003). This prompts an investigation of INGO autonomy within the context
of its external funding environment. As Pffeffer and Salancik (2003) point out, an
“organization ends where its discretion ends…” as such, an INGO‟s relative influence
and control over its activities defines its boundaries or sphere of influence, that is, it
defines where the INGO begins and ends.

1.6 Overview of Research Methodology
Based on resource dependence and tool choice theoretical frameworks posited in
this chapter, two key propositions emerge. First, resource dependence suggests that
receiving a substantial share of financial support from government or any other funding
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source (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) may compromise an INGO‟s autonomy. Second,
different government funding mechanisms, that is, contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements, present their own operating characteristics and programmatic consequences
(Salamon 2002a), they uniquely influence INGOs‟ autonomy since each tool provides a
unique structure within which INGO decision making takes place.
And in response to the question of how government funding influences INGO
autonomy, as well as what strategies INGOs employ to safeguard their autonomy, this
study adopts a qualitative multiple case study methodology. This decision is inspired by a
number of factors. First, understanding “how” organizational autonomy is influenced by
funding not only identifies funding as the context within which autonomy loss takes
place; this also draws our attention to the existence of mechanisms influencing INGOs‟
autonomy. In addition, a qualitative case study methodology provides this research with
tools necessary to study the phenomenon of INGO autonomy within this specified
context of resource dependence and funding tools (Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin
2009).
The use a multiple case study design also has the advantage of enhancing the
credibility of the findings since such a design is considered more robust (Miles and
Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009). By restricting this study to
USG-funded direct relief and development INGOs, affords the advantage of literal
replication in that the study allows one to investigate the influence of government
funding across similar organizations. At the same time, selecting INGOs with disparate
shares of government funding allows significant variation to allow for theoretical
replication (Yin 2003; Yin 2009).
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Finally, the literature has treated the concept of INGO autonomy in such nebulous
terms, making it difficult to identify exactly what “autonomy” really is. A qualitative case
study approach allows enough exploratory room for this research to navigate complex
relationships where not only definitions are unclear, but where there is a scarcity of
literature on the subject. By employing in-depth interviews and drawing from multiple
data sources, the methodology allows one to uncover nuances around this complex
relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy, thus generate a detailed
understanding of government-INGO exchange relationships (Miles and Huberman 1994;
Baxter and Jack 2008).
The remainder of this research is organized as follows; the next chapter provides
an in-depth description of the current state of the literature on government-nonprofit
interactions and the debate surrounding the influence of USG funding on INGO
autonomy. Chapter 3 details the research methodology adopted in this study, the
hypotheses derived from theoretical frameworks and the data collection methods. Chapter
4 showcases the data analysis techniques adopted in this study, as well as the nature of
the data derived from the data analysis. A comparison of the within-case findings to the
hypotheses drawn from resource dependence framework, and a presentation of the crosscase findings with respect to the hypotheses drawn from the tool choice perspectives are
presented in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. And while Chapter 7 discusses some
practical considerations for managing the risk of autonomy loss, Chapter 8 concludes this
research with a review of the key findings and implications for policy, practice and future
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
While INGOs receive their revenue and support from diverse sources, the share of
U.S. Government (USG) funding has increased steadily over the years, compared to
multilateral financing. For instance, U.S. official development assistance jumped from
about $10 billion in 2000 to $16.2 billion in 2003 (Kerlin 2006a). The key rationale
behind the increased government financing of INGOs is linked to the desire for increased
control by the U.S. government, especially in light of the failures of government-togovernment aid and the ineffectiveness and waste associated with multilateral
organizations such as the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Stoddard 2002b;
Lancaster 2007). In particular, the USG “desires accountability, transparency, and a large
measure of substantive and managerial oversight of humanitarian programs” (Stoddard
2002b). In order to establish this control, a wide variety of mechanisms, including
contracts, grants, vouchers, tax exemptions, have been used by government to finance
INGO activities (Salamon 2002a). However, this raises concerns as to how governmental
expectations embedded in these mechanisms influence what INGOs do.
The desire for control over humanitarian programs is attributed to two primary
changes that took place after World War II. First, humanitarian assistance became
politicized in the U.S foreign policy (Atmar 2001; Duffield, Macrae et al. 2001; Fox
2001; Stoddard 2002b). For instance, in response to the complex emergencies of the
1990s (e.g., Sudan Crisis, Kosovo), the USG used humanitarian aid more as a foreign
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policy tool to substitute for direct political involvement (Stoddard 2002b; Drury, Olson et
al. 2005; Lancaster 2007). In these instances, Congress was divided about the appropriate
response and administration was reluctant about deploying U.S. troops in response to
these crises (Stoddard 2002b). In other words, officials spoke of foreign “aid in noncommittal terms, as a policy instrument that can complement, or provide an alternative to,
diplomatic pressure and military action” (Stoddard 2002a).
The second change came in the aftermath of the Rwanda Genocide in 1994 in
response to the poor performance and lack of coordination among NGOs, multilateral and
bilateral agencies (Stoddard 2002b). This resulted in increased demand for accountability
and performance measurement by the U.S. government and other donors by demanding
to see measureable results from their donations and increased oversight of INGO work
(Goyder 1994; Stoddard 2002b; Lancaster 2007).
Yet another recent influence is the new security climate following September 11.
Not only has this strengthened the support for more U.S. control over humanitarian
programs, but it has also served to reinforce the U.S. government‟s bilateral approach,
which is generally targeted towards specific locations and tasks (Randel and German
2002; Stoddard 2002a; Stoddard 2002b; Forman and Stoddard 2003; Lancaster 2007). In
Stoddard‟s (2002b) words, “US humanitarian policy is likely to be increasingly
intertwined with national security objectives: as a legitimizing or public relations
component to military actions, as in Afghanistan; as a political lever for „hearts and
minds‟ campaigns in key regions; and to help shore up unstable states to prevent new
terrorist constituencies and staging-grounds from forming.”
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This chapter reviews the literature on government-INGO relations by outlining
the different typologies of government-INGO relationships. In an effort to showcase the
policy environment INGOs operate in, I describe the character of the U.S. foreign aid
policy and how this policy environment defines government-INGO relationship. I
conclude this chapter by summarizing the debate surrounding government funding and its
impact on INGO.

2.2 Typologies of Government-INGO Relations
A broad range of models have been used to explain the existence of nonprofits as
well as describe the exchange relationship between government and nonprofits.
Economic models attribute the founding of nonprofit organizations to inherent limitations
of government and private markets. The “market failure” view argues for government
provision of collective goods such as clean air, since such goods or services entail “freerider” problems owing to the non-excludable and non-rival nature of collective goods.
Government, as a result of its ability to tax citizens, is in a better position to provide such
goods (Weisbrod 1977).
The efficiency of provision by government is nonetheless constrained by
considerations of equity, given “the need of government officials to treat groups and
individuals fairly,” that is, “defining need in order to allocate resources by criteria
deemed to be fair” (Smith 2006). Efficient government provision has also been
constrained by considerations of majority rule or popular vote such that those programs
or services that fail to attract enough public support become under-provided resulting in
what has been labeled “government failure” (Weisbrod 1977). To address this failure, the
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“third” or nonprofit sector arises when private citizens, using private resources,
voluntarily decide to participate in the political economy by setting up private
organizations to supplement government provision (Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992).
The foregoing “government failure” depiction of the relationship between state
and nonprofits has been criticized for being one-dimensional, characterized by
“competition in which one actor‟s gains are another‟s losses” (Gidron, Kramer et al.
1992). These authors regard the paradigm as positing a misleading picture of a conflicting
rather than cooperative relationship between government and the nonprofit sector. The
competitive paradigm is founded on liberal political philosophy which emphasize
individualism and political liberty in the face of “the overarching power of the state”
(Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992).
Gidron, Kramer et al. (1992) contend that the conflicting relationship relates more
to an ideological rather than real relationship between state and the nonprofit sector.
These authors assert that the nature of government-INGO relationship in reality, varies,
by level of analysis, i.e., by fields of service or by individual organizations. In order to
fully comprehend the character of government-nonprofits relationship, one has to
appreciate that nonprofits have different functions (e.g., service, advocacy, social,
representational) and consequently, they each relate to the state in different ways. For this
reason, this research is restricted to a study of disaster relief and development
international NGOs.
Gidron, Kramer and Salamon‟s (1992) conceptualization of the governmentINGO relationships is one that is closely related to the subject of organizational
autonomy. The authors characterize the relationship between government and INGOs in

41

terms of the level of discretionary power or control over the financing and provisional
functions of any program (see Table 2 below). So in their view, although the state may
provide funding for services, it does not necessarily exert full control over the provision
of the services (Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992). Consistent with a government-INGO
contractual relationship, the fourth column in Table 2 suggests that “collaborative”
relationships occur when the government finances programs provided by INGOs. Thus,
although the government controls the purse-strings, it may also provide nonprofits with
room for discretion or for making autonomous decisions. INGOs may have some
discretion in the management and implementation of government-funded programs
(Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992). However, it is not clear what government control over
finances entails and how that impacts INGO implementation.

Table 2: Models of Government-Third Sector Relations (Gidron, Kramer et al.
1992)
Function
Finance
Provision

Government
Dominant
Government
Government

Dual

Collaborative

Government/Third
Sector
Government/Third
Sector

Government

Third Sector
Dominant
Third Sector

Third Sector

Third Sector

The above model however is not clear about the nature of program management
and implementation discretion when both the government and the nonprofit participate in
the financial support of the program and the provision of service i.e., the dual or paralleltrack model. Gidron, Kramer et al. (1992) however point out that “dual” relationships can
take two forms, that is, nonprofits as “supplementary” to the state, that is, delivering the
same kinds of services to clients not reached by the state or “complementary” – by filling
the needs not met by government. While the model is insightful, it fails to acknowledge
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that though funding may come from government, it comes through funding mechanisms
(i.e., contracts, grants, cooperative agreements) that present unique operating
characteristics and programmatic consequences for the nonprofits (Salamon 2002a). The
model also seems incomplete when we take into account the influence different
government rules, regulations and conditionalities attached to funding have on INGO
service provision or implementation.
Young (2000; 2006) and Najam (2000) provide alternative characterizations of
government-INGO interactions that describe and explain how different kinds of
relationships develop between INGOs and government. According to Young (2000;
2006), the interactions between government and nonprofits are animated by different
theoretical economic strands. Similar to Gidron, Kramer et al. (1992), the “supplementary
model” postulates nonprofits as fulfilling the demand gap for public goods and services
left unsatisfied by the public sector. This is also consistent with the government and
market failure theories. According to the supplementary view, as private financing of
public goods increases, government expenditure is expected to drop. This inverse
relationship implies that as the public sector takes more responsibility for the provision of
public goods, there is a less need for voluntary collective provision. Hence the view
explains the dominance of one type of institutions over another in providing public good
and services.
Also similar to Gidron, Kramer et al.‟s (1992) “collaborative” view, Young‟s
“complementary” model depicts nonprofits as partners to government, carrying out the
delivery of public goods while the government serves as the financing partner. This is
done through contracts and grants. This view is also consistent with Salamon‟s (1995)
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view of nonprofit agencies as implementing partners of government. In this direct
relationship between the state and nonprofits, an increase in government funding results
in increased levels of nonprofit activities. Finally, Young‟s “adversarial model” describes
a reciprocal relationship where the nonprofit push government to make public policy
changes and maintain accountability to the public. In turn, government influences the
behavior of nonprofits through regulation and oversight of its services, as well as
responds to its advocacy initiatives.
Young (2000; 2006) however does not question whether different funding
mechanisms would affect these relationships in different ways. Najam (2000) on the
other hand, bases his Four-C‟s model of government-INGO relations on a theory of
strategic institutional interests. This view regards the emergent relationships between
government and INGOs as a function of whether the goals (ends) and strategies (means)
of government and INGOs converge or diverge (see Table 3). “Cooperative” relationship
exists when there is alignment between the goals and strategies of both parties, while the
relationship becomes “confrontational” when the goals and strategies collide. Najam
(2000) also posits a fifth possibility characterized by non-engagement. This may
exemplified by the decisions of INGOs such as Oxfam America and Direct Relief
International to pass on government funding.
Table 3: Four-C’s Model of NGO-government Relations (Najam 2000)
Goals (ends)
Similar
Preferred
Strategies
(means)

Dissimilar

Similar
COOPERATIVE

CO-OPTATION

COMPLEMENTARY

CONFRONTATION

Dissimilar
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Again the model does not get into detail about how the decision making
competencies of INGOs are influenced when a government-INGO relationship is deemed
complementary or cooperative. In other words, do INGOs have more discretion when
their goals and strategies are similar to those of their state benefactor or when they share
similar strategies but not similar goals? Branching off from Najam‟s (2000) theory of
strategic institutional interests, this research first draws the assumption that government
preferences and interests are articulated through different funding, through different
funding tools. In other words, knowledge about whether an emergent relationship is
cooperative or complementary does not tell us much about the degree to which INGOs‟ is
compromised. This proposition is consistent with Salamon‟s (2002a) and Schneider and
Ingram‟s (1990) suggestion that different policy tools are selected on the basis of the
kinds of behaviors they are intended to induce. In my view, government-INGO autonomy
relationships are probably best understood in the context of funding.
Using a case study approach, Gronbjerg (1993) goes beyond merely providing a
typology of government-INGO relations by examining how different funding
environments and institutional structures influence INGO management tasks. She
examines these through organizational environments, resource dependence and strategic
management lenses. Though referring to domestic nonprofits, Gronbjerg (1993) proposes
a model that defines the distinctive institutional environment within which nonprofits and
government interact (see Table 4 below). The model is defined in terms of the public
sector‟s dependency on nonprofits and the degree of prominence of the proprietary
sector, i.e., private sector providers. As such, the dominance of one type of nonprofit in a
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particular policy arena is influenced by how dominant the private sector is in the same
arena, as well as by the level of public investment or endorsement.
For example, the “cooperation pattern” exists when, because of market or contract
failures, people who want the service cannot afford it, or when the service itself is not
easily standardized, thus creating insufficient incentives to foster the entry of the
proprietary or private sector. Similar to Najam, cooperation between the public and the
nonprofit sector comes about as a result of a shared commitment to substantive goals and
the limited public resources devoted to the issue area (Najam‟s 2000). In the early stages
therefore, the public sector may actually be dependent on the more developed nonprofits
to execute the public mandate. Related to disaster relief and assistance INGOs, this
suggests that the U.S. government may be dependent on INGOs to implement some of its
foreign assistance policies, in return for financial support.

Table 4: Nonprofit Institutional Environments (Gronbjerg 1993)
Dominance of Proprietary Service Sector
No
Public Sector
Dependency
on Nonprofit
Sector

Yes

Yes

COOPERATION
(Social Services)

ACCOMMODATION
(Health)

No

COMPETITION
(Education)

SYMBIOSIS
(Community Development)

Gronbjerg‟s “competitive pattern” arises when the public sector has a strong
vested dominant interest in a particular policy area (e.g., education) and is directly
involved in the delivery of the service. While the public sector‟s strong responsibilities
over the service create barriers to entry of the proprietary sector, the establishment of
direct public services also implies that the public sector is not so dependent on nonprofits
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to implement the services on their behalf. Gronbjerg (1993) envisages a relationship
characterized by an implicit division of labor between nonprofits and public sector. The
competitiveness of the relationship thus arises as a result of a scarcity of resources
(Gronbjerg 1993). Given that the government rarely directly provides humanitarian
assistance (perhaps with the exception of the use of the military in relief aid (Stoddard
2002a)), the competitive pattern however does not seem to describe the relationship that
exists between government and INGOs. However, the situation may change if resources
become more constrained, especially if more of the proprietary sector decides to become
more socially responsible and implement its own social programs (e.g., Coca Cola
implements its own water and sanitation programs in Africa).
The “symbiotic environment” on the other hand emphasizes a co-existent
relationship that ranges from mutual advantage to mutual exploitation. In such an
environment, nonprofits play a specialized role given their inability to compete directly
with either the public or the private sector. In this situation, the only role nonprofits can
play is that of mediation or drawing attention to the decision making process (Gronbjerg
1993). Overall, the model captures key aspects of the organizational funding
environments in which nonprofits operate in the United States, though it does not address
the concept of nonprofit autonomy in detail.
A final government-INGO typology discussed here is one by Coston (1998).
Similar to Najam (2000), Coston (1998) provides a more internationally-oriented model
of government-INGO relationships. Using extensive empirical research, Coston (1998)
created a typology with eight classifications of government-INGO relations predicated on
two dimensions, the power relationship between government and the nonprofit sector,
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and the acceptance or resistance of the sectors to institutional pluralism. The governmentINGO relationship is observed to vary with the degree of the formality of interaction
(shown in Figure 1). As such, an environment with symmetry of power between
government and INGOs and a greater acceptance of institutional pluralism or autonomy
is likely to result in more “complementary” or “collaborative” relationships (Coston
1998). “Collaboration” entails an explicit relationship or partnership between
autonomous actors, where the partnership rests on formal agreements, a balance of power
and an environment characterized by an acceptance of institutional pluralism. In this
environment, INGOs participate in the planning and policy making processes (Coston
1998). The description of government funding tools provided here however, suggests not
so much a partnership but a relationship, were government retains control over INGO
activities.

Resistance to Institutional Pluralism

Repression

Rivalry

Formal/Informal

Competition

Formal

Acceptance of Institutional Pluralism

Contracting

Formal

Third Cooperation
Party

Complementarity

Informal

Asymmetrical Power Relationship
(Government Advantage)

Collaboration

Formal

Symmetrical Power
Relationship

Figure 1: Model of Government-INGO Relationships (Coston 1998)

Conversely, relationships characterized by rivalry or repression emanate from an
environment where there is greater resistance to institutional autonomy and where the
government enjoys greater power at the expense of INGOs. Coston (1998) however,
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notes that it is this relationship that dominates between government and INGOs since the
government enjoys a power and resource advantage over INGOs. Assuming that
government-INGO relationships are rarely based on equal partnership, this may explain
the link between government funding and INGO autonomy loss.
In summary, the models presented above, illuminate that different environmental
and institutional conditions influence the forms of interactions that can emerge between
government and nonprofits (see Table 5). While the different forms of governmentnonprofit interactions articulated in the models share some similarities, inconsistencies
remain as to the key environmental and institutional conditions and factors that influence
the government-nonprofit relations.

Table 5: Summary of the Government-Nonprofit Typologies
Author(s)

Environmental/Institutional Conditions

Weisbrod (1977)

Majority rule

Gidron, Kramer et al.
(1992)

Young (2000; 2006)

Service financing function
Service provision function
Shared service financing
Shared service provision
Supply & Demand Economic models

Najam (2000)

Strategy and Goal divergence/ convergence

Gronbjerg (1993)

Dominance of the private sector
Dependence on the nonprofit sector by the
government
Public investment or endorsement
Symmetry or asymmetry of power relations
Acceptance or rejection to institutional
pluralism
Degree of formality of the interaction

Coston (1998)

Type of Government-Nonprofit
Interactions
Competitive
Zero-sum relationship
Government Dominant
Dual or Parallel-Track
Collaborative
Third Sector Dominant
Supplementary
Complementary
Adversarial
Cooperative
Confrontation
Co-optation
Complementary
Accommodation
Competition
Cooperation
Symbiosis
Ranges from Repression – to –
Collaboration

Overall, the models fail to shed much light on how each emergent relationship
form influences the way INGOs make decisions about their activities, that is, INGOs‟
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decision making competencies. The literature points out that there are dangers associated
with receiving government funding, especially since government may have divergent and
possibly conflicting motives, demands and expectations (Smith 1993; Salamon 2003;
Kerlin 2006a). It is this gap that this research addresses by examining the influence that
government funding may have on INGO autonomy.
Although Najam‟s (2000) theory of institutional interests and preferences does not
articulate how government articulates its interests and preferences, this research builds on
this theory by drawing the assumption that government articulates its interests and
preferences through funding. Essentially, this study posits that government‟s interests and
preferences are articulated through government funding choices and specified through
specific funding mechanisms. As a result, each funding tool impacts INGOs‟ autonomy
in different ways. Whether the emergent government-INGO relationship is deemed
cooperative, complementary or not, probably makes very little difference in terms of the
autonomy of INGOs.

2.3 U.S. Foreign Aid Policy Environment: Implications for INGOs
Unlike governments, INGOs “do not enjoy the legal status enjoyed by nationstates and their representatives under international law” (Ahmed and Potter 2006), e.g.,
the diplomatic immunity extended to governments. Rather, INGOs are subject to the laws
of the nation-state within which they reside as well as those of the nation-states where
they operate. As Ahmed and Potter (2006) also note, the legal status of INGOs within
their own states is no trivial issue given that it is this environment that determines
whether INGOs are permitted to operate and if so, under what terms. This section
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illuminates how the position of U.S. based INGOs may be influenced by U.S. foreign aid
policies.
One way of viewing the environment in which INGOs exist is by identifying the
reasons for aid provision by nation-states. This helps us to understand the kinds of
purposes a government pursues with its aid and why it selects certain kinds of purposes
and not others (Lancaster 2007). The debate surrounding this concern centers on whether
foreign aid should be utilized for diplomatic purposes, that is, to advance “the national
security and economic interests of the donor country,” or development purposes, that is,
“to help better the human condition in [the] countries receiving aid” (Lancaster 2007).
Consistent with Kerlin‟s (2006a) observations, “…we need to understand the often
neglected domestic politics of aid in aid-giving countries [that is, understand] the widely
shared ideas and norms shaping aid giving, the political institutions in which aid
decisions are made, the interests competing for influence over aid‟s purposes,” and how
government is organized to manage its aid (Lancaster 2007). So while international
NGOs may have ideologically and historically been regarded as apolitical organizations,
their roles have major political implications (Ahmed and Potter 2006), not only because
they operate in foreign nations, but by virtue of receiving funding from the U.S.
government.
The questions about why nation-states give aid however are not new. In the 1970s
and 1980s, using formal modeling techniques, economists predicted that bilateral aid
donors would be driven by donors‟ own interests (Lancaster 2007). Such predictions
were based on correlations between how much aid was provided to certain countries and
the characteristics of those countries. Such predictions, would postulate that the U.S.
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government was motivated by the Cold War concerns, while the French were motivated
by the desire to maintain a post-colonial sphere of influence in Africa (Dudley and
Montmarquette 1976; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2004). In this light, the
role of INGOs would consist of implementing donor interests. Alternative to this view is
the “dependency” perspective which emanates from the Marxist and the postmodernist
schools of thoughts. This perspective regards foreign aid as a capitalist instrument used
by dominant nations to control and exploit developing countries (Cockcroft, Frank et al.
1972; Rodney 1974; Escobar 1995). INGOs would be regarded as mere conduits for
exercising that dominance, a view that would threaten their credibility and legitimacy.
The “constructivist” perspective on the other hand, portrays foreign aid as a social
norm that emerges from the interaction between rich and poor nations. This view argues
that foreign aid cannot be explained in terms of political or economic interests instead,
foreign aid is predicated on the belief that long-term peace and prosperity is only possible
in a generous and just world order (Lumsdaine 1993). Inherent in the current U.S. foreign
aid policies are some of these constructivist notions. For instance, “the National Security
Strategy introduced by President Bush in September 2002, underscores that, although
poverty, poor health and lack of economic opportunity do not lead directly to unrest and
terrorism; they can be their precursors” (Kerlin 2006a). The inherent security concerns
however, may have reinforced the politicization of U.S. foreign aid, thus overriding the
development-oriented purposes explicit in the constructivist perspective.
Based on the foregoing theories, it is clear that any discussion of governmentINGO relations, especially with the objective of trying to understand NGO autonomy,
should account for one crucial element, “the impact of domestic [and foreign] politics on
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aid-giving” (Lancaster 2007). This is crucial since U.S. motivations behind foreign aid
have been depicted as a “Morgenthau Puzzle,” which describes a mixed-purpose
approach to foreign aid (Morgenthau 1962; Lancaster 2007). While the U.S. foreign aid
began as an instrument for diplomacy, today it is characterized by a dual purpose –
diplomatic ends and altruistic values (Lancaster 2007). Based on this dualistic approach
to foreign aid, one could speculate that the goal misalignment between government and
INGOs that Kerlin (2006a) states occurs when the motivation behind government funding
exhibits diplomatic leanings at the expense of the altruistic values of international NGOs.
As a result, INGOs lose their autonomy and may start to act as mere appendages of
government implementing government projects.
Alternatively, goal misalignment may occur as a result of ideological or
philosophical differences about how humanitarian problems should be solved. An
example of this is implicit in why CARE turned down federal funds for food aid and
intends to phase out the practice by 2009. According to one CARE staff member,
importing food from the United States which is then sold in an aid recipient country in
exchange for money that is then channeled to aid provision has the danger of stunting the
growth of local agriculture thus damaging both the local farmer and the trade. Contrary to
the U.S. federal government, CARE regards this system of monetization as inherently
flawed and inefficient (Dugger 2007).
Note however that, the tension between dual purposes of the U.S. foreign aid
policy is no historical accident, but is a consequence of two factors, the peculiarities of
U.S. domestic politics which is characterized by left-right wing controversy over its
utility, and “the nature of American political institutions, which tend to amplify
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controversies involving foreign aid” (Lancaster 2007). Other actors also influence foreign
aid. For example, by 2006, domestic political support for foreign aid geared toward relief
and development was strengthened by a growing engagement of the evangelical
movement in development and related activities abroad (Lancaster 2007). In addition, the
War on Terror also elevated the prominence of diplomatic purposes in aid provision. As
such, it is within this dual-purpose-tension climate that U.S. based INGOs must exist.
This motivates our investigation of the influence a funded relationship with the U.S.
government has on INGO autonomy.
The influences of domestic and foreign politics on aid-giving also highlight the
fact that different federal administrations, approach foreign aid in different ways. This
may imply different kinds of relationships with INGOs. A good example of this is The
Global Gag Rule highlighted in Chapter 1; first announced in 1984 by President Ronald
Reagan, the rule was rescinded by President Bill Clinton in 1993 only to be reinstated by
the Bush Administration in 2001.
For the most part however, the direction and motivation for foreign aid has been
determined by changes taking place in the global environment (A detailed timeline of the
U.S. foreign aid policy is provided in Appendix 1). For instance, the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1989 resulted in emergent countries
rising from the demise of the USSR. The Bush Administration responded by providing
aid to support these political and economic transitions (Lancaster 2007), some of which
was provided through INGOs.
On the other hand, U.S. support to Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s was
spurred by an increase in the demand for multiparty elections and democratic
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governments in that part of the world (Lancaster 2007). Scholarly discourse during the
Clinton Administration also provided justification for investing in the promotion of
democracy. Specifically, President Clinton declared that democracy was a necessary
precursor to international security because democratic countries were perceived as
predisposed against inter-state wars (Lancaster 2007). In addition, aid was also provided
in response to global problems such as environmental degradation and international
health, in particular, the rise and impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
At the domestic politics front, it is important to recognize that bilateral aid
provision is also governed by numerous congressional “earmarks” and “directives”
(Stoddard 2002b). For example, “Congress has the power to impose legislative earmarks
on how aid is used or what countries or organizations receive it,” and this was especially
so beginning with the Clinton Administration given the administration‟s dedication
toward the promotion of democracy as shown above (Kerlin 2006a; Lancaster 2007).
Earmarks and directives are also a mechanism to ensure that congressional priorities as
well as those of the administration are implemented. While the 1970s directives and
earmarks were largely characterized by sectoral allocations (e.g., for agriculture, health or
education), the scope and specificity of earmarks and directives have actually intensified
over the years. “By 2005, they were often quite specific as to how the aid should be”
(Lancaster 2007), further constraining INGO autonomy if channeled through them.
Different institutions within the U.S. government not only determine federal expenditure
but also shape policies. Most importantly, consistent with Salamon‟s (2002a; 2002b)
framework, not only does government articulate its strategic institutional interests via
earmarks and other policy instruments, but different institutions do so as well.
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Clearly, the debate surrounding government-INGO relationship extends to the
current political climate. The terrorist attacks of September 11, the national security
priority, and the current War on Terror are developments that have had major
implications for U.S. foreign aid policy and hence influence the nature of the relationship
between government and INGOs. As has been noted above, the White House‟s National
Security Strategy for the United States of America (September 2002) elevates
development purposes of aid as one of the three priorities of U.S. foreign policy, along
with defense and the promotion of democracy abroad (Kerlin 2006a; Lancaster 2007).
Also clear is the prominence of INGOs as the official public policy implementing
partners of government (Smith 1993; Salamon 1995; Forman and Stoddard 2003;
Salamon 2003). And as Coston (1998) pointed out, a competitive relationship has
historically dominated relations between government and INGOs. And since government
enjoys both a power and resource advantage over INGOs, an analysis of government
funding-INGO relations in the absence of an appreciation of the political (and global)
environment within which INGOs operate would fail to provide a complete picture of the
degree to which INGOs retain or lose their autonomy.

2.4 Government Funding and INGO Autonomy: Then and Now
Speculations over the dysfunctional consequences of government funding have
been discussed in the literature since the early 1900s. For example, Fleisher (1914) saw
the determination of the boundaries between state and the voluntary sector as a complex
and perennial problem (cited in Smith 2006). Beck (1970) and Manser (1974) also
identified dependency, a dilution of the advocacy role of INGOs, increased
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bureaucratization and professionalization and a loss of autonomy (see Kramer 1985), as
some of the dysfunctional consequences of government financing of INGOs.
However, not only is there no clear definition of autonomy, evidence supporting
autonomy loss is ambiguous. For instance, a study of the Greater New York United Way
conducted by Hartogs and Weber in 1978 yielded little data to support the alleged inverse
link between government funding and INGO autonomy. Instead, most organizations
reported that government funding actually enabled them to carry out their programs more
effectively, that is, “rather than leading voluntary agencies into oblivion, government
funding permits their survival as they deliver services for which the government is
willing to pay” (Hartogs and Weber 1978; Kramer 1985). In fact, the core program, i.e.,
the original purpose of the agency‟s raison d’etre and the services rendered to
accomplish the raison d’etre and the target population essentially remain the same in
spite of government funding (Hartogs and Weber 1978). Another study emanating from
an Urban Institute national survey of 3,411 nonprofits conducted in 1982, also revealed
little evidence of mission distortion as a consequence of government funding (Kramer
1985).
Kramer (1985) attributes the above conclusions to the payment-for-service form
of transactions which involved less control than grants or subsidies; a lack of incentives
and capacity in government for stricter accountability controls; and the diversity of
nonprofit income sources. In his view, the threat to organizational autonomy is not
credible in light of a lack of government oversight and monitoring. Instead, Kramer
(1985) argued that the high degree of income pluralism was more likely to result in goal
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deflection [than autonomy loss], owing to the entrepreneurialism and vendorism
stemming from the problem of donor dependency.
However, a lot has changed since the 1980s – for one, the government has
increased its efforts to foster and demand INGO accountability. For example, the passage
of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) has injected a high
demand for performance measurement of government operations at all levels (Gronbjerg
and Salamon 2002). This mandate has offered the “federal government a valuable tool for
catching up with the demands of managing indirect government” by providing managers
with an avenue for “focusing on what goals they seek and how well their programs
achieve them, regardless of who actually does the work” (Kettl 2002). This has also
strengthened government‟s ex post oversight (Posner 2002). Also noted by Ebrahim
(2003a), heightened accountability concerns have resulted in increased oversight and
INGO regulations by both government and other donors.
Nonetheless, the speculations surrounding the link between government funding
and the loss of INGO autonomy remain pervasive in the literature. For example, it has
been argued that contracting out profoundly changes nonprofit organizations because
nonprofits belong to a “like-minded community” of people whose primarily concern is
responsiveness, and are responsive to the norms of that community, while government
tends to approach services and clients from an equity standpoint (Weisbrod 1977; Smith
2006). Norms of equity create challenges for government officials by requiring them to
provide justification for providing services to one group as opposed to another (Smith
2006). Though referring to domestic nonprofits, Smith (2006) also argued that
government funding does affect nonprofit agencies‟ operations, particularly the services
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provided and the clients served. Smith also predicted that “the specific effects are likely
to vary depending on the type of services provided, level of professionalization, the
agency‟s origins and mission, as well as the character of the government-nonprofit
relationship.” A fresh investigation, with more clear measures of organizational
autonomy, into the government-INGO autonomy relationship is necessary.
Hulme and Edwards (1997) also speculate that the risk to an INGO‟s autonomy
appreciates with receipt of government funding. INGOs are especially at risk when their
goals and those of government are not aligned (Kerlin 2006a). Nonetheless, the real
impact of government funding on nonprofit organizational autonomy is largely
unexplored (Kerlin 2006a). Perhaps this gap in the literature can be attributed to limited
attempts to explicitly investigate the different forms of government financial transfers –
the means by which government articulates its institutional strategic interests and
preferences, as well as the dearth of clear organizational autonomy measures applicable
to the nonprofit sector. Although this research is unable to quantify the degree of INGO
autonomy loss given the qualitative research design adopted here, the study does however
provide insights as to the degree to which government funding undercuts INGO
autonomy across specific dimensions, relative to other funding sources. This research
also seeks to understand the mechanisms through which such autonomy loss may occur.
Investigating the government funding-INGO autonomy dynamic has become even
more crucial given the increasing popularity of international NGOs with government and
official donors as credible implementing partners of public policies. This comes in the
wake of the dismal failure of the government-to-government foreign aid and development
assistance approach (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Stoddard 2002b; Forman and Stoddard
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2003; Grossrieder 2003). In a sense, part of the allure of the nonprofit sector may derive
from the distinctive character of INGOs as being what governments are not, that is, “not
bureaucratic, not rigid, not directive, and not stultifying of local initiatives” (Smillie
1993) and not corrupt and wasteful. In addition, nonprofits project a reputation of
neutrality, independent and impartiality and a level of responsiveness that is characterized
by speed, effectiveness, efficiency (Smillie 1993; Smith 1993), programming innovation
beyond the reach of official political or bureaucratic actors, a participatory approach, and
an ability to reach the poorest sectors in developing societies (Smith 1993; Robinson
1997; Forman and Stoddard 2003).
Although INGOs have come to be regarded as the operational arms or the
implementing partners of government and multilateral assistance agencies (Salamon
1995; Forman and Stoddard 2003), a mistrust of INGOs still lurks in the shadows. For
example, some regard INGOs as veneers for spies or simply as pawns or tools for
furthering the objectives of their own national donors (Atmar 2000; Forman and Stoddard
2002). This view is consistent with those that predicted that bilateral aid donors would be
motivated by their own interests (Lancaster 2007). So, while in some circles, INGOs have
been depicted as the “saviors of failed economies,” i.e., consistent with the constructivist
view, they have also been reviled as puppets of Western imperialism, i.e., consistent with
the dependency view (Carapico 2000). Such conflicting notions continue to raise
concerns about the influence of funding on INGOs given that those who fund nonprofit
organizations may have strong diverse and possibly conflicting motives, demands and
expectations at odds with those of INGOs themselves (Salamon 2003; Kerlin 2006a).
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Others have also observed that nonprofits begin to resemble those who fund them,
thus suggesting a blurring of sectors (Young 1984; Brody 1996). The „new governance‟
paradigm also posits an interdependent relationship between government, the private and
third sectors (Salamon 2002a). Despite this purported interdependency between
government and the third sector, INGOs often are “in agreement with government on the
basic goals of saving and improving lives abroad, although they are at times out of
alignment with government in terms of ideology and approach to international work
(Kramer 1985; Robinson 1997; Salamon 2002a; Kerlin 2006a). In light of the increasing
politicization of foreign aid, and given that foreign assistance has become an important
tool of foreign policy, INGOs are increasingly confronted with complex questions about
their ability to remain autonomous while accepting government funding (Atmar 2001;
Duffield, Macrae et al. 2001; Fox 2001; Stoddard 2002a; Kerlin 2006a).
The influence of government funding has also been inversely linked to INGOs‟
ability to advocate and respond effectively to their missions (Kramer 1985). For instance,
“[I]NGOs are facing increasingly difficult questions about their autonomy (Smith 1993),
legitimacy, and ability to advocate when accepting government funding” (Kerlin 2006a).
“In several European countries, Canada [and the U.S.], special funds have been
earmarked to support [I]NGO activities in regions that are foreign policy priorities of the
home governments (such as former colonies) or specific issues of domestic public
concerns (such as AIDS, women in development)” (Smith 1993; Lancaster 2007). Smith
(1993) goes further to state that although none of the restrictions on the funds necessarily
run contrary to the goals or interests of INGOs, they do reduce the autonomy of INGOs
to set their own agenda, increase the temptation for some INGOs to undertake activities
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that lie outside of their areas of expertise or scope in order to attract grants and subsidies,
and skew their activities towards immediate relief as compared to programs that produce
enduring results. Scholars are therefore encouraged to investigate the mechanisms by
which INGOs are responding to the stringent and restrictive government funding
conditions in order to preserve their independence (Smith 1993); a challenge that is
undertaken in this research. And like Smith (1993), it is crucial to recognize that
government funding is associated with stringent restrictions which may constrain INGOs‟
autonomy. A CARE staff member contributed the rise in restrictive U.S. Government
(USG) funding to the very outsourcing of USG functions, including foreign assistance.
It is worth pointing out that nonprofit organizations are not unique in being
influenced by their funding relationship with governments and donors. Public agencies,
though distanced from central government, have also faced questions concerning the
devolution of power and authority vis-à-vis the actual discretionary powers that public
agency managers have when making strategic and policy decisions on the ground (see
(Behn 1995; Christensen 1999; Carpenter 2001; Verhoest, Peters et al. 2004). Examples
from the public administration and management literature also suggest a positive link
between organizational autonomy and performance and responsiveness (Behn 1995;
Braadbaart, Van-Eybergen et al. 2007). For example, Behn (1995) positively linked
discretion to performance and staff motivation.
Other researchers have also observed that although the steady increase in
government funding for INGOs to undertake development and relief work in developing
countries has been taking place since the 1960s, the changes in both the amounts and
purposes of such funding raise serious challenges for INGOs‟ autonomy (Smith 1993;
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Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003). These changes were also accompanied by changes in the
nature of government-nonprofit relations (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2002). In particular,
the substantial growth in government spending and support of nonprofits inadvertently
“created the need for greater formality and structure,” and subsequently a loss of
flexibility not only for nonprofit organizations but also for government (Gronbjerg and
Salamon 2002).
Though chiefly ignored, there are several other largely positive sides to this
complex story of government-INGO exchange relationship. For example, closer relations
with government have been associated with increased professionalization on the part of
INGOs (Kramer 1985; Korten 1990 cited in Robinson 1997). And while recognizing the
dangers of “too close” a relationship with donor governments, Commins (1997) notes
that, closer relationships have also led to positive results at least for World Vision
International (WVI), where the organization has been able to achieve some balance
between work done in the field and policy work on aid issues. In particular, WVI has
been able to exert influence on public policy by persuading governments to revise their
funding priorities, a process labeled “reverse agenda” (Commins 1997).
Commins (1997) also reports that although (the umbrella association) InterAction
was concerned that the government funding of its members would result in reduction in
public policy work, a review of the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s revealed
that this has not been the case. Commins (1997) does not seem to regard the loss of
organizational autonomy as the main concern. Instead, he is more concerned about
INGOs‟ ability to be accountable to multiple actors or funders, which, based on the

63

discussion of autonomy and accountability supplied in Chapter 1, is really an
interventional constraint question.
In summary, the literature does reveal differences between INGOs and
government preferences, particularly on where aid is provided and the kinds of programs
offered (Smith 1993; Stoddard 2002a). While it is commendable that WVI criticized the
U.S. government for cutting assistance for human development programs such as those
related to child morbidity, mortality and education in the early 1990s (Commins 1997),
Mawer (1997) points out that donor influence on INGOs is far greater than INGO
influence on donors (reverse agenda). As such, it would seem that donors, intentionally or
inadvertently, have relatively more power to reshape INGO activities than the other way
round.
Many authors seem to agree that, based on examples of INGOs around the globe
(see (Dichter 1997; Hodson 1997; Pearce 1997; Perera 1997), “the tail (INGOs) is not
wagging the dog (donors)” (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Instead, it seems that there is
increased pressure on INGOs to become public service contractors, that is, “market-,” as
opposed to, “value-oriented5” nonprofit businesses serving public purposes by selling
their services as implementers of donors‟ and government agencies‟ projects and
programs (Korten 1990 cited in Robinson 1997; Smith 2006). Moreover, given that
different tool packages result in varying operational characteristics and programmatic
consequences, and hence differentially influence INGO autonomy, it is plausible that the
different policy instruments used to transfer funds to INGOs are being employed by

5

Value-oriented NGOs are nonprofits that define their programs on the basis of their social missions, and
then seek the funding required to implement them (Brown and Korten 1991, as cited in Robinson 1997).
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government to foster particular kinds of behaviors from INGOs (Schneider and Ingram
1990; Salamon 2002a; Salamon 2002b; Stoddard 2002b).
That being said, there is also evidence to suggest that at times “the tail does wag
the dog” – a process Commins (1997) referred to as „reverse agenda.‟ In as much as
INGOs operate in multiple funding environments fraught with many rules, regulations
and compliance demands; they also operate in a much broader humanitarian assistance
and development environment that can be influential in its own right. For example, the
humanitarian community establishes its own way of doing things and best practices
which may influence the programs and policy solutions and strategies that funding
agencies adopt. This is exemplified by The Sphere Project, which is a commitment by
INGOs to establish best common practices or Codes of Conduct for emergency response.
Consistent with the above is the view supplied by Stoddard (2006) that
humanitarian INGOs also influence governments‟ foreign assistance policies through
information. The hands-on information taken from INGOs‟ field experience and best
practices, can and at times, does shape governments views by influencing how policy
makers frame humanitarian policy problems and the solutions to those problems
(Stoddard 2006). Such information helps shape what policy actor know and how
problems and solutions to humanitarian issues are framed.
This chapter summarized three bodies of literature, the U.S. foreign aid
environment and its implications for INGOs‟ autonomy, INGO-government relationships
and the impact of INGO-government interactions on INGOs‟ autonomy. These bodies of
literature not only help frame this research in the current INGO-government relations
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discourse; they also help to establish some context for the investigation of INGO
autonomy.
Undergirding this study are resource dependence and tool choice frameworks.
These two frameworks, together with the literature, highlight the environmental context
within which INGO autonomy may be influenced. Assuming that funders use their
donations as conduits for articulating their interests, priorities and preferences (an
assumption that is not explicit in Najam‟s theory of institutional interests), this research
investigates both the influence of government funding on INGO autonomy within the
context of inter-organizational resource dependence and tool choice.
This study attempts to understand the concept of autonomy as it relates to INGOs‟
interactions with government funding. Understanding that government funding is
provided through a variety of tools, this research also investigates into the mechanisms
through which INGO autonomy is undermined. And finally, in response to Smith‟s
(1993) challenge, the study also seeks to understand the strategies by which INGOs are
responding to the constraints associated with government funding, thus illuminating how
INGOs are managing the risk of autonomy loss.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
To investigate the relationship between government funding and INGO
autonomy, this research adopts a qualitative multiple case study methodology. This
methodology is most suitable when investigating a complex subject, one that is not
sufficiently understood (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin
2009). Evidence from the literature is such that, the relationship between government
funding and INGO autonomy has been ambiguous and therefore not fully understood.
This has also been exacerbated by an absence of clear measures of organizational
autonomy particularly applicable to the nonprofit sector.
Qualitative multiple case studies are also more applicable when responding to
research questions that focus on “how” and “why” complex phenomena occur, and when
contextual factors are believed to be relevant to the phenomena under investigation (Yin
2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009). This study meets these conditions in that, as
indicated by the expansive literature on government-INGO relations with respect to
INGO autonomy, autonomy has largely been referred to in nebulous terms like discretion,
flexibility, and independence thus, lacking a clear definition and understanding as to what
it really is or means. In addition, the relationship between government funding and INGO
autonomy is not only complex, it is also not clearly understood (e.g., Hulme and Edwards
1997; Forman and Stoddard 2002; Kerlin 2006b; Lancaster 2007). This research therefore
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seeks to understand “how” the government-INGO autonomy correlation can be
characterized and explained.
This chapter outlines the research questions and hypotheses. The chapter also
details the research methodology and the data collection methods employed in this study.
I conclude the chapter with a review of the study limitations stemming from the
qualitative multiple case study nature of the research design employed here.

3.2 Research Questions
This research investigates the ways in which funding impacts the autonomy of
international NGOs, with a primary focus on the impact of U.S. government funding.
Central to this dissertation is the research question, “How does government funding
influence INGO autonomy?” To understand the nature of this exchange relationship, the
study assesses how INGOs have experienced USG funding relative to foundation or
corporate funding, with respect to their decision making competencies. Of interest to this
research is to establish an understanding of the behavior of different funding sources and
their impact on INGO autonomy, by focusing on the conditions attached to funding. And
in an effort to understand how INGOs maximize their autonomy, this dissertation poses a
second research question – “What strategies do INGOs employ to preserve their
autonomy?” This study does not posit any hypotheses in response to this question.

3.3 Hypotheses
Undergirding this research are two theoretical frameworks; resource dependence
and tool choice as shown in Figure 2 below. Resource dependence theory enables the
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investigation of the impact of an INGO‟s dependence on a single funding source on its
autonomy, while the tool choice approach helps investigate whether different funding
mechanisms, i.e., grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements, translate into differential
levels of government control of INGO activities, thus yielding varying degrees of
autonomy to an INGO. As a result, resource dependence allows one to focus on the
impact of an INGO‟s high dependence on any one funder; while the tool choice approach
allows a closer examination of how and why different funding mechanisms due to their
nature, would constrain INGO autonomy.

NGO Funding Sources

FUNDING SOURCES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE
FOUNDATIONS
CONTRIBUTIONS
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
& INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

FUNDING MECHANISMS
(1) CONTRACTS
(2) GRANTS
(3) COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS
(4) RESTRICTED
(5) UNRESTRICTED
(6) OTHER

Data Sources: USAID Data;
Interviews

Resource Dependence

NGO Autonomy

FACTORS
(1) RESOURCE IMPORTANCE
a. Proportion of revenue from source
b. Criticality of the revenue source
(2) RESOURCE ALTERNATIVES
a. Regulations restricting access to
other sources
b. Number of available sources
c. Size or importance of alternatives
(3) DISCRETION
a. Ownership of the resource
b. Ability to control actual use of the
resources
c. Rules to regulate resource
ownership, allocation & use
__________________________

NGO AUTONOMY
(1) Decision Making
Competencies
a. Managerial Autonomy
b. Operational Autonomy
(2) Constraints on Decision
Making Competencies
a. Financial Autonomy
b. Structural Autonomy
c. Legal Autonomy
d. Interventional Autonomy

TOOL CHARACTERISTICS
a. Coercive
b. Restrictive
c. Directness

Data Sources: USAID Data;
Interviews; Documents Review

Figure 2: Theoretical Framework
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Data Sources: Interviews,
Documents Review
(Adapted from COBRA)

In addition, both resource dependence and tool choice frameworks assume that
environmental designs can be changed to affect organizational behavior (Schneider and
Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002a; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Hence, by observing the
funding environment characterized by the funding type (e.g., government, corporate,
private contributions or foundations), and by the funding mechanism, one may be able to
understand how and why funding influences INGO autonomy.
This research explores the impact of three factors on autonomy – resource
importance, resource alternatives, discretion and tool characteristics, i.e., the degree to
which the funding tool is coercive, restrictive, and direct. And while the intention was to
regard the third resource dependence factor of discretion as an organizational autonomy
variable since it fits into the definition of organizational autonomy provided in Chapter 1,
an analysis of the data revealed the tautological challenges associated with this attempt,
as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

3.3.1

Resource Importance
The literature suggests that increased inter-organizational dependence by INGOs

for financial resources leads to reduced control and decision making autonomy (Provan
1982; Gronbjerg 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As noted in Chapter 1, the
vulnerability or dependence of an organization to extra-organizational influence and
control may depend on the importance of the resource, that is, the relative magnitude of
the exchange from a particular funding source and the criticality of that resource, as
measured by the extent to which an INGO can survive without that particular source
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As a result, greater dependence on a singular major funding
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source diminishes the capacity of an INGO to make autonomous decisions since the
decisions of that one major source will affect the INGO (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).
The literature also recognizes that each funding source entails some exchange
relationship with the recipient organization, and that organizations disproportionately
dependent on a particular funding source must pay a relatively higher price in order to
manage those exchange relationships (Gronbjerg 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). We
should expect a high dependence on government funding to yield less autonomy to
INGOs, especially so, given that the relationship between government and INGOs has
been dominated by repression, rivalry and competition in light of the power and resource
advantage government enjoys over INGOs (Coston 1998). In addition, Hulme and
Edwards (1997) associated an appreciation of USG funding receipt by an INGO with an
increased risk to the INGO‟s autonomy.
In this regard, I expect INGOs receiving a high proportion of USG funding to
possess less autonomy compared to those that dependent less on the USG funding for
their total revenue and support.
Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy

Unlike Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), Gronbjerg (1993) considers nonprofits that
develop funding in single concentrated sources to be efficient in that it simplifies
management tasks by allowing the recipient “organization to specialize and fine-tune its
management efforts.” In a similar vein, others contend that some nonprofits have grown
big, not by seeking after diverse sources of funding as conventional wisdom would have
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it, but by going after a single type of funder such as corporations or government (Foster
and Fine 2007). However, most of the nonprofits Foster and Fine (2007) studied reported
having restricted programs or operations as a result of their high dependence on a single
dominant funding source. It is likely that, by virtue of contributing the lion‟s share of an
INGO‟s revenue relative to other sources, some funding sources may place more
demands and control on a recipient INGO, thus undermining its autonomy. Any shifts
and instabilities in the funding environment become sources of vulnerability for the
INGO as this threatens the reliability of the funding source.
Another factor to consider is that, while a high dependence on institutional
funders like foundations, government, or corporations may raise questions about the
autonomy and perhaps the credibility of INGOs (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Kerlin
2006a), the same can hardly be surmised about a high dependence on individual
contributions, especially when those contributions are unrestricted. In other words, a high
dependence on unrestricted dollars would actually yield much higher levels of autonomy
to INGOs than restricted funding. For this reason, we should expect INGOs with a high
dependence on unrestricted individual contributions to be more autonomous than those
that are highly dependent on more exacting funding sources like the USG.
Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to
result in limited INGO autonomy

3.3.2

Resource Alternatives
Resource dependence can also be minimized by a lack of access to alternative

resources, the number of available sources, and the size or importance of the alternatives.
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For the most part, an INGO‟s resource dependence arises due to the existence of rules
and regulations that may restrict access to other resources and especially if the funding
sources are important. The availability of alternative resources refers to the extent to
which there are fewer funding alternatives available for INGOs, that is, whether an INGO
has access to funding from other sources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). For instance, the
increase in government funding going to INGOs, relative to foundations and corporations
could be regarded as a measure of concentration of alternatives in terms of the share of
government funding going to INGOs. This speaks to the substitutability of funding
sources, that is, an organization‟s ability to replace government funding or a portion of it
with foundation grants or corporate gifts. Such a strategy also reduces the criticality or
importance of a single funder. The INGOs‟ funding environment has been characterized
by intense competition among INGOs. And increasingly, INGOs have found themselves
competing with the private sector for government contracts.
As noted above, enlarging its share of funding from a single source however
increases an INGO‟s resource dependence. “Organizations are controlled by an external
source to the extent they depend on that source for a large proportion of inputs or output”
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). The maintenance of discretion is regarded as a crucial
organizational activity, and one way to accomplish that is to loosen dependencies through
resource diversification.
Resource diversification diminishes an INGO‟s dependence on any one particular
source, thus diminishing the external control the funding source may have over its
activities –a process called structural differentiation (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).
Dispersing dependency in this way reduces an organization‟s need to respond to any
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given demand, instead various groups may be simultaneously satisfied, thus providing the
INGO with more discretion or autonomy (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As the authors
indicate, “the most direct solution is to develop an organization which is dependent on a
variety of exchanges and less dependent on any single exchange.”
As a way of reducing their external dependence, I expect INGOs to demonstrate
efforts to diversify their funding portfolios as a strategy for reducing control by any one
funder. I also expect INGOs with low revenue concentration indices6 to be more
autonomous than INGOs with high revenue concentrations (closer to 1).
Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external
dependence and control through revenue diversification.

While an INGO can have access to alternative resources, a funder can exert
control over those resources by regulating access to them and their exchange. In other
words, a funding source can use different rules and regulations to restrict access to
alternative resources in spite of their availability (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). An
example if this would be the Fly America Act noted in Chapter 1. This regulation restricts
INGOs receiving USG funding from utilizing cheaper or alternative modes of
transportation by requiring them to fly on American airlines, as well as transport their
commodities only on U.S. shipping companies. And based on the USG‟s Eligibility Rules

6

A Revenue Concentration Index, also referred to as a Herfindahl Index is an index that measures an
organization‟s degree of revenue diversification. The index ranges between “0” (least concentrated) and
“1” (highly concentrated) and it is a sum of the individual revenue streams squared divided by the square of
total revenue and support. Revenue Index = ∑ (Revenue streamij2/Total Revenue & Supporti2); where i
represents the INGO and j refers to the revenue stream.
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for Goods and Services, USG-funded INGOs are also required to purchase U.S.
manufactured inputs such as U.S. manufactured vehicles regardless of the availability of
cheaper alternatives. As a result, I expect USG funding to restrict INGOs‟ access to
alternative resources, thus yielding less autonomy to USG-funded INGOs.
Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources.

3.3.3

Tool Characteristics
Certain conditions facilitate the control that some organizations may have on

others (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Such conditions include the funding source‟s
discretion in the allocation of the resource, as well as its ability to make its preferences
known. This research assumes that funding is the mechanism through which government
uses to convey its interests, priorities, and preferences to recipient INGOs. As a result,
funding instruments such as contracts and cooperative agreements are used to articulate
those preferences and interests, and therefore steer and direct INGOs decision making
thus yielding less autonomy to INGOs. When donors retain the decision-making power to
allocate resources towards specific activities, such preemptive acts result in an
“allocation-effect” on INGOs resources, thus minimizing INGOs‟ discretion over
resource allocation and use (James 1983).
In as much as the idiosyncrasies of each funding source may matter since each
source displays unique environmental factors (Gronbjerg 1993), the same can be
surmised about each of the funding mechanism used to transfer funds to INGOs. As
proposed in Table 2 in Chapter 1, this research postulates that different funding tools, i.e.,
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grants, cooperative agreements and contracts, constrain INGOs‟ autonomy in differential
ways, owing to the degree to which the tools are coercive, restrictive or direct (Kelman
2002; Salamon 2002a).
Also noted in Chapter 1, a funding tool is deemed coercive by the extent to which
it restricts an organization‟s “behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging
it” (Salamon 2002a). And contracts are considered relatively more coercive than grants
and cooperative agreements because of the way in which they specify INGOs outputs,
input use, aid recipients and program operations (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and
Conlan 2002; DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002; Shaikh and Casablanca 2008).
As such, “contractors …, when implementing U.S. government programs, are subject to
the government‟s direct instruction and control …, and close public scrutiny …, through
annual independent and government audits by the inspector general” (Shaikh and
Casablanca 2008).
Since INGOs implement clearly specified scopes of work, the authors assert that
contracts offer the greatest accountability and transparency for government. For INGOs
however, this translates into higher accountability demands which in turn undermine their
interventional autonomy. I expect INGOs highly dependent on contracts and to a lesser
extent, cooperative agreements, to be less autonomous than those dependent on grants.
Hypothesis 5: Greater dependence on highly coercive funding instruments
surrenders less autonomy to INGOs.

On the other hand, the hallmark of restrictive funding tools or sources is the
presence of conditionalities attached to aid which prohibit INGOs from engaging in
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certain activities. For example, the United States President‟s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief funds (PEPFAR) have been criticized because of the mandate they place on
INGOs to adopt an organization-wide anti-prostitution policy. The same policy applies to
the INGOs sub-grantees and any other INGOs they may partner with. Another example is
“The Mexico City Policy also known as the Global Gag Rule, which denies U.S. family
planning funds to any organization that performs, collects data on, provides referrals for,
or advocates legal changes for abortion” (Jacobson 2005). In view of these examples, I
not only expect contracts to be associated with lower levels of INGO autonomy, but also
USG funding in general to be associated with lower levels of INGO autonomy for the
funded program, relative to corporate and foundation funding.
Hypothesis 6: Greater dependence on highly restrictive sources of funding is likely to
limit the autonomy of INGOs.

And finally, a funding tool is considered direct by the extent to which the entity
financing a public activity is involved in carrying it out. This is when the authorization,
funding, and execution of a funded project are essentially carried out by the same entity
(Salamon 2002a). Such directness can also be interpreted as control. In this light, I expect
not only USG funding, but contracts to exert more direction and control over INGOs‟
program implementation for the funded program (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and
Conlan 2002; DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002; Shaikh and Casablanca 2008),
thus undermining their autonomy.
Hypothesis 7: Greater dependence on highly direct funding instruments is likely to
result in lower levels of INGO autonomy
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Note however that, while the funding source itself may not physically engage in
the implementation process, it may do so indirectly, for example, by sending monitors
into the field or by retaining discretion over resource allocation and use through requiring
prior approvals of changes to budgets, implementation plans and key personnel.
In closing, the literature makes multiple assertions about the dysfunctional
consequences of government funding by drawing our attention to a pervasive fear of
government interference in INGOs‟ autonomy through funding (Beck 1970; Manser 1974
as cited in Kramer 1985; Lipsky and Smith 1993; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smith 2006;
Brown and Moore 2001; Kerlin 2006a). As noted in Chapter 2, Salamon (2003) indicates
that INGOs face fiscal challenges associated not only with the changing funding terrain
and issues relating to receiving funds from multiple sources, but also with receiving
government funding. Reason being that, given its strong foreign policy orientation, USG
funding may manifest in divergent and possibly conflicting motives, demands and
expectations to the longer-term development focus of INGOs (Smith 2006; Lancaster
2007).
Others draw our attention to the notion of INGO credibility, that by receiving
government funding, it becomes suspect that INGOs are no longer connected to the
grassroots – that is, the communities they serve, thus undermining their downward
accountability (Atmar 2001; Ebrahim 2003b; Kerlin 2006a). Should the negative
correlation between government funding and INGO autonomy be legitimate, we should
have reason to be concerned. As Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) underscore, an
“organization ends where its discretion ends,” that is, to the extent that an INGO has
influence and control over its own activities.
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3.4 Research Design: Qualitative Multiple-Case Study
The nonprofit literature suggests an inverse link between funding, especially
government funding and INGO autonomy. Employing a multiple case study design helps
to explore and explain this causal link within “real-life interventions that are too complex
for the survey strategy” (Yin 2003). Apart from the imprecise manner with which the
subject of INGO autonomy has been dealt with, an analysis of this nature is further
confounded by the fact that INGOs hire special staff to navigate and negotiate funding
relationships with the diverse funding sources. This set up presents problems when trying
to identify participants to respond to a survey. For example, INGOs retain foundations
and corporate funding specialty staff and a separate set of staff members to deal
specifically with USG funding.
In addition, the implementation of the solicited contracts and grants is usually
conducted by different sets of people (e.g., the program managers and their staff members
in the INGOs‟ country offices), from those that negotiate the contracts and grants with
the funders. Consequently, this disaggregated set of events and actors makes it difficult to
adopt a survey approach. For this reason, coupled with a lack of data to allow for
statistical analysis, and following careful consultation with peers in the field and the
INGO community, the qualitative case study design was deemed more suitable for this
study.
A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003). While the method generally
“relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation
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fashion,” it also has the advantage of benefiting “from the prior development of
theoretical propositions [which help] guide data collection and analysis” (Yin 2003;
2009). The case study design too can be “generalizable to theoretical propositions
[though] not to populations or universes – [hence] the cases do not represent a “sample”
per se” (Yin 2003; 2009) While the object of quantitative designs due to the ability to
enumerate frequencies is to make inferences about a population based on empirical data
collected about a sample – a process called statistical generalization; case studies can
conducted with the object of expanding and generalizing theories – a process referred to
as analytical generalizations (Yin 2003).
The decision to use a qualitative methodology was also inspired by other factors.
The approach is instrumental in understanding how and why different funding sources
uniquely influence the different dimensions of organizational autonomy. It also helps us
to understand the strategies INGOs employ to safeguard their autonomy within the
context of funding. For instance, understanding “how” organizational autonomy is
influenced by funding not only identifies funding as the context within which autonomy
loss takes place; the question also draws our attention to the existence of the mechanisms
influencing INGO autonomy. A qualitative case study methodology provides the
researcher with tools necessary to study the phenomenon of INGO autonomy within the
specified context of resource dependence and funding tools (Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack
2008; Yin 2009).
Case study designs, unlike experiments, do not divorce the phenomenon from its
context (Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008). The logic of the design allows the researcher
to deliberately consider contextual conditions such as the fact that unlike public or private
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entities, INGOs can receive funds from multiple funding sources with diverse interests,
preferences and priorities. Each exchange relationship between the recipient INGO and a
funding source, presents unique environmental factors and idiosyncrasies, and thus
demanding different management tasks and efforts, resulting in different degrees of
management discretion (Gronbjerg 1993).
In addition, employing a multiple case study design has the advantage of
enhancing the credibility of the findings since such a design is considered more robust
than relying on a single case study (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Baxter and
Jack 2008; Yin 2009). This research relies on a purposive convenient sample of three
INGOs that receive differential levels of USG funding. The rationale behind this
selection is predicated upon two replication logics. First, literal or direct replication
enables cross case comparison by selecting similar INGOs, in this case, from the same
subfield of direct relief and development INGOs (Rubin and Rubin 1995; Yin 2003;
2009).
On the other hand, the logic of theoretical replication is a technique that is used to
deliberately select cases primarily because they offer contrasting scenarios; in this case,
differential levels of government support. In this regard, the three organizations display
varying levels of dependence on government funding. The advantage of using this
technique, especially, to multiple-cases (as opposed to a single-case) is that, the technique
does not only provide analytical benefits, but also strengthens the external validity, i.e.,
analytical generalization of the findings (Yin 2003; 2009). Multiple-cases enable the
researcher to seek convergent evidence from dissimilar cases (Yin 2003; 2009).
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Furthermore, the choice of a qualitative multiple case study design was also
inspired by the nebulous manner in which the literature has treated the concept of INGO
autonomy. The ambivalence associated with not only the concept of autonomy, but also
with the dysfunctional relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy,
begs a fresh investigation into the matter. A qualitative case study approach allows
enough exploratory room for the researcher to navigate unclear complex relationships
where not only definitions are unclear, but where there is a scarcity of literature on the
subject. By employing in-depth interviews and drawing from multiple data sources, the
methodology allows one to uncover nuances around the complex relationship between
government funding and INGO autonomy, thus generate a detailed understanding of
government-INGO exchange relationships (Miles and Huberman 1994; Baxter and Jack
2008).
Generally speaking however, the case study approach faces a number of criticisms
and challenges. The design has been criticized for lacking sufficient precision, i.e.,
quantification; objectivity and rigor on the grounds of failing to follow systematic
procedures. They have also been criticized for “allowing unequivocal evidence or biased
views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions,” thus providing little
basis for scientific generalization since one can hardly generalize from a single case (Yin
2003; Babbie 2004; Yin 2009). And finally, case studies are criticized for taking too long
to conduct and for resulting in massive, unreadable documents.
To counterbalance these criticisms, it is important to recognize that the case study
design and its amenability to multiple sources of evidence (e.g., documents, interviews,
surveys, and observations), can provide measures or indicators with greater validity
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compared to surveys and experimental measurements, through triangulation and by
allowing one to dig into the depth of the meaning of various concepts such as that of
organizational autonomy (Yin 2003; Babbie 2004; Yin 2009). This research therefore
takes advantage of this strength by relying on in-depth face-to-face (FTF) guided
interviews and documentation review as the primary sources of evidence. This approach
allows for an in-depth analysis of the nature of organizational autonomy as it relates to
the INGOs, and with respect to government funding.
In addition, when organized carefully, the multiple case study design can follow
systematic procedures especially in the data analysis stages. To ensure a systematic
analysis, this research takes advantage of the three distinct phases of open, axial and
selective coding inherent in grounded theory methods (detailed in Chapter 4, section
4.2.2). To enhance this systematic qualitative data analysis, the study also takes
advantage of NVIVO 8 software to assist in data organization and management (also
detailed in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1). As Yin (2003; 2009) pointed out, a well-organized
qualitative database can also enhance the reliability of a case study since by using
qualitative software one can leave a trail leading one to evidence for independent
inspection.

3.4.1

The Selection Process and Criteria for the Cases
To enhance the precision of this study and to ensure a systematic approach, this

study sets out criteria to guide the selection of case studies, one that can easily be
replicated. The case selection process was largely conducted using two methods – the
theoretical replication logic (Yin 2003) noted above – a technique quite similar to the
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theoretical sampling method (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and purposive convenience
sampling.
In addition, the following observations also guided the selection process; first,
Kerlin (2006b) points out that, between 14 and 19 percent of USAID‟s overall budgets
have traditionally been allocated to PVOs. And according to the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) – Guidestar National Database, while 71 percent of INGOs‟
revenue came from private contributions, only 20 percent came from government grants
in 2003. And of the 4,124 INGOs in the NCCS international dataset, only 391 (about10
percent) of these received government grants in 2003 (Kerlin 2006a; Kerlin 2006b;
Lancaster 2007). This also indicates that USG funding does not represent the lion‟s share
of relief organizations‟ total revenue and support, but constitutes a small percentage
(approximately 13 percent) of their overall funding (Kerlin 2006b).
The above also shows that, government funding tends to be biased towards
particular kinds of INGO activities and that is towards international relief. For instance,
between 2002 and 2003, the share of USG funding to international relief INGOs
increased by 60 percent, compared to a 21 percent increase in government support to
education-oriented INGOs and a 30 percent increase in support of health-oriented INGOs
(Kerlin 2006b).
Gronbjerg (1993) also argues that individual nonprofit service industries or
subsectors constitute unique organizational environments. For example, the
organizational environment for direct relief and development INGOs is distinct from that
of education research-oriented INGOs. For this reason, this study restricts its
investigation to a study of three U.S-based disaster relief and development INGOs (or
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PVOs) registered with the USAID in 2005. These INGOs were also registered with the
NCCS.
To select the three candidates for the case study, I used the USAID Volag data
from 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. While the data represents only 489 PVOs that were
registered with USAID in 2005 (note that this does not compare to the 4,124 INGOs
reported in the 2003 NCCS data); using the USAID Registry, I generated a list of 108
disaster relief and development INGOs. The three INGOs were therefore selected using
two main guidelines; they had to be U.S.–based direct relief and development agencies
conducting operations outside of the United States, and they had to be recipients of USG
funding, though at varying levels.
Using the average share or percentage of government support received over a four
year period (FY 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006), and using the following cutoff points to
capture variations in the share of government support or private contributions, that is, the
degree of dependence on USG funding, I selected at least one INGO whose share of USG
funding constituted,
(i)

less than 20 percent of its total revenue and support,

(ii)

nearly 50 percent of its total revenue and support, and

(iii) over 80 percent of its total revenue and support.

Figure 3 below shows the three INGOs recruited into the study and the names
represent pseudonyms provided to protect the INGOs‟ and participants‟ confidentiality.
Figure 3 also provides a summary of the financial profiles of the three cases; more
detailed profiles of three INGOs are provided in Chapter 5.
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Beta Assistance International (BETA) is the largest of the three organizations
with a budget of approximately $656 million in FY2006. Averaging its total support over
a 4-year period, i.e., FY2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006, BETA‟s share of government
funding is about 46 percent. Sigma Relief Development (SIGMA) is the smallest of the
three INGOs, with a budget of approximately $29 million in FY2006. On average, 97
percent of its total revenues support came from the USG. ALPHA on the other hand, has
a budget of about $38 million in FY2006. Averaging its support over the 4year period,
ALPHA‟s share of government is less than 10 percent. As such, these three organizations
depend on USG funding in varying ways.

Share of Government
Support (%)

INGO

% USG Support

% Private Support

<20%

Alpha Relief Agency
(ALPHA)

7%

93%

c.50%

Beta Assistance
International (BETA)

46%

23%

>80%

Sigma Relief &
Development (SIGMA)

97%

2%

Figure 3: Selection Criteria of the Three Cases (based on Average Government
Funding Support)

Despite my efforts to recruit INGOs from among the 20 largest INGOs since
according to Kerlin (2000b), of the 10 percent of INGOs that receive government grants,
nearly half of these are larger INGOs. Owing to the low response rate, I decided to recruit
INGOs using a purposive convenience sampling method by specifically looking for case
that varied along the share of government support, regardless of their size. The three
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INGOs identified about were contacted via telephone and email. And upon accepting the
invitation to participate in this study, I worked with my initial contact to schedule
interview sessions, usually via email and telephone.

3.5 Data Collection Methods
Since this study involved contact with human subjects as a result of the
interviewing data collection method, a research protocol was approved by the Georgia
State University‟s Institutional Review Board on July 3, 2008. As a result, data for this
research was collected using two key methods, in-depth interviews and document review.
By allowing for triangulation hence boosting the reliability and validity of the findings
(Yin 2003; Babbie 2004; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009), these two methods facilitated
a comprehensive appreciation of the relationship between funding and INGO autonomy
through seeking a convergence of evidence. Detailed below therefore, are descriptions of
the data collection methods adopted in this study.

3.5.1

Guided Interviews
Interviews are considered to be one of the most important sources of evidence of

case study information (Weiss 1993; Yin 2003; Kvale and Brinkman 2009). The decision
to employ qualitative interviews as a data collection method was inspired by the capacity
of the interview method to provide one with “access to the observations of others,” thus
yielding a deep understanding about a phenomenon (Weiss 1994; Rubin and Rubin 1995;
Babbie 2004). As a process of knowing through guided conversations, interviews are
appropriate for gaining insight and context (Kvale and Brinkman 2009) into the
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interactions between funding and INGO autonomy. As a result, interviews can inform us
about the nature of the relationship between government funding and INGOs‟ autonomy
by providing perceived causal inferences (Weiss 1994; Yin 2003; Kvale and Brinkman
2009).
To ensure consistency in data collection, an interview guide was used to focus and
direct the conversations on the topic of funding and its influence on autonomy (Yin
2003). Each participant was therefore asked the same set of questions with some
exceptions, while at same time allowing sufficient flexibility for probing emergent issues
(Weiss 1994; Rubin and Rubin 1995; Babbie 2004). The interview guide, which is
included in Appendix 3, focused on questions covering seven key areas: resource
dependence; the autonomy of INGOs; steering and control of the INGO by donors;
perceptions of general administrative red tape; the influence of grants, contracts, and
cooperative agreements; strategies of autonomy retention and additional questions on
board influence. This last set of questions was only asked to higher level staff such as,
executive directors, chief financial officers, as well as board members. Three pilot
interviews were conducted with staff members from an Atlanta-based direct relief and
development INGO. These interviews were instrumental in refining the interview guide.
The interviews from the pilot were not analyzed for this report.
In total, 19 interviews were conducted, with only one potential participant from
SIGMA declining to participate in the study because she felt unknowledgeable about
INGO funding issues. Despite my intention to conduct face-to-face interviews, at the
request of some respondents, five out of the 19 interviews (from the three cases) were
conducted via telephone. The order in which participants were interviewed was
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established on the basis of the availability of the staff members. Each face-to-face and
telephone interview lasted approximately 45 to 90 minutes. Extensive field notes were
also taken during each of the 19 interviews. Clarifications and follow-up questions were
all conducted via email and telephone.

3.5.1.1

Description of the Study Participants
Similar to the case selection process, participants for the study were also

purposively selected. In all three cases, my initial contact person from each of the INGOs
suggested possible participants I could interview based on their own assessment of my
information needs. These candidates were then contacted by email to establish suitability,
as well as set interview dates. Additional information emerging during the initial
screening, the data collection process and based on suggestions from some participants, I
was able to seek out additional participants to include in the study. Ultimately, this study
recruited individuals whose primarily role in the organization including soliciting funding
from different funding sources, especially USG funding. As a result all participants
interviewed had experience dealing with either government funding, foundation grants or
corporate gifts.
I also recruited Chief Executive Officers were possible, as well as Chief Financial
Officers in order to gain insight into government-INGO autonomy relationships at
strategic levels. And in order to augment the sample size, this study also recruited
members of the board who where available to give interviews. The following participants
and their roles were ultimately recruited for this study:
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Chief Executive Offices (CEOs): From ALPHA and SIGMA, which are the
smallest of the INGOs (N=2).
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs): From ALPHA and BETA, though for BETA,
this was an acting position for the participant. I also recruited BETA‟s Internal
Auditor, who had experienced dealing with the USG‟s A133 Audit and other
internal and external compliance issues (N=3)
Experts on USG Funding: In order to understand INGOs‟ experience with USG
funding, this research recruited participants with experience soliciting USG
funding, as well as responding to USG compliance and reporting requirements.
These included two participants from ALPHA that is, the Director of Grants and
Contracts Compliance and the Director of Institutional Funding. And from BETA,
I recruited the Director of Competitive Bids whose position involves identifying
funding announcements to respond to. (N=3).
o The following participants also had extensive experience with USG
funding: ALPHA‟s Program Director and the VP of International
Programs; BETA‟s VP of Global Support, the Director of Food Programs,
and the Director of Humanitarian Assistance (N=5). These directors had
experience implementing different USG-funded programs.
o Note that SIGMA‟s CEO and Program Coordinator (N=1), as well as
ALPHA‟s CEO also had experience dealing with USG funding. The two
participants from SIGMA are heavily involved in funding solicitation.
Foundation and Corporate Giving Experts: The study also recruited participants
experienced in soliciting and dealing with corporate and foundation funders.
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These included the BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations and ALPHA‟s
Foundations Expert (N=2)
o SIGMA‟s CEO and Program Coordinator also had experience dealing
with corporate giving.
Board of Directors: This research recruited ALPHA‟s Board Chair and Treasurer
and BETA‟s Board Secretary (N=3). For SIGMA however, the CEO and the
Program Coordinator also held the positions of Board Chair and Treasurer,
respectively.

3.5.2

Issues of Confidentiality
At the signed consent of all participants, all the interviews were audio recorded

using a digital voice recorder. The interviews were transcribed verbatim in order to
preserve the context of the responses. The transcription phase also presented me with an
opportunity to familiarize myself with the data. Both the audio files and transcribed files
were stored on a password-protected computer that only the researcher had access to.
And to further protect the confidentiality of the INGOs and participants recruited for this
study, pseudonyms in lieu of the real names of the organizations and the research
participants are used. The participants were made aware of these facts using the Informed
Consent Form included in Appendix 2.

3.5.3

Documentation Review
This research collected a number of documents as sources of evidence for the case

study. While the study relies mainly on data collected via face-to-face interviews;
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additional sources of data include strategic plans, corporate engagement guidelines,
annual reports from BETA and ALPHA. The study also reviewed an example of a
contract, grant, and cooperative agreement supplied by BETA. Table 6 below, provides a
summary of all the data sources. Due to privacy and confidentiality concerns surrounding
sharing some of the key documents needed for this research, I was unable to obtain
contracts, and grant cooperative agreements from the other INGOs. Furthermore, the
INGO also determined which parts of the documents to share with me.

Table 6: Overview of the Data
In-depth Interviews
(FTF & Telephone)
Field Notes

Documentation

Other Sources and
Documentation

ALPHA
< 20 percent USG-funded
9

BETA
c. 50 percent USG-funded
8

SIGMA
> 80 percent USG-funded
2

9
- Strategic Plan
-Annual Reports
- All efforts to obtain
grants and cooperative
agreements were futile.
The International
Programs Director
referred me to the website
http://www.grants.gov
instead

8
2
- Strategic Plan
All my efforts to obtain
-Annual Reports
documents from the
- 1 Cooperative
INGO were futile
Agreement
- 1 Grant
- 1 Contract
- Corporate Engagement
Guidelines
-Attempts to obtain
corporate and foundation
grants have been futile
- Websites: ALPHA, BETA, SIGMA, USAID; GRANTS.GOV
- Requests for Proposals and Requests for Agreements (RFP & RFA]
- “USAID Grants and Cooperative Agreements to Non-governmental Organization,”
Automated Directives System, Acquisition and assistance Chapter 303 [ADS 303]
- USAID Glossary of Automated Directives System [ADS]
- The 2002 Code of Federal Regulations Title 22 – Foreign Relations, Volume 1 of
Chapter III, “PART 226--ADMINISTRATION OF ASSISTANCE AWARDS TO
U.S. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.” [CFR 22]
- USAID Volag Reports (1999, 2004, 2006 & 2007) – contains Financial data on
U.S.-Based -PVOs registered with the USAID.

Additional documents were obtained from the USAID website, with the USAID
being the main U.S. agency responsible for implementing international aid programs.
Documents from the USAID include;
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Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 303: Grants and Cooperative
Agreements to Non-governmental Organization: This document describes the
“USAID‟s internal guidance, policy directives, required procedures, and standards
for the award and administration of USAID grants and cooperative agreements.”
Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 302: USAID Direct Contracting
(2009): This document describes the USAID‟s “policy directives and required
procedures for the procurement of goods and services through direct contracts.”
USAID Glossary of Automated Directives System (2009): This document provides
a list of definition of terms that the USAID and other USG funding agencies use,
thus establishing a common language and understanding of terms between the
USAID and its INGO contractors and recipients.
Automated Directives System Chapter 591: Financial Audits of USAID
Contractors, Recipients, and Host Government Entities (2005): This document
provides “policy directives and required procedures for planning and conducting
financial audits of USG-funded contractors, recipients, and host entities.”
Stipulated in this document is the requirement of an annual program-specific
financial and non-financial audit – called an A133 Audit, effective of 2004. This
applies to all U.S. nonprofit organizations that spend $500,000 or more of federal
awards within their fiscal year.
The 2002 Code of Federal Regulations Title 22 – Foreign Relations, Volume 1 of
Chapter III (CFR 22): Published by the federal government, this document is a
“codification of the general and permanent rules” governing the use of federal
funding. Title 22 of the CFR for instance, contains rules and regulations
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governing financial and program management, procurement standards, the
Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services, and Air Transportation, among other
areas. These rules are applicable to INGO recipients of USG funding.
Mandatory Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-Governmental Recipients: These
provisions are attached to all grants, contracts and cooperative agreements as a
reminder to INGO recipients of the rule and regulations they are required to
comply with as part of their funding agreements with USG funding agencies.

Note that as long as an INGO receives USG funding, the standard rules and
regulations contained in these documents apply to it. As such, these documents were used
as evidence to facilitate the process of triangulation described in detail in Chapter 4. And
due to limited access to actual contracts, grants and cooperative agreements, I decided to
review grants, contracts and cooperative agreements funding announcements from the
USAID instead.
The financial data used to guide the selection and profiling of the three INGOs are
obtained from the USAID Volag Reports. Unlike the publicly available NCCS-990 Core
data from the Urban Institute, which does not distinguish between government grants
from contracts, this data shows relatively distinct revenue sources for each INGO, i.e., the
amount of support and revenue coming from the USAID in the form of food donations,
contracts, and grants; support from the other USG bodies – also in the form of contracts
and grants; support from other governments and international organizations; in-kind
contributions, private contributions and private revenue. This data however, does not
distinguish between grants and cooperative agreements as these two are lumped together
under grants.
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3.6 Limitations of the Study
There are several shortcomings to this research. Like with any case study
approach, the findings in this study are only applicable to the three cases studied. As a
result, generalization of the findings is not only limited by the small sample size, it is also
limited by the limited number of participants interviewed for this study. However, this is
not to say that any one of these cases does not represent some class of USG-funded relief
and development INGOs; there are organizations similar to the three studied here.
Notwithstanding this limitation, confidence in the findings is enhanced by the multiple
cases studied, as well as the reliance on multiple sources of data which enabled
triangulation (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; 2009).
Second, the inability to access internal document due to privacy concerns resulted
in some INGOs providing access to more documents than others. This affected the
distribution of documents, with BETA providing more documentation. However, an
advantage emanating from the examples of grants, contracts and cooperative agreements
obtained from BETA is that the documents contained the USG Standard Provisions for
all U.S. Non-governmental Recipients. These standards contain rules and regulations
applicable to all INGOs recipients of USG funding, thus facilitating the triangulation
process.
In addition, alternative data sources were obtained to make up for this deficiency.
This research also reviewed a number of documents from the USAID. Such documents
include the USAID‟s ADS (303; 302) which define and explain USAID funding
instruments and when such instruments are used, the CFR 22 and a few funding
announcements.
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Finally, the nature of the subject of autonomy may have caused some participants
to become defensive due to the problem of social desirability. This is a tendency among
participants to provide distorted responses in an attempt to make themselves look better
or avoid making themselves look bad (Fowler 1998). Other sources of social desirability
include, providing distorted responses to avoid risking improper disclosure (e.g., about a
major funding source) or as a way of managing one‟s self-image because the respondents
do not want to think of themselves or their organization is a certain way (Fowler 1998).
However, positing the second question of how INGOs are mitigating autonomy
loss helped balance out this problem in that, the question assumed that an INGO was
already losing its autonomy. As a result, the question acted as a point of reflection for the
participants by compelling them to explicitly consider the strategies they have used to
exercise their autonomy.
In summary, the research questions outlined in this section suggest that this study
is both exploratory and explanatory in nature. This is largely inspired by the dearth of
autonomy measures in the nonprofit literature, as well as the scarcity of robust evidence
in support of the presumed negative link between government funding and INGO
autonomy. To gain insight on the complexity of INGO autonomy within the context of
funding, this research employs a qualitative multiple case study methodology. By so
doing, the design helps investigate “how” government funding, relative to other funding
sources such as foundations, individual contributions, and corporations, adversely
influences INGOs‟ autonomy across the different autonomy dimensions. In this regard,
one is able to provide explanations for the causal link between INGO autonomy loss and
government funding.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS

4.1

Introduction
Miles and Huberman (1994) outline three phases of a qualitative data analysis.

Data reduction is exemplified by data coding and generation of themes, while data
display organizes and compresses all the data codes and themes. According to the
authors, the information assembled here permits the drawing of inferences, which leads to
the final stage of drawing of conclusions and verification. In actuality, the qualitative
analysts establishes meaning of all the data “by noting regularities, patterns, explanations,
possible configurations, causal flows, and proposition,” right from the start of the data
collection process (Miles and Huberman 1994).
This chapter showcases the data analysis process. Using various data displays,
chapter outlines the nature of the data collected and coded for purposes of this research.
The coded data is compared to the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3 for
consistency. The chapter also outlines the process by which the research conclusions
were drawn and verified. And given that the emergent meanings from the data have to be
tested for plausibility, “confirmability,” or validity (Miles and Huberman‟s 1994; Yin
2003; Yin 2009), this chapter also addresses the ways in which validity tests were
conducted.
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), final phase of data analysis is in
qualitative research – the verification of the conclusions, can be achieved by simply
revisiting a second thought the analyst had or what Yin (2003; 2009) refers to as
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revisiting rival hypotheses. This is when the analyst takes excursions back to the field
notes and memos to confirm hunches (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Yin 2009).
In addition, various triangulation techniques can be employed to facilitate this process.
For instance, the analysts can conduct an in-depth review in an effort to establish
“intersubjective consensus,” a type of triangulation Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to
as triangulation by researcher. Since only one researcher was involved in this research,
rival hypotheses were sought and explored and other triangulation techniques were
employed.
Yin (2003; 2009) asserts that, in order to link data to the hypotheses and confirm
the findings emerging from one‟s analysis, data needs to converge in a triangulation
fashion, that is, through a synthesis and integration of multiple sources of data. This study
relied on what Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to as triangulation by method that is,
when data collected through different methods such as, observations, interviews or
documents, converges. A second form of triangulation – by source, is also employed in
this study; this is when data from different participants corroborates.
In view of these distinctions and of the nature of the data available for this
analysis, this research adopted the following triangulation rule for both the within-case
and pooled case analyses. Findings were considered corroborated when evidence from
both the interview data and any one of the documentation converged (methodological
triangulation). And for situations where supporting documents were unavailable, as in the
case of foundations and corporate gifts, the findings were considered confirmed when
two or more of participants‟ experiences, across any of the three cases corroborated or
converged (source triangulation).
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And as Yin (2003; 2009) also pointed out, “if two or more cases are shown to
support the same theory, replication may be claimed” especially compared to a rival
theory. As a result, the process of triangulation helped strengthen the interpretation of the
findings, thus increasing the reliability and validity of the findings (Yin 2003; Baxter and
Jack 2008; Yin 2009).

4.2 Notes on the Methods of Analysis
To facilitate the data analysis process, I used a qualitative software package called
NVIVO 8. In order to facilitate a systematic data analysis, I employed the grounded
theory techniques of open, axial, and selective coding.
Aside from defining the research questions, articulating the research hypotheses,
and the unit(s) of analysis, some of the major challenges to using the case study approach
include identifying the logic linking the data to the hypotheses and establishing “criteria
for interpreting the findings” (Yin 2003). The use of multiple cases however offers
solutions to this challenge through pattern matching and triangulations techniques.
The multiple-case study approach not only enables cross-case comparisons and
syntheses (Yin 2003; Yin 2009); it also permits within-case analyses. In light of this and
the theoretical frameworks applied in this research, the data analysis process, using the
pattern matching technique, takes place at two levels. Recognition of the “organization”
as the resource dependence framework‟s unit of analysis, this study conducted withincase analysis by examining data collected for each INGO. And to test the tool choice
hypotheses, the study employed the cross-case analysis by examining data pooled from
all three INGOs.
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Before probing into the nature of the data, the following sections describe the
nature of the qualitative software used to assist with the data organization, management
and data mining processes, as well as the methods used for data coding. This is followed
by a description of the codes, nodes or concepts generated from the data and a description
of the nature of the emergent data used in this research.

4.2.1

NVIVO 8: Organizing and Managing Qualitative Data
The analysis of the interview transcripts is centered on a qualitative analysis of

texts using a qualitative data analysis software package called NVIVO 8. The software
package, an updated version of NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing,
Searching and Theorizing), is highly recognized for its ability to improve the quality of
analysis by assisting the researcher with the organization and management of data files
(Ozkan 2004; Bazeley 2007). The researcher does the coding and analysis; the software
simply helps the researcher to organize and manage the data and the themes generated
(Ozkan 2004; Bazeley 2007), allowing for a systematic analysis (Yin 2003; Yin 2009).
A key advantage of NVIVO is that the software allows one to “package” the
emerging themes from different participants across different research questions. In
addition, data analysis can be conducted on a question by question basis to compare how
different participants responded to the same questions. To facilitate the basic coding and
analysis, this research used a grounded theory approach as a channeling technique for the
identification of themes and patterns from the data. It is important to highlight that the
NVIVO 8 software only helped me to organize and manage the data in order to facilitate
a systematic analytical approach for data mining. As a result, while much of my judgment
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is involved in the process of interpreting and drawing meaning from the data, as well as
arriving at the conclusions reached in this report; this is done in consultation with the
data, as well as, the triangulation techniques identified above.
Note that NVIVO 8 also has other functions such as memoing, annotations, and
queries, which can be instrumental in searching for evidence that can be utilized in
hypothesis testing.

4.2.2

Pattern Matching Technique Using a Grounded Theory Approach
Unlike quantitative analysis, qualitative data analysis “involves a radically

different way of thinking about data” given that it forces the researcher to “listen” to the
data, by allowing the data to speak to them (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998).
Consistent with the hallmark of qualitative research, the researcher becomes the
instrument of analysis. Such a methodology therefore calls for a more flexible and less
rigid approach to one‟s data analysis. And this is where a grounded theory approach is
instrumental in helping one to organize one‟s data analytical process by implementing
three distinct phases. The approach also provides a systematic procedure for analyzing
qualitative data by enabling the researcher to identify the patterns or themes within the
interview data using distinct analytical processes (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998;
LaRossa 2005).
Using LaRossa‟s (2005) interpretation of grounded theory approach, a method
consisting three main phases of open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. I began
with the open coding phase, which is an analytical process where “data is broken down
into distinct incidents, ideas, events, and acts and are then given a name that represents or
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stands for these” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This process “open(s) up the text and
expose(s) the thoughts, ideas, and meanings contained therein” (Strauss and Corbin
1998). Open coding therefore, fosters a microscopic examination of the text, by
promoting a detailed, line-by-line analysis with the intent to break the data into discrete
concepts or variables (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005).
The axial coding phase on the other hand, involves an intense analysis conducted
around an individual concept or theme. The process entails asking questions about how
the emergent categories or concepts could be linked to one another, under what
conditions, and with what consequences (Strauss and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005). The
process involves a deliberate search for clues that reveal potential ways in which the
concepts emerging from the interview data could be related to each another along
different dimensions. For example, in order to understand the relationship between
managerial autonomy with respect to human resource management and the concept of
funding – I searched the data for evidence indicating variation across different funders.
As a result, a statement like the following would signal the existence of variation among
funder with regards to human resource management.
The USG wants to review your chief of party, but foundations don‟t really
care about that.
Asking the data questions like, “Does the USG approve the chief of party for
every project? If not, under what conditions does it render its approval,” helps one
interpret the relationships, as well as test one‟s hypotheses.
Finally, once the key themes or concepts were identified, the selective coding
phase helped to integrate and refine categories or concepts into a coherent theory or
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“story” (Strauss and Corbin 1998), that is, to identify the “main story underlying the
analysis” (LaRossa 2005). This phase helped channel this analysis toward a focus on
USG funding and its associative impact on INGOs‟ autonomy, relative to other funding
sources, thus centering the “story” around this relationship.
To ensure a systematic analysis, I employed the concept-indicator comparison
model introduced by Glaser (1978), but refined by LaRoass (2005). This is predicated
upon a constant comparison of the indicators of concepts, i.e., the labels associated with
particular indicators, as well as, the concepts themselves, as one conducts open and axial
coding. Constant comparison is achieved through the identification of similarities and
differences between indicators and their subsequent concepts (LaRossa 2005). The
identification is achieved by asking questions such as; “What is being talked about here?
What does this sentence connote? What is going on here? What is the story?” Asking
these questions also helps one bring meaning to the data by enabling one to advance from
data analysis into the interpretation realm (Rossman and Rallis 2003).
Based on this grounded theory approach therefore, the first step in my analysis
was to conduct a careful microscopic, line-by-line analysis of all the transcribed
interviews. Using open coding, I examined words, sentences, and phrases, and was able
to identify a number of indicators related to the different dimensions of autonomy.
Instead of giving these indicators new labels (referred to as nodes in NVIVO), I labeled
indicators using the existing autonomy dimensions labels of financial, managerial,
structural, operational and interventional autonomy formulated by Verhoest, Peters et al.
(2004). Using the descriptions of each of the autonomy dimensions, I was able to identify
numerous phrases or indicators that aligned well with the definitions and descriptions.
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Based on this process, I was able to identify multiple indicators leaning towards each of
the autonomy dimensions with the exception of legal autonomy and to a limited extent,
structural autonomy. The concept-indicator in Table 7 shows some examples of
indicators used to identify the autonomy dimensions coded from the interview data using
open coding. Note that a theoretically saturated concept would have numerous indicators
(LaRossa 2005).

INDICATORS (phrases or sentences)

Table 7: Concept-Indicator Model
Managerial

Financial

*They can reject
your key personnel,
they can simply say
look, your chief of
party isn‟t acceptable
to us, find another
one. I think that‟s
fair, sadly, who holds
the purse strings
basically gets to
make some
decisions.
* they don‟t dictate
who we hire – for
key personnel,
particularly for a
contract, they do
have approval over
that, they do have to
agree to that, so yeah
– with any big award.
It is usually chief of
party or something at
that level needs to get
the approval of the
donor, of the USG.
*I mean it‟s a fairly
complex bureaucracy
and so they prefer
someone who has
been through it, who
understands the
ropes, rather than
someone who
doesn‟t.
*we are setting up a
Grants Compliance
Unit, that‟s a new
unit, but we have had
a compliance officer,
but just one person.
So we are increasing
the resources

*USAID is the worst
… but they are also
our single largest
donor so we don‟t
have any choice.
* (Referring to US
government funding)
We‟ve actually gone
down, when I first
gone down here I think
it was 60% and now
it‟s about 40%.
* Everybody can go
well, “we kind of agree
with this but we are
not prepared to give up
the money because
there is not
replacement money.”
* Are you looking for
resource support to
basically fill your cash
pipelines and even
though it may not be
optimally what you
would like to do? I‟m
still going to do it
because I need cash to
run my program?

LABELS/NODES
Operational
Structural
*If the organization
says we are going to
program this way,
and you know, if
some of that resource
support doesn‟t
match the way we
would like to
program – you say
ok, thank you, but we
can‟t do this anymore
*there were restricted
projects that they
didn‟t allow us to
achieve the full
potential of our
programs
*The grant spells out
exactly that, it
doesn‟t allow you to
do any other things…
If we identify (other)
issues.., with those
very closed project,
we don‟t address
those issues that we
identify as we
implement this
program
*The difference is we
made a decision on
how we were going
to use their resource
or not and that was
our decision.
*A contract is a
different type of
relationship…you
have to be willing to
pretty much take
whatever direction
that they are going to
give you
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*The global
organization International
Headquarters (IH)
– has a central
coordinating
function and they
are getting money
from us and 16
other national
organizations and
coordinating
through budgeting,
and cash
management and
internal control
processes, where
the money goes
and what it‟s going
to be spent on,
unless it has been
designated by the
donor to be spent
in a certain way.
*we have such a
diverse set of
funding because
we have 16 other
offices like
ALPHA

Interventional

Constraints

*USAID is the
worst as far as the
independent audits
and what we are
having to do to
comply with them...
*This whole time
and effort in
reporting, if we
don‟t get that in
place, we could
lose millions of
dollars –and so the
time and effort we
are spending to put
in place and the
time and effort
reporting is for just
for one donor – and
so it‟s we either do
it or we can‟t take
that money
*So the reporting
has gotten much
more rigorous
*But a $10,000
donation to a CO
might not have as
significant type
reporting
*therefore we
report on how we
spend that fund

*Most of their rules
and regulations is
how we spend that
funding.
*Now the USAID
has a standard book
of indicators, you
have to have
certain indicators
that align with
those indicators
*we do what are
called A133 audits
… an audit of the
financial
statements…more
importantly it is an
audit of compliance
with government
rules and
regulations and an
audit of the internal
controls to promote
compliance
*But the largest
constraints are
often over some of
the financial
reporting and the
booking side of it,
they want to see
very detailed
records of how the
money was spent

Picturing each of these labels or free nodes as a “basket,” I placed only those
indicators that resonated with the definition of that label into the baskets. A free node is
simply a „stand-alone‟ container or basket that is not linked to other nodes or labels (QSR
2008). I initially generated 40 free nodes; however, not all of the nodes were related to
the subject of INGO autonomy. This is also one area were selective coding became
instrumental in deciding which of the nodes to include to support the central “story.” This
decision was also guided by how many of the nodes were theoretically saturated.

INGO AUTONOMY

FUNDING SOURCE
Government (USG) (3)

Operational (3)

Foundations (3)
Managerial (3)

Corporations (2)
Individuals (3)
TOOL CHARACTER
Coercive (3)
Restrictive (3)
Direct (3)

STRATEGIES
CONSTRAINTS

Diversifying (3)
Congruence – Fit (3)

Ex Ante (3)

Due Diligence (2)

Interventional (3)

NGO Capacity (2)

Structural (3)

Walk Away (2)

Financial (3)

Figure 4: Tree Nodes: Parent Nodes with their Child Nodes, by Case

Using axial coding and the constant-comparison techniques, I was able to reduce
29 of the 40 free nodes generated to 5 tree nodes – leaving 11 free nodes that are not used
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for purposes of this research. Trees nodes are labels organized in a hierarchical structure,
moving from a parent node (general label) to more specific nodes (child nodes) (Bazeley
2007; QSR 2008a; 2008b). Each child note therefore has its own indicators, i.e., those
generated during the open coding phase. Once I began to ask questions about how these
nodes or common themes of patterns could be related, it was then that I was able to
reduce 29 of the free nodes to the 5 tree nodes shown in Figure 4 above.
Therefore Figure 4 shows the 5 tree nodes used to respond to the research
questions addressed in this research. Note that each of the child nodes represents a
“basket,” and each of the baskets contains various indicators or phrases coded from the
interview data. Each of the indicators is regarded as evidence to support the label. The
process of placing indicators in appropriate baskets was also facilitated by the constant
comparison of the phrases or indicators.
The numbers shown in the parentheses illustrates the number of INGOs that
contributed to the discussion of each of these concepts. For example, participants from all
three cases contributed to the discussion around their experiences with coercive tools.
And information on INGOs‟ experience with corporate funding could only be found in
interviews from two of the cases (SIGMA and BETA). With regard to strategies for
managing the risk of autonomy loss, BETA and ALPHA contributed a lot to this
discussion, with SIGMA contributing to the discussion surrounding the subject of
revenue diversification and congruence and fit of funded programs. This information
therefore gives us a rough idea of where information supporting these concepts or themes
originated from.
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4.3 Description of Data
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research does not rely on correlation
matrices, regression coefficients and significant tests to showcase the correlation between
variables and the strength of the findings. Instead, this research relies on techniques such
as counts; and matrices to show points of consensus among participants within the same
organization, as well as across cases. Various descriptive data displays are therefore
employed to populate the evidence emerging from the data.
An advantage of NVIVO 8 is that, it keeps a record of the number of sources used
to code for each concept, as well as a count of the indicators used to populate that node.
As shown in Table 8 below, the numbers under the source column reflect the number of
interviews from which indicators pertaining to the subsequent concepts or nodes were
coded from. The numbers under the reference column show a count of each indicator,
phrase or word coded for each of the concepts indicated in the first column. However,
care should also be taken when interpreting these numbers since a single interview
(source) can have multiple references, while others may only have referenced the concept
a few times.
To help bring more light to the richness of the data, Table 8 also breaks down
these counts by case. Note that these numbers are based only on the interview data and
not the documents review. This is primarily due to NVIVO‟s sensitivity when uploading
particular files. Due files size or formats, I was unable to upload some documents into
NVIVO for coding. These documents were therefore reviewed manually.
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Table 8: Key Nodes by Count and by INGO
Dependent Variables
INGO AUTONOMY
Operational
Managerial

Source

Intervening Variables
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE

Source

18
15

References

Count

91
38
References

ALPHA
9 (43)
6 (18)

Count

ALPHA

BETA
7 (42)
7 (14)
BETA

SIGMA
2 (6)
2 (6)
SIGMA

CONSTRAINTS
Discretion
Ex Ante
Ex Post (Interventional)

15
17

37
80

7 (14)
7 (32)

6 (21)
8 (32)

2 (2)
2 (16)

Resource Importance
Financial

17

42

8 (12)

7 (19)

2 (11)

Other
Structural

3

7

3 (7)

0

0

ALPHA

BETA

Resource Alternatives
(Included under restrictive tools)
Independent Variables
FUNDING SOURCES
Government
USG

Source

References

Foundations
Corporations
Individual Contributions
Source
TOOL CHARACTERISTICS
Coercive
Restrictive
Direct
Strategies
Diversification
Congruence – Fit

13
10
9
Source
13
15

References

Count
226
296

127
137

57
112

42
47
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90

41

20

89
30
Count

32
25
20
References
30
41

SIGMA

Count

30
89
ALPHA

48
8
BETA

11
0
SIGMA

5 (15)
2 (2)
4 (10)

6 (14)
6 (13)
3 (8)

2 (3)
2 (10)
2 (2)

ALPHA
6 (11)
8 (25)

BETA
5 (13)
5 (10)

SIGMA
2 (6)
2 (6)

Due Diligence

8

17

3(5)

4 (10)

1 (2)

NGO Capacity
Walk Away

10
9

23
25

5 (9)
4 (11)

4 (11)
5 (14)

1 (3)
0

OTHER
INGO Professionalism
INGO Donor Influence

18
9

79
29

8 (34)
4 (13)

8 (38)
5 (16)

2 (7)
0
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This variable model above (Table 8) shows the variables that emerged from an
analysis of the interview data. The funding sources row shows word counts grouped by
INGO. For example, across all 19 interviews, the word government was mentioned 226
times. Participants in ALPHA mentioned the word 127 times, compared to BETA‟s 57
times and SIGMA‟s 42 times. The word USG on the other hand, was mentioned 296
times, with ALPHA mentioning the words 137 times. The word foundation(s) was
mentioned 151 times, while the corporate funding, corporation or corporations were
mentioned a combined 89 times. Only ALPHA spoke of individual contributions in terms
of sponsorships and participants mentioned this word 89 times. The word individual and
contributions were mentioned 41 and 30 times, respectively. Other words of interests
include rules (69), regulations (59), requirements (50), and reporting (64 times).
Table 8 also shows some of the key strategies that emerged from the data. 13
participants (6 from ALPHA; 5 from BETA and 2 from SIGMA) identified revenue
diversification as an autonomy retention strategy. And 15 participants out of the 19
interviewed, made reference to the need for INGOs to ensure that the goals embedded in
funding announcements were congruent with their own. From the 15 participants, 8 were
from ALPHA, 5 from BETA and 2 from SIGMA. Another interesting theme emerging
from the interview data analysis is that of INGO professionalism; 18 out of the 19
participants interviewed for this research felt that USG funding had helped improve the
professionalism of INGOs, especially with respect to establishing systems that encourage
self-evaluation. This theme was coded 79 times.
It is also important to note that the numbers shown in the INGO Autonomy,
Constraints, and Tool Characteristics rows represent the number of interviews from
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which these concepts were coded. For example, data from 17 out of the 19 participants‟
interviews contained indicators suggesting the existence of interventional constraints. Of
the 17 interviews, 32 indicators were coded from 7 interviews from ALPHA. Another 32
indicators were coded from all of BETA‟s 8 participants‟ interviews and the remaining
16 indicators were generated from SIGMA‟s two interviews. These numbers therefore
suggest that the topic of ex post controls was a hot subject among participants from all
three INGOs.
There is also evidence to support the existence of operational or policy autonomy
concept from 18 of the 19 participants interviewed. Of the 91 indicators used to code for
this concept, 43 came from all 9 of ALPHA‟s participants, 42 indicators from 7
participants from BETA and only 6 indicators from SIGMA‟s two interviews. This too
suggests that the data from all three INGOs contained strong evidence supporting the
existence of the concept of operational autonomy. In addition, 17 out of the 19
participants also gave indication of the importance of an INGO‟s financial autonomy.
In addition to ex post controls, Table 8 also suggests that a keen discussion took
place around the idea of the ex ante controls utilized by funding sources. This discussion
provided strong evidence to suggest that such ex ante, (mid-course) and ex post
constraints do steer and control INGOs‟ decisions as will be shown in the findings. 15 out
of 19 participants pointed to the existence of ex ante constraints associated with the
INGOs‟ funding sources – that is, 7 participants from ALPHA, 6 participants from BETA
and the two participants from SIGMA.
These numbers provide strong evidence to suggest that the presence of ex ante
controls create tightly controlled environments within which INGOs‟ decision making
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occurs. For instance, as a way of ensuring that USAID policy interests are met, INGOs
are required to adopt USAID indicators in their evaluation plans. However, this does not
mean that INGOs cannot include indicators of their own. And according to Section
226.21 (a) of the Code of Federal Rules, INGO recipients are required to “relate financial
data (including budget plans) to performance whenever practical,” for evaluation
purposes. Linking ex ante promises to ex post evaluation and reporting requirements may
stand to ensures and verifies that INGOs do what they promised by holding INGOs
accountable to ex ante promises.
In contrast to the conceptual model shown in Figure 2 (in Chapter 3), the variable
model in Table 8 shows evidence to suggest a strong consistency between the two
models, with some exceptions. This consistency is strong across all other factors with the
exception of resource dependence‟s resource alternatives factors. However, evidence
supporting the existence of regulations restricting access to alternative funding sources
was coded under the tool choices‟ restrictive label.
A second area of inconsistency is seen in the disappearance of a number of the
organizational autonomy dimensions. The employment of the constant-comparison
techniques in the close examination of the indicators groups under each of these concepts
revealed tautological issues associated with trying to operationalize Verhoest, Peters et
al.‟s (2004) dual conceptualization of autonomy. To correct for this, and based on the
emergent themes, this research moved to regard the authors‟ second formulation of
autonomy (as the presence of constraints), in terms of intervening variables that lead to a
depreciation in an organization‟s autonomy. This is discussed in detail in Section 4.4.3.
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Description of Key Topics, by Case
Table 9 summarizes the distribution of topics discussed by case. Some details are
not shown in order to preserve the confidentiality of the INGOs.
Table 9: Summary Description of the Cases and Participants
Founded
Scope of Work

Total Revenue &
Support (FY2006)
Major Funding Sources
(FY2006)

Major USG Funding
Tool Used

# of Staff Interviewed
(including their
Positions)

# of Participants who
talked about Contracts
# of Participants who
talked about Grants
# of Participants who
talked about
Cooperative Agreements

# of Participants who
talked about Individual
Contributions
# of Participants who
talked about
Unrestricted Funding

ALPHA
1930s
Children-Focused
development programs,
including relief efforts

BETA
1940s
Women and Childrenfocused development
programs, including
relief efforts

SIGMA
1980s
Generalist-focused
development programs,
including relief efforts

$38 million
Private Support,
including Individual
Contributions (91%);
USG (9%)
Grants (100%)

$656 million
USG Funding (41%);
Other Governments and
International
Organizations (36%)
Grants (69%);
Donated Food & Freight
(31%)

$29 million
USG Funding (94%);
Private Support (6%)

9
Positions:
Executive Director;
Chief Financial Officer;
Dir. of International
Programs;
Director of Grants and
Contracts Compliance;
Dir. of Institutional
Funding;
Foundations Expert;
Program Director;
Chairman of the Board;
Treasurer of the Board
8 (Excludes the Board
Treasurer)
9

8
Positions:
Acting Chief Financial
Officer;
Dir. of Competitive
Bids;
Dir. of Humanitarian
Assistance;
Deputy Dir. of External
Relations;
VP of Global Support;
Dir. of Food Programs;
Internal Auditor;
Secretary of the Board
7 (Excludes Acting
CFO)
8

4 (CEO; Dir. of Grants
and Contracts
Compliance; Dir. of
Institutional Funding &
the Program Dir.)
8 (Excludes the Dir. of
Grants and Contracts
Compliance)
3 (CEO; Program
Director & VP of
International Programs)

3 (Dir. of Competitive
Bids; VP of Global
Support & Dir. of
Humanitarian
Assistance)
2 (External Relations &
Dir. of Competitive
Bids)
3 (Acting CFO; External
Relations & Dir. of
Competitive Bids)
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Contracts (48%);
Grants (29%);
Donated Food & Freight
(23%)
2
Positions:
Chief Executive Officer
(also the Chairman of
the Board);
Program Coordinator
(also the Treasurer of
the Board)

2
2
1
(CEO)

0

1
(CEO)

As noted above, all the cases are directly replicable since they were selected from
the same subfield of INGOs engaged in relief and development. The cases also exhibit
variations in their dependence on government funding. In order to display the nature of
the data used in this study, Table 9 also shows the numbers of participants who talked
about grants, contracts, cooperative agreements and unrestricted funding. Detailed
financial information for each of the INGOs is provided in Chapter 5. This section details
the data variance between the three cases, including variance in the topics discussed by
participants within these three cases. This section outlines this data with respect to the
context under which these topics were discussed.

4.3.1 Discussion on the Nature of Funding Tools
Compared to grants and cooperative agreements, all 18 participants who
discussed contracts (all participants from BETA and from ALPHA), agreed that contracts
are very specific in terms of what is expected of INGOs, thus establishing INGOs as
contractors of the USG. With the exception of SIGMA‟s CEO, all other participants
expressed a preference for grants and cooperative agreements compared to contracts.
Overall, data from all 18 participants indicated that dealing with contracts would require
a specialized machine – that is, strong capacity to take on the high compliance
expectations associated with contracts.
Speaking on the coercive nature of contracts, compared to grants, and whether the
funding tools employed by the USG to finance INGOs‟ activities influence INGOs‟
decision making and activities; BETA‟s VP of Global Support had this to say,
It matters very much; I mean, a cooperative agreement is much easier to
work through, contracts are the difficult ones because, contracts are almost
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business documents and everything is set out very clearly and we have
very little leeway in terms of how we can influence that. I mean, the steps
are there, you just have to follow them 1, 2 and 3; while a cooperative
agreement is much looser, and we have a chance to influence it and
modify it a bit if needed. Grants and cooperative agreements are very
similar. And BETA prefers cooperative agreements or grants.
Unfortunately the USG is going much more towards contracts and it is
much harder for us because it doesn‟t give us the leeway that would prefer
to have.

This view was commonly shared among all participants, again, with the exception
of SIGMA‟s CEO who found contracts easier to deal with as a result of their specificity.
In his view, the specificity of outputs, tasks and outcomes actually simplifies what is
expected of SIGMA. In other words, the specificity of contracts actually frees the INGO
to do only that which is specified in the contract, that way, “there would be no surprises.”
An interesting subject emerging from the literature is one of the degree to which
USG-funded INGOs can exercise their autonomy in some way given that USG funding
has largely been considered as a more exacting funding source. In light of the foreign
policy climate surrounding USG funding, participants from ALPHA and BETA pointed
out that their INGOs are strategic in the way they make choices about which Requests for
Agreements (RFAs), that is, the grants and cooperative agreements that they choose to
respond to. This suggests that different grant requests impose different restrictions and
limitations on INGOs such that their ability to choose between different RFAs provides
INGOs with some latitude to make strategic choices in the kinds of relationships they
want to enter into with the USG. The idea is that INGOs are at least autonomous in
making that choice. This also suggests that all grants restrict INGOs in some unique way.
As a result, the choice of RFA to respond to becomes one of weighing the benefits and
costs based on inherent restrictions and requirements.
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In light of this, participants from both ALPHA and BETA emphasized the need
for INGOs to carefully scrutinize the contents of contracts and grants announcements and
awards, a process others referred to as due diligence. For example, according to its
Treasurer, ALPHA makes,
choices in terms of what grants to go after and so if there is a USG grant
or grant from a multi-lateral donor, that‟s going to put some kind of
restrictions on our activities then we choose not to participate.
ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Contracts Compliance also pointed out the
following;
Our key focus is “compliance,”… so if a request for application (RFA)
comes out, we read it through and pull out all the requirements because
there is compliance when you submit a proposal too… Our unit is
involved is throughout the whole life of a project from the decision on
whether to bid on something or not. We may look at something and say,
look there are inordinate amount of requirements on this for a small
amount of money, and we just don‟t think that the cost-benefit ratio is
worth it.
And according to BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance,
BETA is very deliberate in analyzing where we will work in country. So at
times we don‟t work where donors would like us to be operating.

Illustrating the process of sifting through grant solicitation, the following
statement from BETA‟s Direct of Competitive Bids outlines how grant solicitations are
selected;
We distribute it the COs… then we will ask them to let us know their gono-go decision… we have a whole set of tools about what types of factors
they look at. They look at their capacity and alignment with their own
country operating strategy, they look at the competition, and they look at
what it would take them to do it, in terms of partners and resources and the
feasibility of implementing it.
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So if they are and usually if they are issues with the bid, I mean policy
issues, then those get uncovered pretty early in the process. For example,
recently there was an RFA that came out in Afghanistan, it was called
IDEAS. It was for some alternative development… a poppy substitution
and it required that you would work very closely with the Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRTs) – kind of the USG military Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and you would have to work very
closely with those. BETA determined that while we wanted to… work
with the farmers on improving their income and their livelihood; we did
not want to work closely with the US military. So after about a week of
going back and forth, and we asked questions, really because it wasn‟t
clearly how closely you were going to have to work with them – so we
submitted questions to USAID and then they answered and we decided no,
we couldn‟t go for it.
The same sentiments were also articulated by BETA‟s Humanitarian Assistance
Director; however, he goes further to state that,
a grant that is somehow amended to also meet some of the donor
requirements… does affect how we implement it on the ground because
we need to comply with the grant regulations…. but that being said, it
doesn‟t necessarily mean that we are influenced or driven by that grant.
This view helps explain ALPHA‟s Board Chair‟s perception that the USG is not
necessarily “restrictive” but is “demanding” as shown in the rival hypotheses section
below. Her statement, in light of the above views, suggests that by responding to
particular grants and not others, INGOs in essence demonstrate their willingness to and
acceptance of compliance requirements inherent in funding tools and associated with
USG funding. However, because of the inherent compliance requirements, USG funding
is seen to be demanding since INGOs are still held accountable for what is expected of
them, according to those agreements. In other words, complying with USG regulations
and various other expectations is demanding, hence why both ALPHA and BETA have
established formal Grants and Contracts Compliance Units “just to keep up with
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government regulations” (Director of Grants and Compliance, ALPHA, also highlighted
by BETA‟s Internal Auditor)
As a result, there was a great deal of discussion in the interview data about the
differences between contracts, grants and cooperative agreements and the implications of
that on INGOs‟ decision making and implementation. This discussion was mostly
associated with a common emergent theme of the presence of various ex ante regulations
attached to different funding tools that INGOs have to comply with in exchange of
receiving USG funding. This also suggests that by signing a grant agreement and hence
signaling one‟s acceptance of the terms therein, an INGO in some ways automatically
foregoes some measure of its autonomy. As ALPHA‟s Grant and Compliance Director
and Program Director, and BETA‟s Director of Competitive Bids all pointed out, grants
are essentially “conditional gifts.”
A great deal of discussion also took place around financial and non-financial ex
ante and ex post controls. Participants talked about the degree to which funders
scrutinized INGOs‟ budgets, and spending, as well as how INGOs are required to comply
with different procurement rules. A highly discussed ex post requirement attached to the
USG funding is the A133 audit. The A133 Audit of State, Local Governments, and
Nonprofit Organizations requires nonprofit spending more than half a million dollars of
federal funds annually to have this audit. According the OMB circular, the A133 audit
closely tracks and classifies revenue received from the federal government, by looking
for compliance with general and specific government audit requirements covering
financial and non-financial factors such as program effectiveness, efficient use of
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resources, and the allocation and spendability of federal resources. External auditors also
test for the adequacy of INGOs‟ internal control systems.
While participants from all three INGOs described the A133 Audit as being rather
tedious and quite demanding since it requires INGOs to be more careful in how they
allocate and spend federal funds through rule compliance; participants also indicated that
the audit also encourages INGOs to become more professional in their recording keeping
and information tracking. In other words, the audit requirement and other ex post
monitoring and evaluation requirements may have compelled these INGOs to develop
advanced internal financial controls, efficient procurement practices, as well as establish
formal evaluation practices.

4.3.2 Discussion on INGO‟s Capacity to Influence Funding Agencies
In spite of the nature of funding tools and restrictions associated with funding
sources, participants also talked about the different ways their INGOs exert influence on
the contents and terms of funding agreements. The interview data provides information to
suggest that INGOs have room to negotiate, during the grant application phase, what the
final grant agreements would look like. BETA‟s Director of Food Programs highlights
this point in the following statement,
What essentially happens is you assess the need, design your program and
then you prepare your proposal and if approved, you implement it… With
Title II Programs… like any grantee, you can try and push the envelope a
bit, but at some point, you can‟t go over the line. So I wouldn‟t call it
necessarily autonomy as much as flexibility and I think we have had a fair
amount of flexibility as programs have been evolving.
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First, participants pointed out that their INGOs respond to RFAs by articulating
the activities to be implemented (through the implementation plans they design in
consultation with the funding announcement guidelines), the outputs or results of those
activities, and the cost function associated with the activities (budget plan). It appears
therefore that INGOs can influence USG programs by putting their “signature” on
program activities. In a sense, INGOs exercise their autonomy during this stage since the
specifics of the program (unless stipulated by the USG, as with contracts and other
unsolicited funding), originate with the INGOs. All 19 participants agreed that the USG
Technical Cognizant Officers (TCOs) would then review and evaluate the INGOs‟
programmatic proposals and would either suggest amendments or decline the proposals
altogether. In order for proposals to be accepted, they would need to include the USG‟s
program objectives and goals.
A review of the data also suggests a second opportunity for INGOs to exercise
their autonomy and this comes once the INGOs have received the Letter of Award from
the funding agency. Consistent with views from BETA‟s Director of Competitive Bids,
ALPHA‟s Director of Funding highlights this observation in the following statement;
Once you get to the letter of award, you then begin the negotiation process
with the government agency as to what the final agreement would look
like. And once you get to an agreement, you sign the agreement and you
start implementing the project.

In addition, INGOs can also suggest changes to the implementation plans during
the implementation phase; however, this can cause delays for the INGO since any
deviations from the agreed-upon agreements require USG review and approval,
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suggesting a type of ex ante or mid-course constraint. These views were common shared
among all the participants with USG experience.
The data also highlights the recognition that INGOs operate in specific funding
environments that are laden with unique politics and cultures, as well as, the limitations
and controls inherent therein. Also emergent from this data is that, it is equally important
to recognize that INGOs also operate in a broader humanitarian environment that has its
own culture and generates its own language of best practices. As a result, such an
environment also stands to strengthen INGOs‟ bargaining power and ability to push back
when funder attempt to co-opt them. In other words, the humanitarian assistance and
development community has devised its own culture of doing things and best practices
which funding agencies may have to respect. This view was shared by 4 participants from
ALPHA and 5 participants from BETA.
The above suggests avenues INGOs can take to militate against complete
autonomy loss. Other avenues open to INGO influence are explicated in the following
statement by BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations,
Corporate philanthropy is changing, whereas in the past, corporations
would kind of sit down as a foundation and say $200,000 to BETA,
$100,000 to the United Way. That type of philanthropy from an
international development perspective is different were BETA just doesn‟t
want the $200,000. They want to sit down with the corporation and help
influence their policies, especially corporations that are international and
corporations that have presence in the countries we work with. We want to
sit down with them and talk about, you know, Child-labor practices, we
want to talk about how they can be very socially responsible and they are
also approaching BETA and saying, can you help us develop a better
sustainability program for our organization
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4.3.3 Discussion on Unrestricted Funding
Across all the 7 participants who talked about unrestricted funding (3 from
BETA, 3 from ALPHA and 1 from SIGMA), the conversation illuminated on how this
type of funding source affords INGOs with the ultimate level of autonomy. One
participant described unrestricted funding as,
flexible funding…, (that is), the blood that causes this whole organization
to function. (BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations)
And according to ALPHA‟s Program Director, unrestricted funding is what
allows INGOs to accomplish,
what is near and dear to their hearts.

The only limitation associated with unrestricted funds is how costly it is to
acquire as noted in a statement by BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director.
Unrestricted (funding) being the kind of funding that is not project-tied….
is very expensive to get – it is more expensive to get unrestricted than
restricted, you have to invest more dollars to get one dollar back.

4.4

Interpretation of the Data
Qualitative researchers draw a distinction between data analysis and

interpretation. Were data analysis involves immersion into one‟s data, organizing and
data coding to generate themes or pattern identification; an interpretation of the data
involves a process of finding meaning from the data or of the relationships between the
nodes or concepts (Weiss 1994; Rossman and Rallis 2003). While is it important to
understand the patterns and concepts inherent in the data, it is equally important to
understand the linkages between them, as such relationship nodes were instrumental in

121

that they gave me “containers” to record evidence of the connections between two or
more concepts in the data (Bazeley 2007). And in order to derive meaning from the
interview and documentation data, this research also relied on the research questions,
theoretical frameworks and the subsequent hypotheses as guides or contexts to help
explain the findings.
“Pattern matching” through explanation building helps one to establish the link
between the data collected and the derived hypotheses (Campbell 1969). This aids one in
connecting the research questions to the emergent conclusions. Pattern matching entails a
comparison of the findings (patterns) from each case against the hypotheses derived from
the theory (Yin 2003; Yin 2009). By using NVIVO, one is able to achieve this through
the creation of relationship nodes in which the data collected, is linked to the derived
hypotheses. The link is essentially achieved by storing evidence supporting the
hypotheses articulated by the relationship nodes (shown in Table 10 below).
One advantage of using NVIVO is that, it allows the researcher to generate
relationship nodes, which are nodes or labels that define a symmetrical, one way or
associative link between two parent or child nodes (e.g., government funding and
constraints). Together with the triangulation techniques, it is at this phase that hypothesis
testing for this research took place. To code for relationships between the tree nodes,
including the child nodes, I looked for indicators from within the individual baskets
(shown in Figure 4) for evidence to support the hypotheses in this research. In other
words, evidence supporting these hypotheses is coded at the relationship nodes (Bazeley
2007) and this evidence is pooled mainly from the interview data.
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For example, in order to test the hypothesis, “High dependence on government
funding as the primary source of revenue and support is likely to result in less
INGO autonomy,” I first created a relationship node or basket for this hypothesis with
respect to each of the emergent autonomy dimensions. As a result, I ended up with subhypotheses where government funding influenced managerial and operational autonomy
in particular directions or where USG funding influenced INGOs‟ operational autonomy
through ex post constraints. I labeled one such relationship node Government Funding is
associated with high Interventional Constraints. Table 10 below shows additional
hypotheses tested in this research. As a result, all evidence supporting this hypothesis was
packaged within this node. Some of the indicators supporting this hypothesis include
statements like,
The results-based framework that the USG has and the various regulations
that they have can be arduous. (VP of International Programs, ALPHA)
The bad thing about the Department of State is that they are very
centralized…. they rely very heavily on the reporting and the indicators
because they don‟t have any field presence and they are only going to go
out once a year to check on your project and that one time a year, they are
going to try and figure out, did you do what you said you were going to
do. (Director of Competitive Bids, BETA)
The A133 Audit which is conducted every year – this looks only at those
projects that meet a certain threshold in terms of funding and checks for
contractual compliance (with USG regulations). The process is very
rigorous and tends to be very specific in that at times evidence of reports
submitted, as well as, the reception of that report is required by these
external auditors. (Program Director, ALPHA)
Well, the compliance issues, they have become more onerous as time goes
on; they require more every year, it‟s getting to be you spend more time
complying with things than you do actually doing things sometimes.
USDA compliance has increased. (Program Coordinator, SIGMA)
And then they will do a direct costing where they will pick out 3 or 4 of
our projects and really scrutinize them in a detailed manner, they go out to
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the field and look at detailed expense reports and individual vouchers and
things like that… (Director of Institutional Funding, ALPHA)

To facilitate the methodological triangulation process, this research relied on a
review of documents such as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 22), the USAID‟s
Automated Directives System, Acquisition and Assistance Chapter 303 (ADS 303) and
BETA‟s grant, contract and cooperative agreement, including the mandatory standard
provisions attached to them. As a result, anytime indicators in the relationship nodes
converged with or were supported by indicators from any one of these documents, a
hypothesis was assumed to have been supported. In the case of the sub-hypothesis
pertaining to influence of interventional constraints, supporting data came from a review
of the ADS Chapter 591 document on the financial audits requirements for USG funding
recipients, as well as Sections 226.50 – 226.52 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The above illustrates that this analysis paid close attention to the strategies and
tactics employed by each funding source in order to understand the mechanisms through
which autonomy is undermined. By so doing, I was able to understand the conditions
under which autonomy is undermined. For instance, in the context of managerial
autonomy with respect to financial management, ex ante requirements can impinge upon
an NGO‟s managerial autonomy, as well as operational autonomy. Commenting on an
INGO‟s ability to make budgetary changes between different line items, one participant
pointed out that,
If you have a valid reason, particularly and again if you go to them before
hand and say, things have changed since the proposal was developed, we
want to move some of this money to another activity and you have a good
reason, they will allow it and you can do that. They don‟t like it when you
do that on your own and afterwards you say, we have made these changes.
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This also gives us an indication of how budgetary approvals act as ex ante
constraints on an INGO‟s decision making. In this case, an INGO would need to seek a
priori approval by providing justifications for budgetary shifts before any changes can be
made. This is confirmed in Section 226.25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as well as
the funding tools obtained from BETA. Such approval requirements could result in major
delays on implementation thus reducing the timeliness of a response. Indicators such as
these provided this research with key information that helped clarify how INGO
autonomy could leak as a result of such ex ante and mid-course budgetary requirements.
Therefore Table 10 (below) shows examples of hypotheses or relationships nodes
generated from this research. The table also shows the number of participants from which
statements were coded as evidence supporting these relationships or hypotheses nodes.
These counts are also shown by INGO. Again, source refers to the number of interviews
the evidence was coded from, while references shows a count of each indicator, phrase or
word coded for each relationship node. As such the numbers listed under the heading
sources and references suggests that data from 9 participants interviewed indicated that
coercive tools diminish their INGO‟s operational autonomy. Evidence in support of this
was coded 22 times from 3 participants from ALPHA, 2 participants from SIGMA and 4
participants from BETA. All these participants were qualified to talk about this
relationship given their experience with government funding.
Also shown in Table 10 is that, 16 out of 19 participants in this study associated
government funding with high ex post controls. Evidence to support this relationship was
coded at least 77 times from all 8 participants from BETA, 6 participants from ALPHA
and both participants from SIGMA. Also shown is that 13 participants talked about the
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degree to which restrictive tools diminish INGOs operational autonomy at 33 different
occasions. There was also strong evidence (a total of 17 participants) to suggest that
government funding weakened INGOs‟ operational autonomy – that is, the extent to
which INGOs can make independent decisions about processes, procedures, policy
instruments, target groups and outcomes.

Table 10: Relationship Nodes and Hypotheses Testing
Sources

References

# of
Participants
from
ALPHA

# of
Participants
from BETA

# of
Participants
from
SIGMA

17

44

8

7

2

13

27

6

5

2

CONSTRAINTS ON INGOs’ ACTUAL DECISION MAKING COMPETENCIES
Government Funding is
16
77
6
8
associated with High Ex Ante
Controls

2

Type

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
Government Funding
diminishes Operational
Autonomy
Government Funding
diminishes Managerial
Autonomy

Government Funding is
associated with high Ex Post
Controls (Interventional)

16

59

7

7

2

9

22

3

4

2

Restrictive Tools diminish
Operational Autonomy

13

33

5

6

2

Direct Tools diminish INGO‟s
Operational autonomy

9

20

4

3

2

2

9

1

1

0

3

8

2

1

0

2

4

6

8

2

7

12

6

1

0

TOOL CHOICE
Coercive Tools diminish
Operational Autonomy

OTHER FUNDING SOURCES
Foundation Funding is
associated with High Ex Ante
Controls
Foundation (large) Funding
diminishes Operational
Autonomy
Corporations constrain NGO
Autonomy through Ex Ante
Controls
Individual Contributions
enhance Operational Autonomy
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Documents
Reviewed

Contract;
Cooperative
Agreement (CA);
CFR 22; ADS 303
Contract; CA;
CFR 22; ADS 303

Contract; Grant;
Agreement (CA);
CFR 22; ADS
303; ADS 591
Contract; Grant;
Agreements; CFR
22; ADS 303; 591

Contract; Grant;
CA; CFR 22;
ADS 302 & 303
Contract; Grant;
CA; CFR 22;
ADS 302 & 303
Contract; Grant;
CA; CFR 22;
ADS 302 & 303

Bear in mind however that this distribution includes only the majority of the data
coded up until theoretical saturation was achieved. Grounded theory suggests that one
ceases to code for a particular concept once one reaches a point of theoretical saturation
where additional coding would not yield anything new about the concept (Strauss and
Corbin 1998). It is therefore probable that continued coding could have yielded more
references or evidence to in support of these hypotheses. Note also that the last column in
Table 10 shows the documents containing evidence to confirm these findings.

4.4.1

Memos, Annotations and Queries
Also instrumental in elucidating some of the nuances associated with the analysis,

and the link between the data collected and the hypotheses derived from the theoretical
frameworks were, the “memos” and “annotations” I kept during open and axial coding
stages. Memos are records of one‟s thoughts and observations generated during the
analysis, while annotations are texts that are linked to selected interview content similar
to scribbles on the margins of a text (QSR 2008a; 2008b). Yet another key advantage of
using NVIVO is that it allows one to keep such memos, and annotations by linking each
one to specific interviews, in the case of memos and to specific sentences or words, in the
case of annotations. As a result, the memos and annotations represent some of my
judgments about the data.
I found it easier to use annotations to record my thoughts and observations since I
could do this for each sentence or phrase I found insightful in explaining the relationship
between funding and INGO autonomy from the interview data and documents (though
done manually). Both procedures were instrumental in providing me with space to record
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my reflections on the data, as well as space to clarify some of the nuances associated with
the analysis. The following example is an annotation highlighting my reflection of a
statement made by BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance;
Director of Humanitarian Assistance: A grant that is somehow amended
to also meet some of the donor requirements…. therefore it does affect
how we implement it on the ground because we need to comply with the
grant regulations… It may be the case that certain objectives may have
been amended to reflect some specific requirement that made sense for us
to implement anyway.
Annotation: In a sense this does support the hypothesis that the tools
matter, for different tools are managed differently. As with a grant, it is
amended (through some form of negotiation whose power dynamics lean
heavily on the donor/funder side I presume) before it is accepted and
implemented. So there is a clear compromise and that there is definite
variation based on each tool as to how much is compromised.....tools also
seem to influence INGO operations/implementation in situ…. What
process does negotiation take? How long does it take to get things
amended; how does that influence operational autonomy?

Such annotations helped me trace my initial observations and impressions for all
key phrases and insights encountered during the line-by-line analysis of open coding.
To further help with the data interpretation, I also took advantage of another one
of NVIVO‟s useful features of queries. This process allowed me to ask questions about
my data across all nodes, all interviews and even across selected cases, in order to
investigate and confirm patterns, as well as track and test some ideas (QSR 2008).
For example, in trying to confirm the relationship between funding tools and
INGO autonomy, I conducted a text search for the word “contracts.” NVIVO highlighted
every time the word “contracts” was used. By so doing, I was able to understand under
what contexts and conditions the term was used and what was uttered pertaining to
contracts. I was also able to identify when comparisons were made between contracts and
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other tools. The query function also allowed me to restrict my text search to the context
of autonomy. Doing this also helped me construct the tables and continuums showing the
relationships between the funding tools and the autonomy dimensions (also see Appendix
4). I conducted similar searches for grants and cooperative agreements and for each of the
funding sources to confirm these relationships, as well as identify alternative
explanations.
Apart from showing how a researcher conducted his or her analysis, another
challenge associated with qualitative research is how to present the findings from that
analysis. I chose to illustrate the findings in the form of impact continuums, in order to
illustrate the degree to which government funding for instance, impacts autonomy,
relative to other funding sources. In a sense, the continuums are designed to emphasize
the direction of the relationship between funding and autonomy. The position or
placement of the funding source (or tool) suggests the magnitude of the impact of that
funding source (or tool), relative to other funding sources (or tools), with respect to a
given autonomy dimension.
As shown in Appendix 4, it is important to emphasize that the decision to place a
particular funding source or tool on a certain point on the continuum, relative to others,
was also informed by various statements derived from the data. As such, I relied on the
indicators within the nodes to guide and inform the construction of the impact
continuums. For example, I found phrases the following phrases or indicators
instrumental in placing different funding sources on the impact continuums;
So when we work with the Lorner Dowen* Foundation (*pseudonym), or
when we work with any of our large foundations, it‟s our health expert
talking to their health expert about the programs. And so compare that to a
corporation where with a corporation you might be working with a head of
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a foundation, but the corporation doesn‟t understand our work as much –
there is this huge educational background, just really educating them about
the work that we do. (Deputy Director of External Relations, BETA)
USAID is the worst as far as the independent audits and what we are
having to do to comply with them, but they are also are single largest
donor so we don‟t have any choice. (Acting CFO, BETA)
Oh, no, foundations are the highest (referring to compliance demands); I
would say the government is the highest, then foundations, then
corporations, and then private individuals. (Deputy Director of External
Relations, BETA)

4.4.2

Rival Hypotheses
In order to verify the findings, thus strengthening their interpretation, this research

also searched for rival theories that could be used to explain the findings. For instance,
the study explored why ALPHA‟ Board Chair did not consider USG funding to be
“restrictive” per se, but “demanding.” In her words, she thought government funding was
“demanding” as opposed to “restrictive” since,
You are not doing anything you didn‟t say you are going to do in your
grant relationship. It does require the operational arm or part of the
organization to do things that it had or has not done before taking USAID
money. But I don‟t call that restrictive; that‟s just the expectations and the
demands of that funding source.

By further exploring this and other negative hypotheses, and also using the
constant comparison model, I was able to establish strong evidence grounded in the data
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Rossman and Rallis 2003) to support the degree to which
USG funding compared to other funding sources can be considered as demanding and
restrictive. In effect, packed in her statement is evidence to indicate the existence of both
ex ante and ex post requirements that INGOs have to comply with. The rival hypotheses
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identified in this research however, served to facilitate a deeper understanding of the
relationship between funding and autonomy by allowing an exploration of the different
insights and nuances surrounding this relationship.
In addition, further clarification of hypotheses was conducted during the data
collection and follow up process. For instance, in trying to understand the relationship
between funding tools and autonomy, this study explicitly and repeatedly asked
participants to expound on their experience with different funding tools in subsequent
interviews. Additional questions were emailed to Government Grants and Contracts staff
for further clarification. This analysis found strong corroboration across participants in all
three INGOs to suggest that different funding tools do confine INGOs‟ decision making
in varying degrees.

4.4.3 Tautological Challenges Emanating from the Data Analysis Process
As shown in the first chapter, Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004) draw a distinction
between autonomy as the level of decision making capacity an organization actually
possesses, and “autonomy as constraints on the actual use of the decision making
competencies” – that is, “referring to the structural, financial, legal and interventional
constraints on an agency‟s decision making competencies” (Verschuere 2007). While the
original design was to treat resource dependence‟s discretion measures such as rules to
regulate resource ownership, allocation and use, as types of autonomy. The constantcomparison technique employed in this analysis unearthed serious tautological issues
emanating from conceptualizing autonomy as constraints that impede organization‟s
actual use of decision making competencies. Such a characterization made it very
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difficult to separate the variables that influence organizational autonomy from the
autonomy variables themselves.
For example, with respect to Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004) characterization of
interventional autonomy as the extent to which an organization is free from ex post
monitoring and reporting requirements; a review of the interview data documents
revealed that participants discussed such ex post factors in terms of conditions or
mechanisms through which their ability to make autonomous decisions is weakened, and
not as a type of autonomy in and of itself. This strongly suggested that constraints on
organizational autonomy, whether channeled through structural or legal means, need to
be regarded strictly as factors that contribute to an organization‟s loss of autonomy.
To counter this problem, this research shifted Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004)
second conceptualization of autonomy as financial, structural, legal and interventional
constraints from the dependent to the independent side of this research‟s conceptual
model (shown in Figure 5 below), thus framing these as concepts describing the
mechanisms through which autonomy is undermined. As a result, and consistent with the
need to regard the concept of autonomy as a latent variable, this research treats the
financial, structural, legal and interventional constraints as intervening variables since in
essence, they describe mechanisms by which organizations decisions and activities are
constrained and controlled.

132

INTERVENING FACTORS
FUNDING SOURCES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE
FOUNDATIONS
CONTRIBUTIONS

FUNDING MECHANISMS
(1) CONTRACTS
(2) GRANTS
(3) COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS
(4) UNRESTRICTED

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
(1) RESOURCE IMPORTANCE
a. Proportion of revenue from source
b. Criticality of the revenue source
(2) DISCRETION
(Ex Ante & Interventional (Ex
Post) Constraints)
a. Ownership of the resource
b. Ability to control actual use of the
resources
c. Rules to regulate resource
ownership, allocation & use

NGO AUTONOMY
Decision Making Competencies
1. Operational Autonomy
2. Managerial Autonomy

(3) STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
TOOL CHARACTERISTICS
a. Coercive
b. Restrictive
Regulations restricting access
to other sources (Resource
Alternatives)
c. Directness

Figure 5: Comprehensive Variable Model

Therefore, Figure 5 represents the concepts where the conceptual model and the
variable model (Table 8) align. This model suggests that autonomy needs to be strictly
regarded as the condition of possessing actual decision making competencies or capacity
to make independent operational and managerial decisions. Such a conceptualization may
help prevent the tautological challenges of having constraints on both sides of a causal
relationship, a problem this study encountered. In this way, one is able to identify and
separate the sources of control from an organization‟s actual decision making
competencies.
In summary, this research recommends a reframing of Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s
(2004) conceptualization of organizational autonomy as a pre-emptive move against
costly tautological challenges. Structural, legal, financial and interventional constraints
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that undermine an organization‟s decision making competencies (autonomy) therefore,
need to be regarded as types of intervening variables or mechanisms through which an
organization‟s ability to make independent decisions is undermined. As such, from a
quasi-experiment sense, constraints would be viewed as a type of treatment.

4.5

Validity and Reliability Issues
To conclude this chapter, the following section outlines the techniques used to test

the comfirmability of the findings in this research. A general challenge with qualitative
interviews is that they have limited ability to guarantee reliable measures. Like any
research design, employing the case study approach requires that one not only explicitly
address concerns about consistency or reliability, but also about internal and external
validity. Several quality control techniques were used to improve the quality of the
design, the data and the findings.

4.5.1 Consistency
First, the logic of theoretical replication technique noted in this research, was
instrumental in setting up the research design in such a way that it would allow for case
comparison and hence facilitating theory testing across the different cases (Yin 2003; Yin
2009). And o increase the reliability or consistency of the data collection methods, this
research employed an interview guide in order to focus and direct the conversations on
the influence of funding on INGO autonomy. By so doing, participants across all three
INGOs were asked the same questions. And since the literature has treated the concept of
organizational autonomy in an ambiguous, one-dimensional fashion, this research was
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able to adapt the Verhoest, Peters, et al.‟s (2004) measures and the Leuven Institute‟s
measures of organizational autonomy in an effort to understand the concept within
context of a nonprofit sector environment.
While this approach helped improve the construct validity and reliability of the
measures utilized in this study, the approach was not without its challenges as seen with
the tautological concerns encountered. Arising from these challenges however, was an
opportunity to advance alternative ways of conceptualizing autonomy. As a result of
having autonomy constraints on both sides of the causal model, this research was thus
able to evaluate the compatibility of Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004) characterization of
autonomy when used in conjunction with other theoretical frameworks like resource
dependence and tool choice.
Therefore, he findings from this research suggest that the present characterization
of autonomy as both decision making competencies and constraints, creates model
specification problems. And if we are to understand the nuances of organizational
autonomy, it may be pre-emptive to be very clear about separating the concept of
organizational autonomy as the possession of actual decision making competencies, from
the mechanisms that constrain those decision making competencies; thus establishing the
premise that one leads to the other.
And apart from relying on source and method triangulation techniques, I also
maintained a coding trail with recordings of the decision rules made during the coding
and data analysis process, in an effort to enhance the replicability of this study.
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4.5.2

Internal Validity
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), internal validity is a question about the

“truth value,” that is, “whether we have an authentic portrait of what we were looking at,”
and whether the findings are credible to the people studied. Various techniques can be
used to check for the internal consistency of the findings and these include the methods
of triangulation, rival hypotheses check and member checking (Miles and Huberman
1994; Yin 2003; Yin 2009).
First, this research‟s reliance on multiple sources of evidence permitted
triangulation by method. As such, finding convergence among the interview data and
several documents collected from the INGOs, as well as the USAID and USG websites,
helped improve the internal validity of the findings. In addition, the pattern-matching
technique, through explanation building was also instrumental in establishing links
between the data and the hypotheses by searching for patterns or common themes within
and across cases (Campbell 1969; Yin 2003).
The literature also suggests that researchers identify and address rival hypotheses
in an effort to verify the credibility of the findings (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003;
Yin 2009). As pointed out above, the rival hypotheses identified in this research, served
to facilitate a deeper understanding of the relationship between funding and autonomy by
allowing an exploration of the different insights and nuances surrounding this
relationship.
A final technique used to verify the internal validity of the study, thus establishing
the credibility of the findings, involved sharing the findings with at least one participant
from each of the cases. Findings from the within-case and cross-case analyses, the
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strategies and the conclusions, were emailed to participants for their review. Follow up
conversations took place via email and telephone once participants had completed their
reviews. At least one participant from BETA and ALPHA was able to ascertain the
plausibility and accuracy of the findings.

4.5.3 External Validity
In quantitative research, external validity refers to the generalizability of the
findings to the population under study. In Yin‟s (2003; 2009) view, the external validity
of qualitative research can be achieved in terms of making analytical generalizations of
the findings to broader hypotheses or propositions. In this case, the findings in this
research can be generalized to the broader government funding-INGO autonomy
discourse or the hypotheses tested in this research.
With regards to making generalizations about the population of INGOs however,
given that these cases represent single INGOs, care need to be taken in making
generalizations about the findings to the INGO population. That being said, the logic of
literal replication employed in this study ensured that the three cases were pulled from the
same organizational environment, that is, direct relief and development INGOs. This
logic can also provide us with a strong basis for making generalizations about the
population of direct relief and development INGOs, but only those INGOs that are
receiving USG funding since not all INGOs depend on the USG as a funding source.
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CHAPTER 5
WITHIN-CASE FINDINGS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
PERSPECTIVE

5.1

Introduction
This chapter compares the within-case findings to the resource dependence

hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 to illustrate the nature of the relationship between
government funding and INGO autonomy across different dimensions. The findings for
each of the cases are preceded by a description of the financial profile of the INGO. As
indicated in Chapter 3, the three INGOs in this study vary in their dependence on USG
funding. The profiles also show revenue pictures that vary across different government
funding tools. Below is a brief description of some of the USAID implementing or
funding tools used to transfer money to the three INGOs, and how each one operates.
P.L. 480 Donated Food: The Public Law (480) food aid was signed into law by
President Eisenhower, under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954. This is also known as Food for Peace supporting programs generally designed to
combat hunger and malnutrition, as well as promote sustainable development. P.L. 480
comprises three sections; Title I consists of government-to-government sales of
agricultural commodities; this is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Title II (or Monetization) and III are administered by USAID. While the former consists
of food donations by the USG to meet humanitarian food needs in foreign countries, the
latter meets government-to-government grants in support of long-term economic
development in developing countries.

138

USAID Freight: This is a program that provides competitive grants for INGOs
registered with the USAID to ship humanitarian assistance-related goods overseas.
INGOs are reimbursed for costs associated with the transportation of donated
commodities.
P.L. 480 Freight: This refers to the funding associated with the transportation
element of the food aid under USAID contracts.
USAID Grants: These are defined as legal instruments used “where the principal
purpose is the transfer of money, property, services or anything of value to the recipient
in order to accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by Federal
statute and where substantial involvement by USAID is not anticipated” (USAID
Glossary). Unlike cooperative agreements, grants recipients have substantial freedom to
pursue their stated programs (USAID 2005).
USAID Contracts: These are defined as “mutually binding legal instrument(s) in
which the principal purpose is the acquisition, by purchase, lease, or barter, of property or
services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal government, or in the case of a host
country contract, the host government agency is a principal, signatory party to the
instrument” (USAID Glossary). Contracts are used for funding “activities or programs
over which the USAID intends to exercise a substantial amount of operational control,”
that is, “day-to-day oversight of the implementation of the program and exercise
technical direction” (USAID 2005).
Other USG Grants and Contracts: These are similar to USAID grants and
contracts except these are administered by other USG agencies other than the USAID
(e.g., Department of Agriculture).
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5.2 CASE #1: ALPHA RELIEF AGENCY (ALPHA)
Established in 1937 with the mission to help support children and their families in
the area of health and education, in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and
South America, ALPHA is part of a federation of national member organizations. Apart
from providing technical assistance in operating country offices (COs), ALPHA‟s main
function involves assisting COs with fundraising.
While the organization receives less 10 percent of its funding from the US
government (USG), more than 80 percent of its total revenue comes from contributions
through child and family sponsorships. As shown in Table 12 below, ALPHA received
95 percent of its total revenue from private contributions and revenue in FY2005; and 91
percent in FY2006. In an explicit effort to diversity its revenue sources, ALPHA is just
beginning to invest in foundation and corporate funding solicitations.
As indicated above, USG government funding also varies by funding tool. In the
case of ALPHA, its share of USG funding comprises, grants from the USAID and other
USG agencies such as the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of
State. Table 11 below, shows that ALPHA has a strong preference for USG grants
compared to contracts; all of its USG support is channeled through grants. In other words,
in light of ALPHA‟s experience with managing USG grants, such experiences could be
viewed as an indication of the extent to which the organization utilizes an existing
administrative structure for managing grants. Therefore, they may have to create a new
apparatus for contract management. This may explain their strong preference for and
ease with grants rather than contracts. Bear in mind however that the USAID financial
data does not separate USG grants from cooperative agreements; as a result, one is not
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able to discern how much of ALPHA‟s funding is channeled through cooperative
agreements, which involve significant government participation.

Table 11: ALPHA'S Revenue Sources (FY1997 - 2006)

USG
Support

TYPES OF FUNDING
USAID Freight
P.L. 480 Freight
P.L. 480 Donated Food
USAID Grants
USAID Contracts
Other USG Grants
Other USG Contracts
Total USG Support

FY1997

FY2002

FY2004

FY2005

$0
$0
$0
$1,304,674
$0
$0
$0
$1,304,674

$0
$0
$0
$2,190,322
$0
$0
$0
$2,190,322

$0
$0
$0
$3,448,518
$0
$183,792
$0
$3,632,310

$0
$0
$0
$1,946,174
$0
$0
$0
$1,946,174

FY2006
$0
$0
$0
$3,274,838
$0
$0
$0
$3,274,838

By Mechanism, combined

USG Grants
USG Contracts
P.L. 480 Donated Food
Other
Gov't
Support
Private
Support

Other Gov't. & International
Organizations

100%
0%
0%

100%
0%
0%

100%
0%
0%

100%
0%
0%

100%
0%
0%

$172,302

$0

$0

$0

$0

In-Kind Contributions
Private Contributions
Private Revenue
Total Private Support

$0
$28,554,842
$1,297,052
$31,328,870

$560,806
$40,256,360
$0
$40,817,166

$0
$29,940,231
$879,997
$30,820,228

$0
$34,818,032
$1,193,853
$36,011,885

$0
$33,462,713
$1,597,880
$35,060,593

TOTAL SUPPORT &
REVENUE
% USG Support
% Other Gov't Support
% Private Support

$32,805,846
4%
1%
95%

$43,007,488
5%
0%
95%

$34,452,538
11%
0%
89%

$37,958,059
5%
0%
95%

$38,335,431
9%
0%
91%

Staff Interviewed:
I interviewed nine participants from ALPHA, and these included the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Director of International
Programs, Director of Grants and Contracts Compliance; a Foundations liaison, Program
Director; and the Director of Institutional Funding. And from the Board of Directors, I
interviewed the Chairman and Treasurer of the Board of Directors. Six out of the nine
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interviews were conducted in person in their Washington DC office, the rest were
conducted over the telephone.

5.3 FINDINGS
5.3.1

Resource Importance

Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy
Since USG funding constitutes less than 10 percent of ALPHA‟s total revenue
support, the findings suggest that the INGO retains most of its autonomy with respect to
financial autonomy. This is because the participants do not regard USG funding to be of
critical importance to the organization. For instance, while participants recognized USG
as a credible funding source (especially, the CEO and the Director of Institutional
Funding), the CFO, Director of International Programs, Board Chair, Program Director
and Treasurer of the Board, all emphasized the importance and dependence of ALPHA
on sponsorship, more so than USG funding. As a result, should the organization fail to
receive any government support; only 10 percent of the organization‟s programs would
be negatively affected – assuming that no replacement funding is found. The inverse of
this is that 90 percent of the programs that are funding through individual contributions
would remain operational. This organization therefore can survive without government
funding. As ALPHA‟s Treasurer pointed out,
Unlike some INGOs, we have a steady stream of revenue from
sponsorship dollars; we are not wholly dependent upon USAID in what
policy may change over four years.
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This suggests that the INGO is not as vulnerable to shifts in USG foreign policy
priorities. However, there is also recognition of the efficacy of government funding, in
terms of improving an INGO‟s capacity to increase its programs. The following
statement illuminates this.
Government funding is growing. As an organization…for a long time,
sponsorship was the bread and butter full stop. Government funding - we
really didn‟t need it… we want(ed) it under the conditions that it met
certain criteria we had, (that) we were in the driving seat. We decided that
if the government did not want to do it our way, we won‟t take it. More
and more we have opened up to government funding in the sense that we
realized that there are potentials of reaching more children in country if we
take government funding. So we are taking government funding to
supplement our funding within the context of the program design
elaborated by the country. (Program Director)

In spite of this new outlook toward government funding, ALPHA still maintains a
guarded approach to dependence on USG funding. The statement below illuminates some
of this anxiety, thus strongly suggesting that there may be some truth to the hypothesis
that a high dependence on government funding yields lower levels of autonomy to an
INGO. Illuminating this pervasive anxiety toward a high dependence on USG funding,
especially with regard to financial autonomy is a statement from ALPHA‟s CFO.
The only limitation that they (Board of Directors) put is… at least, under
our current rules – they don‟t want to see institutional funding (USG
funding) be more than half of our total funding, without them talking
about it. They still want us to be known as a sponsorship organization
where we have a lot of funding still (coming) from individual families and
people in the U.S. who are supporting our cause. They feel that they don‟t
want to become too dependent on the federal government because some
organizations do that and then you have a turn in the economy or the
administration changes, and they reduce the funding of the USAID and all
of a sudden you find yourself in a position where your revenues are going
down.
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This guarded view seems to stem from the fact that in spite of the 10 percent share
of USG support, ALPHA as an organization is not entirely shielded from the spillover
influence of USG funding. The interview and documentation data indicate that the
organization still faces influence and control through the USG mid-course and ex post
reporting requirements to the extent that they have set up a formal Grants and Contracts
Compliance Unit as a buffer to solely deal and manage the constraints and compliance
demands associated with USG funding. For example 7 out of the 9 participants from
ALPHA associated USG funding with high interventional controls, while 6 participants
associated it with high ex ante controls and influence.
In addition, the USAID‟s ADS 303 and 591, as well as the CFR 22 – all
emphasize the requirements for INGOs‟ ex post accountability. While the interventional
(and ex ante) controls apply to the funded programs; it appears that USG funding has
helped reshape ALPHA‟s organizational structure by compelling the INGO to set up a
department in response to ex ante and ex post demands and expectations. Compared to
individual contributions therefore, government funding restrictions and requirements
remain more arduous even for an organization that receives less that 10 percent of its
funding from the USG.
In terms of the influence of USG funding on ALPHA‟s operational autonomy, the
preceding discussion suggests that government funding weakens the INGO‟s operational
autonomy relatively more than individual contributions. In this case, USG funding
undermines ALPHA‟s operational autonomy more; however, this only applies to the
INGO‟s capacity to make decisions concerning those programs supported by the 10
percent share of USG grants and cooperative agreements.
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ALPHA‟s Vice President for International Programs paints the autonomy picture
very well in the following statement, as he commented on the efficacy of resource
diversity and autonomy loss in the face of high dependence on government funding in
general.
You would be very aware that if 70 or more percent of that came from a
particular government (or the USG), that you had a potential risk on your
hands, because if that government where to fall out with the government
of the country in which you are working, you could lose all your funding
and indeed the other side of it, you are more prone to have difficulties in
being independent in your particular views and direction.
This comment suggests that government funding lowers any INGO‟s autonomy
with respect to operational autonomy by influencing the particular views and directions
an INGO takes. As shown in Table 10, 8 out of 9 participants from ALPHA gave
indication to suggest that the USG as a funding source, imposes limitations on the
INGO‟s operational autonomy. These limitations come about through a number of
strategies ranging from program ownership, where an INGO can and cannot operate with
USG funding, and through centralized resource ownership and control. The following
statements illustrate some of the mechanisms.
A long time ago USAID stopped implementing its own projects, so the
INGOs stepped in… we really are implementing USAID projects, whether
people like to admit it or not, there are USAID projects. (Director of
Grants and Contracts Compliance)
…like Myanmar for instance… we can‟t use USG money (CEO)
You have to wait for them (USG) to give you the funding availability, they
give you a grant for $18 million, but they don‟t authorize all that money
upfront, so you don‟t have access to it upfront. They have incremental
funding –so there is a lot of technical things that some people prefer not to
pay attention to… (CFO)
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And according to Section 226.25 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations, INGO
“recipients are required to report deviations from budget and program plans, and request
prior approval for budget and program plan revisions.” The requirement for prior consent
suggests that INGOs cannot make budget or program decisions independent of USG
funding agencies. Sub-section 1 of that code calls for INGOs to seek consent for any
changes in the scope or program objective or any deviations to the program as a whole,
even if there are no budget revisions associated with the changes. “Prior approval”
suggests the presence of ex ante rules and requirement and it is defined as “written
approval by an authorized (USG funding agency) official evidencing prior consent.”
ALPHA‟s operational autonomy is also limited through the USAID‟s substantial
involvement in the administration and implementation of programs funded through
cooperative agreements, as will be shown in Chapter 6. Again, this is with respect to
those programs that are funded through the 10 percent share of USG funding, thus
demarcating the sphere of USG funding influence on ALPHA‟s overall programming and
managerial decisions.

Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to
result in limited INGO autonomy
Similar to the above, a high dependence on any one funding sources would be
expected to yield less autonomy to an INGO. This is not the case with ALPHA due to the
nature of its funding source. In the past 4 years, over 90 percent of the organization‟s
revenues came from individual contributions and private revenues, of which, for FY2006,
almost 85 percent of that is unrestricted. The absence of restrictions on these funds render
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the organization highly autonomous in contrast to the 10 percent share of USG funding
which is laden with all sorts of restrictions, rules and regulations. The following
statements reflect the general level of autonomy that the share of individual contributions
yields.
We are happy that we have the flexibility that the sponsorship funding
provides. (Board Chair)
Unrestricted funding provides INGOs with the resources they need to
accomplish what is near and dear to their hearts, (that is), to fully fulfill
their missions and visions by implementing those objectives that are
important to the INGO. (Program Director)

While there is cognizance of the dangers of being heavily dependent on individual
contributions, especially in light of the current economic crisis, the efficacy of this
funding source in affording ALPHA its operational and managerial remains clear in the
Program Director‟s mind;
We are going to limit the influence of outside funding, outside funding
besides sponsorship, so that the focus, the program decisions remain
within the control of ALPHA which is supported by sponsorship because
it is unrestricted (nature), we can use it as we, quote and quote, see fit, as
long as we keep the sponsor in the loop of what we are doing.

Therefore, while unrestricted dollars yield high levels of operational and
managerial autonomy, it does however come with some ex post requirements, that is,
ALPHA is expected to account for how it spends this money by “keeping the sponsor in
the loop” of what ALPHA is doing. And while this view was also corroborated by
ALPHA‟s CEO, Treasurer of the Board, Program Director and VP of International
Programs; there was also agreement that the ex post demands attached to individual
contributions are not nearly as onerous as those associated with USG funding.
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5.3.2

Resource Alternatives

Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external
dependence and control through revenue diversification.
The analysis of the interview data and a review of ALPHA‟s strategic plan reveal
evidence to suggest strong recognition and support for revenue diversification. As shown
in Table 8 (in Chapter 4), 6 out of the 9 staff members (the VP of International Programs,
CFO, CEO; Director of Institutional Funding, Program Director, and Treasurer of the
Board) specifically addressed the issue of revenue diversification as a financial risk
reduction strategy. The main objective for this strategy is to improve the INGO‟s
financial stability by relying on more than one funding source. And this is in spite of the
organization‟s high share of unrestricted funding coming through individual
contributions. As ALPHA‟s CFO observed;
We‟ve had some involvement with corporations but again, it is still limited
probably to 5 percent of our total revenue per year. But there is certainly a
heavy reliance upon private support from individual donors and sponsors.
And although we are trying to grow that, it is still that group of people, as
opposed to institutions of some kind – you know government, or
corporations or foundations – all those people who are providing the
primary support to ALPHA. And without a diversification of that into
some areas… we may become too dependent on individuals – when you
get into an economy like we are in now. So we have for FY2008, which
we are just getting audited now, I would say probably 65 percent of our
total revenue is coming from individuals.

While recognizing the high level of autonomy unrestricted funds yield to ALPHA,
the Board Chair also illuminates the INGO‟s need to diversify its revenue streams.
We are happy that we have the flexibility that the sponsorship funding
provides, we want management to raise more money from corporation, not
(just) sponsorship… We want management to be raising more money from
more sources; just general diversification.
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The above demonstrates ALPHA‟s views towards the effectiveness of revenue
diversification as a strategy for reducing the INGO‟s dependence on sponsorships.
Clearly, this is a strategy that is inherent in the INGO‟s long-range planning.

Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources.
This research finds that apart from self-censoring by INGOs, the USG imposes
what could be described as “harmless” policy level restrictions on INGOs‟ access to
alternative resources. This research considers these harmless since the alternative
resources may not be of great significance to the organization. Examples of such
restrictions provided by at least 5 participants from ALPHA include The Fly America
Act, which restricts INGOs‟ access to perhaps cheaper non-U.S. carriers when traveling
on program related business.
Another explicit government restriction on INGOs‟ access to alternative resources
is the prohibition of transactions with terrorist groups, under the Executive Order on
Terrorism Financing of February 2002. According to the Special Contract Requirements
issued by USG funding agencies and the Mandatory Standard Provisions for U.S. NonGovernmental Recipients (attached to the grant, cooperative agreement and contract
reviewed in this research) INGO recipients are “prohibited from transactions with, and
the provision of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with
terrorism.” However, a potential danger with this particular rule is that due to limitations
imposed by information asymmetry and bounded rationality on the part of INGOs, it may
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be difficult for them to ensure complete compliance with this rule given the difficulties of
distinguishing terrorist-funded organization from those that are not.
The findings show that ALPHA, similar to BETA, imposes self-censoring
measure codified in corporate engagement guidelines as a strategy for discerning which
corporate funders to solicit or accept funding from. For instance, given ALPHA‟s focus
on children, the organization will not accept funding from corporate funders that have a
reputation for practicing child labor. Other basic restrictions preclude accepting money
for programs that lie outside the organization‟s expertise.
To summarize, the findings shown above suggest that within ALPHA,
government has substantial influence and control, but only over those activities funded by
the 10 percent share of USG funding. As a result, USG influence and control may not
necessarily extend beyond the USG-funded program.
There is also indication to suggest that even though ALPHA is the smallest
recipient of USG funding in this research, the INGO may face transaction costs that could
have larger than anticipated spillover effects on the organization as a whole. This
primarily stems from what participants have described as “arduous” USG accountability
demands. For example, the USG audit and reporting requirements have compelled the
INGO to establish a formal Grants and Contracts Compliance Unit just to cope with USG
funding compliance and ex post requirements. It could therefore be argued that USG
funding has reshaped ALPHA‟s organizational structure by compelling the INGO to add
more units – potentially resulting in an increased bureaucratization of the INGO.
Second, recipients of USG funding are required to demonstrate strong financial
structures and that is before they can receive USG funding. In this regard, it could also be
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argued that USG funding indirectly influences the organization as a whole given that the
funding decisions USG make are made not only on the basis of an INGO‟s prior
experience with USG funding, but on an evaluation of the INGO as a whole.
According to the USAID‟s ADS Chapter 303: Grants and Cooperative
Agreements to Non-governmental organizations document, while an organization‟s past
performance on previous awards can be used as an indicator of the INGO‟s capacity to
handle grants, this history does not guarantee or improve an INGO‟s chances of an
award. Any “changes in personnel, accounting practices, or in an organization‟s financial
status may affect its performance on a new award” (USAID 2009b). Bear in mind also
that USG funding is incremental in that recipients do not receive the entire amount of the
award all at once. As such, INGOs‟ decisions pertaining to the rest of its non-USG
funded programs may influence how it is perceived by the USG funder.
The above also gives indication of the presence of positive externalities
emanating from an association with USG funding. The above suggest that INGOs
receiving USG funding may actually be getting increasingly professionalized given that
the organizations are required to maintain good business integrity in order to continue
receiving USG funding. And while the compulsory A133 Audit may be arduous, it also
provides INGOs with opportunities to improve their internal controls, as well as selfevaluate. Eight out of the nine participants from ALPHA supported the above assertions.
Table 8 (in Chapter 4) also shows that, all participants from BETA and from SIGMA
shared this view.
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5.4 CASE #2: BETA ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL (BETA)
BETA is an INGO whose mission encompasses the implementation of relief and
development programs in over 60 countries across the globe. BETA is the largest of the
three INGOs in terms of total revenue, as well as the second oldest. Similar to ALPHA,
BETA is also part of a federation; and the INGO also assist country offices in fundraising
for their programs. BETA provides technical assistance and expertise, specifically in the
area of water and sanitation, basic education, emergency response. The organization also
has a Humanitarian Assistance Team that is activated in the event of emergencies.

Table 12: BETA's Revenue Sources (FY1997 - 2006)

USG
Support

TYPES OF FUNDING
USAID Freight
P.L. 480 Freight
P.L. 480 Donated Food
USAID Grants
USAID Contracts
Other USG Grants
Other USG Contracts
Total USG Support

FY1997

FY2002

FY2004

FY2005

FY2006

$0
$29,028,000
$73,558,000
$96,564,000
$228,000
$3,383,000
$233,000
$202,994,000

$0
$27,409,000
$51,823,000
$135,167,000
$147,000
$19,093,000
$0
$233,639,000

$0
$17,838,611
$85,669,561
$190,708,809
$367,385
$18,680,696
$0
$313,265,062

$0
$14,428,000
$35,813,000
$151,777,000
($11,000)
$19,031,000
($11,000)
$221,027,000

$0
$24,203,276
$57,923,645
$170,896,342
$490,267
$13,640,264
$0
$267,153,794

49.2%
0.23%

66.0%
0.06%

66.8%
0.12%

77.3%
-0.01%

69.1%
0.18%

50.5%

33.9%

33.0%

22.7%

30.7%

Other Gov't. & International
Organizations

$88,616,000

$105,854,000

$155,174,378

$204,815,000

$235,558,000

In-Kind Contributions
Private Contributions
Private Revenue
Total Private Support

$7,760,000
$52,486,000
$7,517,000
$67,763,000

$7,683,000
$73,650,000
$6,952,000
$88,285,000

$1,074,000
$97,637,560
$30,547,000
$129,258,560

$2,846,000
$188,818,000
$6,850,000
$198,514,000

$4,263,000
$139,651,759
$8,855,000
$152,769,759

TOTAL SUPPORT &
REVENUE
% USG Support
% Other Gov't Support
% Private Support

$359,373,000
56%
25%
19%

$427,778,000
55%
25%
21%

$597,698,000
52%
26%
22%

$624,356,000
35%
33%
32%

$655,481,553
41%
36%
23%

By Mechanism, combined

USG Grants
USG Contracts
P.L. 480 Donated Food
& P.L. 480 Freight
Other
Gov't
Support
Private
Support
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Table12 above shows that BETA‟s largest share of revenue comes from the USG,
and it comes largely through USAID Grants and other USG Grants (e.g., Departure of
State and the Department of Agriculture). In total, USG funding consisted of 55 percent
(in FY2002); 52 percent (in FY2004); dropped to 35 percent in (FY2005) and went up to
41 percent (in FY2006). The table also shows that similar to ALPHA, the distribution of
BETA‟s USG funding across funding tools suggests a strong preference for grants and
cooperative agreements over contracts, with an average of almost 70 percent of its share
of USG funding channeled through grants and cooperative agreements, compared to 0.09
percent channeled through contracts.

Staff Interviewed:
As noted above, 8 participants were interviewed from BETA. These include the
Director for Competitive Bids (a USG funding specialty staff member), Director of
Humanitarian Assistance; the Acting Chief Financial Officer (CFO), an Internal Auditor,
the Deputy Director of External Relations (a corporate, foundations and individual
funding specialty staff member), the Vice President (VP) of Global Support, the Director
of Food Programs, and the Secretary of the Board. 6 out of the 8 interviews were
conducted through face-to-face interviews.
Note that 7 out of the 8 participants interviewed from BETA had experience
dealing with USG funding in some capacity. These include the Directors of Competitive
Bids, Humanitarian Assistance, and Food Programs; the VP of Global Support, Acting
CFO and the Secretary of the Board. As a result, these participants were able to speak on
a number of issues surrounding USG funding.
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5.5 FINDINGS
5.5.1

Resource Importance

Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy
The findings suggest that USG funding undermines BETA‟s autonomy with
respect to operational and managerial autonomy. As shown in Table 10, all 7 participants
from BETA experienced with USG funding agreed that it limits the INGO‟s operational
autonomy. As with ALPHA, additional evidence to corroborate this is found in Section
226.25 (b) of the CFR, which highlights that INGO “recipients are required to report
deviations from budget and program plans, and request prior approval for budget and
program plan revisions.” This suggests that for BETA‟s 50 percent of the programs that
are funded through the USG, decisions pertaining to these have to be made in
consultation with and the approval of the USG funding agencies. And according to its
Secretary of the Board, BETA‟s share of USG funding suggests that the organization‟s
financial budget (size) and programs would be reduced by almost half should the INGO
decide to walk away from USG funding. Commenting on the criticality and importance
of USG funding to BETA, she confessed that a loss of USG funding,
would certainly cut our revenue in about half right now. And so instead of
being a $600 million plus organization; we would be a $300 million dollar
plus organization.

This suggests that BETA is not financial autonomous as a result of this high
dependence on the USG to provide almost 50 percent of the INGO‟s total revenue and
support. Such dependence also threatens BETA‟s operational autonomy through
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differences in policy objectives. The following statement from the VP of Global Support
elucidates this threat – a view also shared by the Internal Auditor.
The USG has started putting in some of their solicitations that if we win
the bid, we have to be promoting the US foreign policy overseas and we
will not go after those type of contracts because we don‟t want to be seen
as an arm with the USG – so our independence and our impartiality are
key to all that; we don‟t want to accept any money that jeopardizes our
impartiality and our independence.

And as long as differences in policy objectives and ideology exist between the
USG and INGOs, owing to the power of the purse, BETA‟s operational autonomy, i.e.,
the INGO‟s ability to make independent decisions about programs, program theories,
how to implement them, target groups and outcomes, remains under threat as illustrated
in the following statement from the Secretary of the Board.
We have some different point of views particularly in the best ways to
prevent HIV/AIDS. And so it is important for us to have other funding
sources and that the USG not have a dominant role in our funding, so that
we can also do things that perhaps may be the administration doesn‟t favor
but we would be allowed to do with other funding sources.

Speaking on the same concern, the Director of Humanitarian Assistance added
that,
donors, in particular, governments have specific policy interests that they
want to pursue and we need to be conscious about those.

Portraying the types of compromises INGOs like BETA are having to confront,
thus further weakening the INGO‟s operational autonomy, the Director elaborates,
It‟s hard to some extent, at times we respond to solicitations that will
contribute to some extent to our strategic objectives in a country but not
completely.
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There is also evidence to suggest that the USG influences and controls BETA‟s
decision making through interventional controls. Similar to ALPHA, the decisions the
INGO makes today can be controlled through accountability requirements that take place
mid-course and post-program implementation. The relationship nodes (shown in Table 10
in Chapter 4) show that 7 out of 8 participants from the INGO expressed their discomfort
with the high ex post monitoring and reporting requirements associated with USG
funding. Such ex post controls can be both financial and nonfinancial in nature (e.g.,
A133). Speaking on BETA‟s response to the high accountability demands, the following
statements articulate some of the reasons behind the INGO‟s decision to hire more staff
members and to formalize the Grants Compliance Unit.
What we have realized is that we‟ve got to get (more) people – I think for
a long time with the audits being so easy in the past, you didn‟t have to
have very technical people in your accounting, you just needed to get it in
there and get it right; but now it‟s got to be classified, (and) categorized.
Reporting – now… is so technically complicated that we had to brush it up
with the caliber of people doing it in-country and then brush it up with the
caliber of people supporting that (to consolidate the INGO‟s financial
reporting). So we are getting it in place and we are headed the right way,
and hiring a Grants Compliance Unit is going to be huge, huge! Because
all of the entities, private donors, government donors – they are all getting
more difficult. (Acting CFO)
The setting up of a new Compliance Unit is in response to the onerous
government regulations and the stricter enforcement of the regulations; I
don‟t think the regulations necessarily have changed that much over the
years, but I think the enforcement has become stricter and therefore we‟ve
been caught up. (VP of Global Support)
These statements also suggest that USG funding has impacted the organization‟s
managerial autonomy with respect to human resources by indirectly influencing the
expertise the INGO needs to hire, in order to ensure accurate reporting and compliance
with USG funding. This influence is also achieved through the USG‟s substantial
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involvement in the selection of key personnel for the implementation of a funded
government cooperative agreement and contracts.
Well, usually the USG would prefer to hire someone who knows their
system, at least one member of the team. And, usually that is the chief of
party or the sub-grants manager… I mean it‟s a fairly complex
bureaucracy and so they prefer someone who has been through it, who
understands the ropes, rather than someone who doesn‟t. (Competitive
Bids Director)
They don‟t dictate who we hire – for key personnel, particularly for a
contract, they do have approval over that; they do have to agree to that, so
yeah – with any big award. It is usually – chief of party or something at
that level needs to get the approval of the USG. (VP of Global Support)
These statements reveal the nuances through which BETA‟s decision making is
influences by way of ex ante rules, requirements and approvals. For instance, in order to
receive USG funding, key program staff members have to meet USG approval. Any
additional changes to the key personnel also require USG approval and consent; however
this only pertains to the funded program. It is through these mechanisms that BETA‟s
operational and managerial decisions are substantially influenced and controlled, that is,
to the extent that they abide by government‟s rules and regulations and the reporting
requirements attached to funding.
While the above illustrates the mechanisms by which USG funding agencies exert
influence and control on INGOs, it is important to highlight that similar to ALPHA,
BETA can also exercise its operational autonomy during the proposal development stage.
This influence is achieved through the designing of the programs in response to funding
announcement, albeit along the stipulated confines of the funding guidelines of the award
agreements, as well as other supporting documents like the ADS Chapter 303 governing
Grants and Cooperative Agreements to INGOs, ADS Chapter 591, which contains
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guidelines for Financial Audits of USAID Contractors, Recipients, and Host Government
Entities, and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 22). These guidelines explain why
INGOs like BETA and ALPHA have set up Compliance Units – just to be able to keep
up with USG funding rules, regulations and requirements.
For instance, INGOs including BETA are required to “relate financial data to
performance data and develop unit cost information.” In addition, INGO recipients shall
provide “written procedures for determining the reasonableness, allocability and
allowability of costs in accordance with the provisions of the applicable Federal cost
principles and the terms and conditions of the award” (CFR 226.21 (b) (6)). This shows
that INGOs‟ decisions pertaining to resource allocation and use are highly controlled.
However, as BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance pointed out, INGOs do
have a choice in the funding announcements they respond to, and hence the projects they
engage in. And according to the VP of Global support, the more restricted the grants are,
the less interested they are. Furthermore, after an INGO has received a letter of award,
that opens up yet another opportunity for the INGO to negotiate the terms of a funding
agreement.
And finally, according to the USAID‟s ADS Chapter 591, as a condition for
receiving USG funding, INGOs are expected to demonstrate organization-level
“reasonable” systems of internal controls, which include “segregation of duties, handling
cash, contracting procedures, and personnel and travel personnel” (USAID 2009). This
suggests that USG funding can positively influence INGOs‟ internal systems even before
an award is received, suggesting increased levels of professionalism on the part of USGfunded INGOs.
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Based on the data analysis, 18 out of 19 participants interviewed across all three
INGOs indicated that an exchange relationship with the USG can result in some positive
externalities in the form of improved professionalism of INGOs (shown in Table 8 in
Chapter 4). Participant partially attributed this improvement to the ex post monitoring
and reporting requirements associated with USG funding. Of the 18 participants, all 8
participants from BETA agreed that their interaction with USG funding has resulted in
positive spillover effects on the INGO‟s professionalism.

Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to
result in limited INGO autonomy
With respect to BETA, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. However
BETA‟s financial profile shows a growing share of revenue support from other
governments and international organizations. For example, Table 12 shows that in
FY2002, other governments and international organizations provided 25 percent of
BETA‟s revenue and support; this number increased to 26 percent in FY2004; 33 percent
in FY2005 and 36 percent in FY2006. The literature suggests that compared to USG
funding, Scandinavian governments for instance are viewed as being less exacting, thus
granting more autonomy to INGOs. As a result, further research in needed to investigate
this development in order to understand its implications on BETA‟s autonomy.
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5.5.2

Resource Alternatives

Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external
dependence and control through revenue diversification.
The findings in this analysis support this hypothesis. Table 8 (shown in Chapter 4)
shows that 5 out of the 8 participants interview expressed how BETA has been trying to
improve the INGO‟s independence from any one funding source through the strategy of
revenue diversification. And highlighted in the INGO‟s Strategic Plan, while USG
government remains the largest single donor, its decline in the last few years is indicative
of the INGO‟s steady progress towards the goal of diversifying its funding sources.
Note that BETA‟s total revenues are the least concentrated of the three cases. In
some ways, its diversification in terms of relying on other funding sources such as
foundations, corporations, and other governments and international organizations may
have resulted in improvements on BETA‟s operational autonomy. The Secretary of the
Board and the Director of Competitive Bids highlight the benefits of BETA‟s aggressive
revenue diversification strategy in the following statements.
(Referring to USG funding), there has been more restrictions over the
years and that‟s another reason for trying to diversify funding… we also
saw that it was important for us to diversify our funding sources and
primarily when you talk about independence and making sure that the
organization stays autonomous – you know…. depending on the
administration; we have some different point of views, particularly in the
best ways to prevent HIV/AIDS. And so it is important for us to have
other funding sources and that the USG not have a dominant role in our
funding, so that we can also do things that perhaps may be the
administration doesn‟t favor but we would be allowed to do with other
funding sources. (Board Secretary)
We have actually been trying to diversify away from the USG funding for
probably the past 7 years and have been doing so successfully, because we
felt it was too large. We didn‟t have a diversified portfolio and for risk
management it just seemed not to be the wisest thing to do. So we have
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reached out to U.S. professional foundations, like Lorner Dowen and
Leasten foundations and we have reached out to other sources of revenue
– just private individual fundraising and we are going to look to continue
to do that, to continue to expand sources of funding other than the USG.
(Director of Competitive Bids)

Clearly, BETA draws a positive link between the operational autonomy necessary
to fully achieve one‟s mission and vision and revenue diversification. As a result,
revenue diversification is not only regarded as a strategy for militating against donor
influence, but also a way of raising less restricted or less exacting funding in order to be
operationally autonomous. This is also reflected in the following statements.
If you look at BETA‟s dependence on USG over the year, it is down from
70 percent to about 45 percent nowadays. So we realized that to some
extent we needed to diversify our portfolio of funding; that is a fact. In
order to achieve our mission and vision we needed to diversify our
funding, not because the donor influenced what we did so much, but the
fact that there were restricted projects that they didn‟t allow us to achieve
the full potential of our programs. (Director of Humanitarian Assistance)
The less dictated those grants and contracts are the better – so that we can
use our approaches. But certainly there has been more restrictions over the
years and that‟s another reason for trying to diversify funding. (Board
Secretary)

Although revenue diversification results in a reduced dependence on a single
dominant funding source, the strategy also increases INGOs‟ extra-organizational
influence and control by relying on multiple funding elements in the funding
environment. Consequently, the accountability demands or interventional controls on
BETA also increase as a result of having multiple funding sources. Instead of reporting to
one funder, BETA now reports to multiple funding sources, all of which may ask
different things. Overall, the findings suggest that revenue diversification is associated
with high levels of operational autonomy.
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Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources.
Similar to ALPHA, the findings suggest that the only explicit and largely
harmless government restrictions on INGOs‟ access to alternative funding include the
travel and transportation restrictions imposed by the Fly America Act; the USG‟s
Executive Order on Terrorism Financing; and the Eligibility Rules for Goods and
Services of 1998. A review of the interview data shows that 6 out of 7 participants with
experience with USG funding expressed annoyance with these ex ante rules and
regulations.
According to the USG‟s Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-governmental
Recipients, The Fly America Act restricts BETA from accessing cheaper travel and
shipment alternatives for their personnel and the shipment of aid-related materials and
supplies. However, this Act only applies when U.S. flagged options are available. As
BETA‟s Internal Auditor pointed out, irrespective of cost, INGOs are required to travel in
U.S. carriers if available, as well as transport aid-related goods using U.S. carriers, even
if the carrier is twice the cost.
In addition, unlike corporate and foundation funding, the Eligibility Rules for
Goods and Services restrict INGOs‟ access to cheaper goods and services (e.g., motor
vehicles, equipment, materials and supplies) if they are not of U.S. origin. According to
these Eligibility Rules, unless the items to be purchased are of U.S. source or origin, and
the items have been incorporated into the program description, prior procurement
approval is required from the USG funding source. Yet another USG funding rule is the
Executive Order on Terrorism Financing which “prohibits transactions with, and the
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provision of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with
terrorism.”
The only other restrictions on access to alternative resources are those INGOs
place upon themselves due to conflict of interest and ethical concerns. Similar to
ALPHA, BETA‟s corporate fundraising strategy is governed by its corporate funding
guidelines which clearly outline a number of red flags to watch out for when seeking
after corporate funds. For instance, following a major natural disaster in Asia, BETA
declined unsolicited funds provided by a weapons manufacturing company on the basis
of conflicts of interest.
The above demonstrates that USG funding comes with inherent restrictions
attached and such restrictions create a highly controlled environment within which
INGOs operate, that is, as long as they receive USG funding and want to continue to do
so. However, as shown in the case of ALPHA, INGOs have the choice of responding to
funding announcements in the full knowledge of these inherent restrictions. This
indicates that INGOs like BETA can exercise their autonomy by strategically choosing
less restrictive funding opportunities. This suggests that funding agreements vary in their
level of control and influence, thus implying that INGO either resigns or retain some
measure of operational and managerial autonomy just by choosing between different
funding opportunities.
As the VP of Global Support, and the Directors of Competitive Bids, Food
Programs and Humanitarian Assistance pointed out, BETA is still able to exercise some
of its operational autonomy and managerial autonomy especially with respect to financial
management during the proposal response and program design phases. Note also that,
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similar to ALPHA, once BETA as won the awarded, the INGO can exercise some
influence or “flexibility” during the negotiation phase, that is, by negotiating the terms of
an award before the final funding agreement is signed. As the Director of Food Programs
noted,
With Title II Programs… like any grantee, you can try and push the
envelope a bit, but at some point, you can‟t go over the line. So I wouldn‟t
call it necessarily autonomy as much as flexibility and I think we have had
a fair amount of flexibility as programs have been evolving

The Director of Competitive Bids explicates the process in the following
statement.
Normally what happens is, you submit your proposal, you win the award
and then you go into the implementation phase, and with USAID,
typically, within the first 3 months of the implementation, you have to
have your detailed implementation plan – so that initial period is where
you reach out, you really make sure that you have all your partners,
beneficiary communities, and usually you have the initial 6 months – I
think, to do your M&E framework. So then you can get everybody
involved (on the grantee side), so you can have it in a very participatory
process – these are the things we are going to track and that whole
process. BETA pretty much acts independently during this phase and then
presents everything to the donor for approval, that‟s what the USAID
expects.

Inherent in this statement, is that, while an INGO can exercise some autonomy in
devising program plans, that autonomy can essentially be „veto‟ by the USG funding
agency as it retains the right to approves or declines the INGO‟s operational decisions.
This implies that, sometimes INGOs may get their way and at times they may not,
suggesting some measure of randomness in the process. The Director of Competitive
Bids expounds on this and some of the challenges that emanate from this negotiation
phase in the following statement.
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The USAID has a standard book of indicators, you have to have certain
indicators that align with those indicators and then you are free to propose
additional ones on your own. Usually the donor presses for more
information and we resist because the information comes at a cost. The
donor always wants you to track everything, from every possible
perspective, you know – segregate by gender, segregate by age, segregate
by status, this and that status. Well, all that information, you know, getting
that information has a cost, so there is usually some kind of back and forth
there about that process. But that‟s the good thing about USAID. The bad
thing is, it is a very formal design process and so it‟s a completely
different kind of relationship.
Now with the Department of State, they issue these calls, they are pretty
narrowly focused – like they will say, we want you to work with refugee
populations and we want you to address their needs vis-à-vis education
and sometimes we look and we say well, we have already surveyed and
we have done an assessment of this refugee population and their primary
need is for latrine, not for education and so sometimes there is a little bit
of back and forth there with the Department of State.

Perhaps an alternative way of framing the discussion presented here is that once
an INGO agrees to the ex ante funding requirements inherent in a funding agreement
(e.g., the adoption of the USAID‟s indicators and the various ex ante rules and
regulations) and the agreement is signed, it becomes legally binding. The INGO therefore
held accountable to the a priori ex ante expectations through mid-course and ex post
mechanisms such as quarterly and annual reports, direct monitoring, field audits, and the
A133 Audit. As in the case with ALPHA, BETA‟s funded program decisions are thus
controlled by results and performance, as well as the threat of sanctions (as indicated by
Section 226.60 – 226.62 of the Code of Federal Regulations), should the INGO fail to
comply with funding requirements and a priori set and agreed-upon expectations.
While these statements indicate that INGOs do have opportunity to exercise their
autonomy by designing the programs to be implemented, a review of Requests for
Proposals and Agreements (RFAs or RFPs) show that the announcements provide INGOs
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with a description of the desired program, as well as, the intended objectives of the
programs. INGOs therefore make “autonomous” decisions within the parameters set by
the RFAs, including the program requirements they must consider in order to be
considered for the award. For example, an RFA for an Iran-based program on Civil
Society and the Rule of Law outlined three program objectives INGOs had to choose
from. This suggests that INGOs‟ decision making could be characterized as “guided” as
opposed to being entirely autonomous. Alternatively, one could argue that INGOs
exercise their autonomy in program design and implementation in consultation with the
USG funding agencies.

5.6 CASE #3: SIGMA RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (SIGMA)
Established in 1983, SIGMA is the youngest of the three INGOs. This INGO
provides food, funds and medicines to impoverished communities; with the objective of
improving their nutrition, health care, and education. With a small staff in the United
States, SIGMA also has COs in a number of Central African countries, and in Eastern
Europe. Similar to the other two INGOs, SIGMA also plays a significant fundraising role
for COs. The INGOs also partners with local INGOs in developing countries to
implement funded programs.
Shown in Table 13 below, SIGMA‟s financial profile shows that unlike ALPHA,
in the last five years at least, the INGO received over 95 percent of its funding from the
USG and this share has been largely transferred through other USG grants and contracts
such as, grants from the Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than grants and
contracts from the USAID. Compared to ALPHA and BETA, SIGMA has the highest
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share of USG funding. For instance, 97 percent of the organization‟s total revenue came
from the USG in FY2004 and FY2005. These figures dropped to 94 percent in FY2006,
with only 6 percent coming from private support, that is, from in-kind contributions;
private contributions, and private revenue. The data however fails to provide any
description of what private revenue consists.

Table 13: SIGMA's Revenue Sources (FY1997 - 2006)

USG
Support

TYPES OF FUNDING
USAID Freight
P.L. 480 Freight
P.L. 480 Donated Food
USAID Grants
USAID Contracts
Other USG Grants
Other USG Contracts
Total USG Support

FY1997

FY2002

FY2004

$0
$0
$5,239,906
$0
$0
$4,114,501
$15,415,585
$24,769,992

$0
$7,801,532
$150,565
$50,000
$0
$25,122,253
$0
$33,124,350

8.2%
0

16.6%
62.2%

76%
0%

67.3%
0%

29.4%
47.7%

91.8%

21.2%

12.4%

32.8%

22.9%

$0
$679,494
$1,551,750
$0
$0
$198,522
$0
$2,429,766

FY2005
$0
$2,431,932
$450,000
$241,561
$0
$5,676,444
$0
$8,799,937

FY2006
$0
$5,832,679
$323,250
$190,000
$12,854,915
$7,732,861
$0
$26,933,705

By Mechanism, combined

USG Grants
USG Contracts
P.L. 480 Donated Food
& P.L. 480 Freight
Other
Gov't
Support
Private
Support

Other Gov't. & International
Organizations

$0

$0

$985,839

$0

$148,014

In-Kind Contributions
Private Contributions
Private Revenue
Total Private Support

$0
$31,491
$11,597
$43,088

$0
$30,928
$11,355
$42,283

$0
$20,131
$166,239
$186,370

$144,233
-$9,276
$100,160
$235,117

$1,478,137
$101,735
$31,910
$1,611,782

TOTAL SUPPORT &
REVENUE
% USG Support
% Other Gov't Support
% Private Support

$2,472,854
98%
0%
2%

24,812,275
100%
0%
0%

$34,296,559
97%
3%
1%

$9,035,054
97%
0%
3%

$28,693,501
94%
1%
6%

Of the total share of USG funding, approximately 77 percent came in the form of
grants in FY2004 and 67 percent in FY2005. Table 13 also shows that, roughly, 62
percent in FY2002 and 48 percent in FY2006 of the total USG funding came in the form
of contracts. In light of the erratic shifts in the funding tools used and in sharp contrast to
ALPHA and BETA, SIGMA‟s funding profile does not suggest the existence of an
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explicit strategy or preference for contracts over grants or vice-versa. This may be an
indication of an organization that is merely “following the money.” It is also possible
that the drop in SIGMA‟s dependence on contracts was a direct result of a disagreement
the INGO had with the USDA in 2002, which resulted in a year suspension of the INGO.

Staff Interviewed:
SIGMA has the smallest US-based staff among the three INGOs, with four people
listed on the organization‟s website, plus an onsite lawyer. Due to issues of
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, I was unable to acquire an interview with the
lawyer. I was however able to obtain telephone interviews from the Chief Executive
Officer, who is also the Chairman of the Board and the Program Coordinator, who is also
the Treasurer of the Board of Directors. The CEO and the Program Coordinator are also
responsible for overseeing the finances of the organization, including writing and
reviewing proposals.

5.7 FINDINGS
5.7.1

Resource Importance

Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy
Evidence from this analysis suggests that SIGMA is the least autonomous of the
three INGOs in this research. This can be attributed to the INGO‟s heavy dependence on
a more exacting and restrictive funding source, that is, USG funding. This is with respect
to its financial, operational and managerial autonomy. Recognizing the INGO‟s high
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dependence on USG funding, both participants from SIGMA acknowledged the poor
state of the INGO‟s financial dependence as shown in the following statements.
We probably have a problem, we‟ve been trying to cut back on it, but
that‟s were a lot of the money is. (Program Coordinator)
We went too much into getting money from the government and I
would… it‟s very difficult at this time to survive the way we are or
anywhere near without government support. (CEO)

While there is recognition of the potency of the USG as a valuable funding
source, there is also recognition of the influence USG funding can have on the INGO‟s
operational autonomy. The following statements by SIGMA‟s CEO suggests that the
INGO‟s priorities take second place to those of government, especially when the INGO‟s
priorities are incongruent with those of government. The statements also suggest that
SIGMA‟s operational autonomy is also undermined as a result of the power and resource
asymmetry between the INGO and its USG funding sources.
Well let‟s say Peru – if you ask people in Peru in the rural areas what do
they need and they say they need a clinic as a priority, but for you it would
be very difficult to fund a clinic at that time than an agriculture project or
something else. So very often PVOs or NGOs have to kind of fit in with
the priorities of the donors (that is), the interventions of the donors, which
is unfortunate…
We were approached by the USDA to do USDA a favor and the favor was
– there was a rice company in the U.S. that needed an INGO or PVO to
sign a contract because they were not a PVO. So I was approached and
asked, would we do them a favor in order to help this American firm to
undertake a program in Africa and after considering it and after
considering very many aspects of it, it sounded like a good project, and we
knew the top people in USDA were interested in this as this organization
or firm also had support from Congress by helping the USDA. And also
the fact that they had funding promised – actually very strongly promised
funding which in part came through from one of the big corporations –
another corporation in the States working in that country. We decided to
undertake the program and then we ran into a lot of interference from the
USDA in trying to implement the program such as, you know this group -
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firm has been (in action) for a long time and they know what they are
doing, you signed the agreement, but hands off, let them do this. And in
the long run we got penalized, the project fell apart – by suspending us for
a year; we had to fight the suspension.

Yet another limitation of USG funding is that it is usually earmarked for
particular countries that are considered a priority to the USG, places where an INGO may
not have existing presence or are not priorities for the INGO. In addition to this, the
Standard Provisions of U.S. Non-governmental Recipients also show that, “unless
otherwise approved by the USAID Agreement Officer (or other USG funding agency),
funds will only be expended for assistance in countries eligible for assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or under the acts appropriating funds for
foreign assistance.”
In light of SIGMA‟s high dependence on USG funding, such incongruence in
priorities has the potential of weakening the financial viability of the INGO especially if
the USG does not earmark funds for countries that are a priority to SIGMA or countries
where SIGMA is not currently operating. Again, we see the influence of such as a
situation on SIGMA‟s operational autonomy in the following statement by the CEO.
If you look at the priority countries of USAID and USDA, they do have
their priority countries and priority countries are usually the countries that
are not as needy may be. I will give you an example, if you look at Africa,
the USDA program is focused on countries such as Senegal, Mali or some
needy countries such as Niger. But then you have Kenya (a less needy
country) – you find that there is no USDA priority country listed…
Central African Republic or the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(former Zaire) is not listed; but then if you look at the USAID list, you
will find that the USAID list (is) even more limited because usually they
give preference to countries where they have their own Aid Missions. So
if you have an aid mission in Senegal, then Guinea Bissau is not a priority
country – that‟s true with the USDA. We have a program in Guinea
Bissau, but we got that program years ago when Guinea Bissau was on the
list – they are still on the list for food education but for nothing else. So
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there is less chance that you are going to get an agriculture program
approved or something similar in rural development for Guinea Bissau
than you are for Senegal.
As a result, SIGMA‟s high dependence on USG funding poses threats to the
longevity and sustainability of its programs due to changes in USG funding priorities.
And while government funding provides critical resources to SIGMA, the funding comes
at a cost to the INGO‟s operational autonomy due to the coercive nature of the funding
tools or funding in general as illustrated in the following statement.
When you do get the money though, within the plan that the USG
approves, there are sections in there on how the money is going to be
used; so if it‟s going to be for the development of food banks in the
country, it‟s going to give a description of the food banks and their
location and it‟s going to give a budget for the food banks, if it‟s cash for
work, then it‟s going to do the same thing – provide a budget and a
description of how it‟s going to be used.

The above not only speaks to how USG funding tends to steer, direct and control
INGOs in particular directions by use of ex ante rules and regulations governing resource
allocation and input use.
The statement also speaks to the specificity inherent in some of the USG funding
instruments such as contracts and monetization (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Note
that a significant share of SIGMA‟s USG funding also comes through food aid
(monetization). It appears that monetization was the organization‟s bread and butter in
1997, with 92 percent of its total USG revenue support being channeled through food aid
and freighting (shown in Table 13). The share however dropped to 21 percent in FY2002,
12 percent in FY2004 and went up to 33 percent in FY2005 and then dropped to 23
percent in FY2006.
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And while INGOs request approvals to make budget or other changes to an
existing funding agreement, the length it takes to get the approvals is long enough to
negatively affect SIGMA‟s operations and hence the INGO‟s responsiveness. Note that
the CFR 22 does not indicate the length of time it takes to get approvals from USG
funding agencies. However, as shown with ALPHA and BETA, we do know that
according to Code of Federal Regulations‟ Section 226.25 on Revision of Budget and
Program Plans, INGOs are required to seek prior written approval from USG funding
agencies before deviations can be implemented. This suggests that INGOs make projectrelated decisions in consultation with the USG funding agencies and therefore, are not
entirely autonomous entities. As the CEO indicated, one is able to,
One is able to… make changes but you have to request an amendment and
that can be quite lengthy, I mean, there are very often changes, for
instance, (when) we sell USDA commodities overseas (a process called
monetization) and particularly in Africa, we very often get more money
than we originally proposed. And if you get more money, you have to
have an amendment approved, which will allow you to spend the money
where you desire to put it…, and the amendments can take 6 months,
sometimes longer; they are very, very slow, with the USDA, very slow.

Such delays can render INGO work less timely and inflexible, suggesting losses
in its operational autonomy. By extension, an INGO might not only encounter difficult
and challenging questions about its operational autonomy, but also its effectiveness and
credibility.
The findings also suggest similar to ALPHA and BETA, SIGMA is also
influenced and controlled through interventional controls; more so for SIGMA given its
heavy dependence on USG funding. As the CEO noted,
You have reporting – I mean, we get reports here on a monthly basis from
overseas; we report to the USG on that every 6 months.
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According to Section 226.51 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations,
“performance reports will not be required more frequently than quarterly or, less
frequently than annually.”
SIGMA‟s Program Coordinator speaks on the burdensome nature of USG funding
compliance requirements in the following statement.
Compliance issues… have become more onerous as time goes on; they
require more every year, it‟s getting to be you spending more time
complying with things than you do actually spend doing other things
sometimes. USDA compliance has increased…

Participants across all three organizations, that is, those with USG funding
experience, agree that the USG‟s monitoring, evaluation, reporting and compliance
requirements tends to be arduous and very demanding to any INGO receiving USG
funding. This suggests that with regard to USG interventional controls, an INGO‟s level
of dependence on USG funding may not matter much. Perhaps the only exception is if the
INGO‟s share of USG funding is channeled through contracts. Participants across all
three INGOs considered the ex post reporting requirements associated with the contract
funding mechanism to be highly controlled and demanding.

Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to
result in limited INGO autonomy
Since USG funding is the only dominant funding source for this INGO, this
hypothesis did not apply to SIGMA.
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5.7.2

Resource Alternatives

Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external
dependence and control through revenue diversification.
When asked if the INGO had any plans for revenue diversification, both the CEO
and the Program Coordinator pointed out that this decision was to be discussed in an up
and coming strategic planning meeting that was to take place in late December of 2008.
Attempts to obtain this information and document proved unsuccessful.
Nonetheless, an analysis of the interview data reveals evidence to support
SIGMA‟s recognition of the need to diversify its revenue streams. This evidence gives
credence to the perceived efficacy of revenue diversification as a strategy for minimizing
an organization‟s external dependence. The following statement by the CEO illustrates
the financial dilemma SIGMA faces should the INGO experience a decline or a cessation
of government funding.
The organization would be able to survive, but it would have to change its
strategy somewhat to do more fundraising from the private sector. It‟s not
easy to get money from the public and we went too much into getting
money from the government and I would say the government – yeah – it‟s
very difficult at this time to survive the way we are or anywhere near
without government support.
The only way SIGMA would be able to remain operational without USG funding
is if alternative funding sources are secured.
Note that SIGMA‟s revenue streams are diversified along USG funding tools that
is, across USG grants, contracts and monetization, rather than along funding sources. As
Foster and Fine (2007) pointed out, some nonprofits have grown big, not by seeking after
diverse sources of funding as conventional wisdom would have it, but by going after a
single type of funder such as corporations or government as SIGMA seems to have done.
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However, most of the nonprofits the authors studied reported having restricted
programs or operations as a result of their high dependence on a single dominant funding
source – a portrait that appears to describe SIGMA‟s current operational autonomy. As a
result, any shifts and instabilities in the USG funding environment will most likely
become a source of financial vulnerability for the SIGMA. In other words, SIGMA‟s
high dependence on USG funding has become its Achilles‟ heel.

Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources.
Again, as illustrated in the case of ALPHA and BETA, this research shows that
the only explicit government restrictions on INGOs‟ access to alternative funding include
the Fly America Act, the Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services of April 1998, and the
Executive Order on Terrorism Financing. More potent restricts are those the INGOs place
upon themselves to ensure that the organization does not enter into exchange
relationships that present conflicts of interest for the organization. As SIGMA‟s CEO
observed, some funding may be provided purely for marketing purpose and not based on
need.
If you use corporations, you find that some of the corporations and also
corporate foundations… want to provide money as subsidiaries. In other
words, if they don‟t have contacts or activities going on in the Congo
Republic than they do in Nigeria (for example), they are going (to fund
you only for programs in) Nigeria… I could give you an example of the
Congo Republic – Petroco (pseudonym) has funded some projects, but
Petroco likes to see their little name on each desk or water project so that
people know they have a corporate responsibility to the country. It‟s a
marketing strategy – the USG does that too; we always try to put U.S.
logos – USAID or USDA on our projects, the USG calls it branding.
(SIGMA‟s CEO)
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Unlike ALPHA and BETA whose financial dependence on the USG is low,
SIGMA‟s high dependence on USG funding provides this research with an opportunity to
observe the full extent of the USG‟s influence and control on an organization rather than
a funded-program. First, the INGO cannot survive in the absence of USG funding, unless
alternative funding sources are secured. Second, in light of the high ex post or
interventional constraints associated with USG funding, essentially all of SIGMA‟s
decisions pertaining to managerial and operational matters have to undergo government
scrutiny, during program implementation – by way of mid-course monitoring and
reporting, and after program implementation – through ex post reporting. This includes
field audits, and direct monitoring by the USG funding agency. These mechanisms enable
USG funding agencies to maintain a tight grip on SIGMA‟s decisions and activities, thus
grossly undermining the INGO‟s decision making capacity i.e., undermining SIGMA‟s
organizational autonomy as opposed to its programmatic autonomy as we have seen in
the case of ALPHA and BETA.

5.8 INGOs Autonomy: The Impact of Foundations and Corporate Funding
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that while INGOs have the freedom to
exercise some of their autonomy or actual decision making competencies, they do
exercise this within very confined or controlled environments. The environment is
confined by virtue of the ex ante rules, regulations, the interventional constraints, and the
USG‟s ability to „veto‟ INGOs‟ decisions by way approving or disapproving them.
Perhaps, an alternative way of looking at this is that INGOs make “autonomous”
decisions in consultation with the USG funding agencies.
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In order to understand the degree to which USG funding influences and controls
INGOs, thus usurping their potential for actual use of their decision making
competencies, this section compares the USG as a funding source to foundations and
corporations. The findings are arranged by autonomy dimension, and they include a
section focusing on some of the ex ante and ex post mechanisms employed by
foundations and corporate funders.
This research finds evidence to suggest that in contrast to government;
foundations and corporations yield relatively more autonomy to INGOs across all
dimensions as shown in Figure 6 below. However, this research also finds that both
foundations and corporations operate like government in some respects, thus negatively
impacting INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions to some degree. And similar to government
funding, the influence on INGOs‟ autonomy takes place through ex ante and ex post
controls, particularly through budget controls and preferences, in the case of both
foundations and corporations; and high monitoring and evaluation requirements, in the
case of foundations.
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Figure 6 therefore illustrates the perceived impact of funding on INGOs‟
autonomy dimensions, by funding source. These figures were constructed based on
participants‟ expressed experiences with each of the funding sources. While the
researcher‟s judgment plays a role in selecting the point of placement for each of the
funding sources relative to the others; the general direction and magnitude of the
relationship was guided by various statements from participants across all three INGOs.
Additional information on the construction of Figure 6, Figure 7 and Table 15 is provided
in Appendix 4.

Operational Autonomy
The findings indicate that government constrains INGOs‟ operational autonomy
by way of ex ante rules, preferences and requirements, as well as through ex post
monitoring and reporting requirements. As a result, USG funding yields less operational
autonomy to INGOs compared to other funding sources, that is, next to larger newer
foundations and older foundations, respectively.
And while foundations may promote innovation among INGO grantees, their
approach to grantmaking also poses threats to INGOs‟ long-term development plans. As
the foundations experts from ALPHA and BETA pointed out, foundations prefer to fund
innovative and pilot projects as opposed to ongoing programs. At the same time, one
could argue that the advantage with foundation grants is that they create an environment
that fosters INGO innovation and perhaps, high operational autonomy since the pilot
projects would originate entirely with the INGOs.
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Similar to government, foundations also have a tendency to allocate funding to
particular programs areas. In the words of ALPHA‟s Foundations Expert, these priority
program areas change with “the trends and fashions of what they want to support.”
Similar to funding pilot projects, allocating money for particular programs also poses
challenges on INGOs long-term operations or agendas, especially if they are highly
dependent on foundation grants. Also similar to government, foundations require INGOs
to submit any budget variances of over 10 percent for approval prior to implementing the
changes, suggesting a loss of operational autonomy for INGOs.
Considering that foundations will not pay for certain items like the vehicles
INGOs may need to implement funded projects, INGOs‟ resource allocation and use
decisions are also influenced and controlled through the requirement that INGOs
maintain minimum overhead costs. This compels INGOs to make budget decisions that
respect these budget rules. According to the foundation experts from both ALPHA and
BETA, where an overhead of 25 percent would be more realistic for INGOs, the Melinda
and Gates Foundation prefers to fund an INGO with an overhead of about 15 percent,
while the Ford Foundation is even more stringent in expecting a 5 percent overhead cost.
ALPHA‟s foundations expert further elaborates on this in the following statement,
In micro-financing projects, foundations have been pushing INGOs to
lower their costs such that they serve more people with very little budget.
This questions the quality of our work. Sometimes we can‟t do much of
quality with very little… The Lorner Dowen* Foundation is mostly
interested in achieving impact and cost effectiveness and sometimes the
two do not always add up.
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Moreover, some foundations engage their own program experts into dialogues
with INGOs during the grant solicitation phase. For instance, according to BETA‟s
Deputy Director of External Relations,
From a foundations side … you are also working across the table with
other program experts. So when we work with the Lorner Dowen
Foundation, or when we work with any of our large foundations, it‟s our
health expert talking to their health expert about the programs.

While this process could be viewed as a filtering for screening out unsound
programs and implementation plans, the inclusion of program experts in the process can
also be regarded as a type of ex ante control mechanism. In this regard, the foundation
program experts act as a mechanism for communicating and emphasizing donor
preferences and priorities, thus steering, controlling, and directing INGOs‟ program
designs and implementation plans to ensure that they incorporate those priorities.
On the other hand, the chance to meet with other experts may be to the advantage
of INGOs as this provides them with a forum to negotiate with the funders directly,
unlike with USG funding where direct, one-on-one negotiation is limited. However, there
is always the chance that INGOs‟ operational autonomy will be undermined as INGOs
can no longer make decisions about programs and how those programs are to be
implemented without the donor‟s approval. Again, such approvals or disapprovals can
make a difference for INGOs in terms of whether they get an award or not. As a result,
that may create an environment that has the potential to compel some INGOs to
compromise on their values in order to win a funding award, thus securing the financial
viability of their organizations.
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While larger older foundations demand low overhead costs, they appear to be a
little more flexible and therefore allow more negotiation with their grantees. The
following statement by BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations elaborates on this.
(The negotiation is characterized by) a lot of back and forth and with
foundations – they approach you, you never approach them. A lot of the
bigger foundations …don‟t take unsolicited proposals. With some of our
foundations, we put a proposal together and then we pitch it to them, but
with big newer foundations, especially the Lorner Dowen Foundation,
since it‟s one of the largest foundation, they come to BETA and say, we
want to help you guys increase your presence in U.S. advocacy, put a
proposal together.

This statement also reveals how foundations are able to retain control over
INGOs‟ decisions by not taking unsolicited proposals. By approaching INGOs,
foundations establish both a power and resource asymmetry over INGOs thus setting the
tone in terms of what they would like an INGO to do. In this sense, the foundations‟
funding preferences, objectives, programming ideas and program theories are more or
less defined a priori and therefore do not necessarily originate with the INGOs. Thus
resembling USG contracting relationships, INGOs become mere implementers of
foundations‟ programs or “contractors” on behalf of foundations.
Nonetheless, INGOs are likely to retain some operational autonomy as they get to
design the programs and implementation plans, albeit, in consultation with the funders.
Similar to government therefore, these program designs and implementation plans must
endure the review and approval process. It is through this process that operational
autonomy is likely to be undermined. In light of this, one wonders whether INGOs are
regarded as the direct relief and development expert that they are or as mere
implementers of funders‟ projects, thus undermining INGOs‟ uniqueness and potential.
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And in response to the question of the degree to which larger newer foundations
influence INGOs operational autonomy, BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations
responded with the following statement, a view also shared by ALPHA‟s Foundations
Expert.
I think it‟s a huge percentage (that is, the extent to which the INGO is
influenced), but I think that‟s why having a relationship with them (is
important) so that they understand what we are doing. With private
individuals, it‟s not that much, really it‟s more of BETA saying, these are
our priorities and you know I understand you are interested in education.

The findings also suggest that corporate funding is associated with high ex ante
and ex post controls, but not as arduous as with the USG or foundations. As a result, the
likelihood of weakening INGOs‟ operational autonomy is relatively weak. According to
BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations, unlike foundations, which usually have
program expertise on staff, corporation funding decisions are usually made by the CEO,
and for the most part, such decisions are primarily focused on a desire to be seen as being
socially responsible.
The high ex post requirements could be attributed to a venture philanthropy
approach, were corporations view their gifts as some sort of “investment” which is
expected to yield some rate of return. As a result of this approach, INGOs may retain a
lot of their operational autonomy, as they are likely to be regarded as the experts at what
they do under this approach. However, they may not be entirely unexposed to the
constraints emanating from the high ex ante budget controls which governing how funds
are utilized, and the ex post control that requires INGOs to demonstrate evidence of the
impact of the gift. BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations articulates this point in
the following statement.
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With a corporation you might be working with a head of a foundation, but
the corporation doesn‟t understand our work as. There is this huge
educational background, just really educating them about the work that we
do and… the impact factors – how they may or may not be difficult to get
based on the outline within the agreement for the funding.... We could not
take the JWS‟* (pseudonym) money and use it to program something JWS
hasn‟t told us – that‟s part of the proposal. It has a dedicated fund and
therefore we report on how we spend that fund – we always go back to
what was the intent of the proposal.
The 10 million dollar gift we just got from JWS obviously has huge
significant section that talks about outcomes. But a $10,000 donation to a
country office (CO) might not have as significant type reporting and we
really try to balance, I mean if you think about it, for a CO to receive a
$10,000 gift, that‟s a lot of work to put on someone for a $10,000 gift…..
Most of their rules and regulations (are concerned with) how we spend
that funding; So they came up with a mutual proposal and it was - a lot of
times it‟s the expectation of how we spend down the grant…. It‟s
spending and impact – it‟s very much spending and impact in areas in
which we work.
The source of INGOs‟ operational autonomy therefore, comes about in that, while
corporate funding is usually restricted to specific objectives, the objectives usually
originate with the INGO. INGOs therefore propose what is assumed to be the best
solutions to societal problems and corporations make investments based on the promise
of success, hence the requirement to show impact. This may suggest that compared to
foundations, corporate funder are more likely to regard INGOs as the experts at what they
do; hence the high levels of operational autonomy associated with corporate funding.
Overall, it appears that even in the face of high ex ante budget controls and ex post
constraints, corporate funding is associated with higher INGO operational autonomy
compared to both government funding and foundation grants. This conclusion is further
elucidated below.
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Managerial Autonomy
Also shown in Figure 6 above, this research finds that unlike government funding,
corporations and foundations do not seek to influence INGOs‟ hiring decisions for the
funded programs. However, the findings do suggest a relatively high influence and
control on INGOs‟ managerial autonomy with respect to financial management. Similar
to government, INGOs are expected to demonstrate good business integrity characterized
by reasonable internal controls, accounting, recordkeeping, procurement and overall
financial management systems (USAID 2009). As a result of these requirements and
expectations, both foundations and corporations also impose relatively high ex ante
budget rules and regulations on INGOs. Given the overhead cost rules identified above,
foundations seem to want to keep a tight grip on how INGOs allocate and utilize the
donated resources, by requiring that they submit financial reports every quarter, as well
as annually. In addition, comprehensive financial reports are required at the close of the
programs.
And according to ALPHA‟s Foundations Expert, similar to government,
foundations require that INGOs seek approval for budget deviations of more than 10
percent prior to implementing those changes. As a result, it appears that foundations in
particular are starting manage their grantee relationships quite like government, thus
influencing and controlling INGOs decisions and activities through similar types of ex
ante and ex post mechanisms.

184

Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints
A key finding from this research is the relationship between accountability and ex
post constraints on INGOs‟ autonomy. This analysis establishes that INGOs are not free
from ex post reporting requirements, evaluations and audit provisions with respect to
their decisions and outcomes. As a result, the analysis concludes that all funding sources,
i.e., government, corporations and foundations, influence and control INGOs through
interventional controls, though in varying degrees as suggested by Figure 6 above. All
this is done in the name holding INGOs accountable. Table 14 below lists some of the
controls mechanism funding sources employ to establish control over INGOs‟ decisions
and activities, thus undermining their ability to make autonomous decisions. Also
included in this section is a discussion of how foundation and corporate donors influences
INGOs‟ decision making and activities through ex ante budget controls.
While red tape is mostly associated with government funding, this study also
finds evidence to suggest a prevalence of red tape within larger and especially newer
foundations. As a result, both government and foundations appear to be using red tape as
a control mechanism to keep INGOs in check by monitoring the decisions they make.
Comparing USG funding to corporate funding, SIGMA‟s CEO had this to say – a view
also shared by BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations;
I can tell you --- business --- corporate funding…., we have had in some
cases, just an exchange of letters, we‟ve had in other cases, a one-page
contract, and other times maybe a 3-page, maybe 4-page contract. It‟s
mixed, but it‟s really interesting because you don‟t have all the paperwork
usually that you do with the government. (SIGMA‟s CEO)

The following statements depict how INGOs have experienced foundation grants
compared to government funding. The statements illuminate some discomfort INGOs
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have had with the monitoring and evaluation requirements of foundations. They also
illustrate that similar to government, foundations like to retain control over INGOs‟
budget, that is, on how INGOs allocate and use the provided inputs by use of budget rules
and regulations. As a result, ex ante controls manifest in budget approvals and
amendments, as well as the requirement that INGOs to provide evidence of how the
provided funding was allocated and utilized.
From a foundations side … it is like the blend of working with
government and working with the private individual or corporation.
(BETA‟s External Relations Deputy Director)
Some foundations are better than others. I have to say Lorner Dowen
Foundation is awful – they have grown pretty rapidly; their new program
officers sometimes don‟t even understand (their) own budget process. ...
And they have very complicated budgets and budget rules and some of
their program officers – some of the new ones, they start making up new
rules that aren‟t right, but because they are very stubborn about it, it‟s not
consistent across the organization. Also Lorner Dowen Foundation tends
to keeping coming back over and over and over for revisions and really, it
takes a very large amount of an organization‟s time – depending on the
program officer. Some of them really micro-manage, others are fine.
At BETA we used to call it “Lorner Dowen Torture,” because they keep
coming back and wanting more and more. And all this is before they
approve the proposal – it goes on sometimes for a year and a half – it‟s a
very long time – it‟s a lot of staff time. Whereas an older foundation like,
the Hannah Foundation; their proposals are pretty simple. (The younger
foundations) are disorganized. And the Lorner Dowen Foundation system
is really complicated, I mean, everybody wants a timeline and their
timeline is linked up to the budget and that‟s linked up to the logframe and
if you change one line item in the budget, you have to go and change all
the other documents. If you adjust, it‟s real difficult. (ALPHA‟s new
Foundations Expert, also a former employee of BETA)

Next to government therefore, larger newer foundations in contrast to older
foundations and corporations, appear to weaken INGOs‟ operational autonomy through
controlling resource allocation and use. This influence also appears to be achieved by
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weakening INGOs managerial autonomy with respect to financial management through
ex ante budget rules and approval requirements. While all this is achieved through ex
ante controls, ex post constraints have also been utilized to ensure continued compliance.
Perhaps the reason this approach may work is that similar to government, foundations
and corporate funders also exercise incremental funding on their INGO grantees.
This research also finds evidence to suggest that unlike foundations and
government funding, the absence of red tape and tedious paper work associated with
corporate funding promotes or facilitates increased INGO operational autonomy. As
SIGMA‟s CEO highlights,
Grants are a little easier and especially if they are from the private sector
(because) … there is more understanding of what goes on. For example, if
you have two organizations funding the same project in the private sector,
(both of them would) say just extend the program, add to it or so, with
government, this is not possible.

This suggests that most of the corporate rules and regulations are concerned with
how INGOs spend the funds they provide (including having solid financial accountability
and management systems), as well as the impact their gift made, with the latter
suggesting the use of ex post controls (though not as arduous as USG or corporate
funding ex post controls). The following statement by BETA‟s External Relations Deputy
Director further elucidates this point further.
A lot of times, it is the expectation of how we spend down the grant…, we
report on how we spent the gift and impact… corporations are more
restricted (compared to some foundations) because they have a bottom line
shareholder – you know, they have to be ready to report back why they
gave us a $500,000 grant.
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Apparent from these statements is that, ex ante, mid-course and ex post controls
are designed to ascertain whether INGOs are doing what they promised to do. Given the
presence of mid-course monitoring, INGOs are compelled to maintain compliance with
the ex ante and ex post rules and expectations since this information is used to support
decisions for continued funding of the INGOs. In other words, decisions about INGOs‟
continued receipt of funding increments are contingent upon their compliance and midcourse performance. Such constraints do not only ensure that the funding source‟s
preferences, priorities and expectations are incorporated into the decision making; they
also ascertain whether they were acted upon and eventually fulfilled. It is however
essential to remember that it is INGOs‟ autonomy with respect to the funded program that
is compromised and not autonomy as it relates to the rest of the organization, unless the
funding from a particular source constitutes the lion‟s share of an INGO‟s total revenue
as in the case of SIGMA.
Table 14 below summarizes of some of the control mechanisms discussed in the
research. The study concludes that different funding sources employ these control
mechanisms in order to steer, direct and control INGOs‟ decision making and subsequent
activities, with respect to the funded programs. Such constraints influence and restrict
INGOs‟ decision making competencies pertaining to resource allocation and use, and
programming. It is through these control mechanisms therefore that INGOs‟ autonomy is
compromise and weakened, that is, INGOs‟ capacity to make unilateral decisions
pertaining to the policy operations, accountability and management tasks associated with
funded programs.
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Table 14: Funding Sources’ Control Mechanism
Funding Source or Tool

Control Mechanisms

Government
Ex Ante Controls
(includes pre-Award
requirements):

Mid-course Controls:

Ex Post Controls:

Sanctions:

Proposal Approvals
Budget Rules & Regulations (e.g., USG
Procurement Rules codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR 22); Fly America Act; USAID
Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services of April
1998; the Executive Order on Terrorism Financing)
Budget Approvals
Key Personnel Approval
Red Tape
Budgets Deviations (e.g., variance of above 10%)
Program Deviations
Red Tape
Evaluation Reporting (e.g., quarterly, 6 months, or
annual)
Financial Audits (e.g., A133)
Field Audits (by Audit staff)
Direct Ongoing Monitoring
Red Tape
Federal Conditionalities (e.g., Anti-Prostitution
Clause; The Global Gag Rule)
Threat of Sanctions (e.g., suspension; pay back
funds)

Foundations
Ex Ante Controls:

Proposal Approvals
Program Deviations
Budget Approvals
Budget Deviations (variances above 10%)
Expert Screening
Budget Rules (e.g., 15% overhead (Gates); 5%
overhead (Ford); No purchase of program-related
vehicles)
Financial Reporting
Red Tape

Ex Post Controls:

Ongoing Monitoring
Evaluation Reporting (quarterly narrative reports)
Annual Financial Reporting
Red Tape

Sanctions:
Corporations
Ex Ante Controls:

Ex Post Controls:

Threat of Sanctions (pay back funds)
Budget Rules
Budgets Deviations
Financial Statements
Programs Deviations
Monitoring & Evaluation Reporting
Annual Financial Statements
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5.9 Summary of Findings
To summarize, this research began with the central question of whether
government funding, relative to other funding sources undercuts the autonomy of INGOs.
This chapter compared the within-case findings to the derived hypotheses, with a special
focus on the resource dependence framework utilized in this study. The findings suggests
that in many respects, USG funding weakens INGOs‟ autonomy relatively more than
other funding sources, and this impact varies by autonomy dimension as illustrated in
Figure 6 above. These conclusions are inductively drawn from the participants‟
experiences with government, corporate and foundations funding. As such, the Figure 6
is based on commonly shared agreements about the impact or influence of government
funding on different autonomy dimensions, relative to alternative funding sources like
foundations, corporations, and individuals contributions.
This research also finds that relative to other funding sources, USG funding in
general, is associated with strong ex ante and ex post controls in the form of strict rules
and regulations. Coupled with this are the significant differences in ideology (compared
to INGOs), which come in the form of funding conditionalities (e.g., The Global Gag
Rule). This research concludes that it is through these constraints that the steering,
directing, and controlling of INGOs‟ decision making occurs. In other words, it is
through these mechanisms that INGOs‟ actual decision making competencies with
respect to programmatic operational autonomy for the funded programs are weakened or
confined.
This is not to say that foundation grants and corporate gifts do not undermine
INGOs‟ autonomy. The findings articulated in this research suggest that similar to
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government funding, foundations in particular, might increasingly be operating more and
more like government with respect to their use of ex ante and ex post control mechanisms
to direct and control INGOs‟ decision making pertaining to resource allocation and use.
This may be attributed to the “venture philanthropy” approach which perceives
foundation grants and corporate gifts as “investments” as opposed to “donations.” This
increased interest in seeing a rate of return on donors‟ investments may be a function of
the stricter ex post compliance requirements INGOs are increasingly facing, all in the
name of accountability.
As a result, similar to USG funding, though not at the same level of influence,
corporations and foundations influence INGOs‟ operational autonomy by controlling and
constricting the environment within which INGOs make decisions pertaining to resource
allocation and use. This is achieved through a number of control mechanisms as shown in
Table 15. These include ex ante budget rules, regulations and controls such as placing a
ceiling on overhead costs, and requiring INGOs to seek prior approval for their
purchasing and procurement decisions.
In addition, information from mid-course monitoring also appears to be used to
ensure INGOs‟ compliance. By so doing, failure to demonstrate compliance and/or
impact could result in a cessation of an INGO‟s continued funding. In other words,
donors‟ incremental approach to financing INGOs provides donors with the discretionary
room to discontinue or terminate the provision of remaining installments or obligations to
an INGO. All this suggests that INGOs receiving USG funding, as well as foundation
grants are increasingly operating in tightly controlled funding environments, suggesting a
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milieu in which such conditions potentially stifle INGOs‟ innovation in decision making
and by extension, their overall responsiveness and effectiveness.
With regards to USG funding, the findings in this research suggest that an
INGO‟s share of USG may not matter much when it to comes to the influence of
interventional constraints. As such, regardless of the proportion of USG funding an
INGO receives, it still faces equally onerous ex post monitoring and reporting
requirements. This is exemplified by the fact that, in response to only 10 percent share of
USG funding, ALPHA set up an entire unit with a staff of 4 people to deal solely with
compliance issues associated with USG funding.
The share of USG funding an INGO receives however makes a difference when it
comes to the level of influence the USG is able to exert on an INGO‟s operational
decisions and managerial decisions, especially with respect to financial management. The
findings suggest that while government may be able to exercise influence on INGOs
decision making through various mechanisms, for an INGO receiving the least share of
USG funding like ALPHA, USG influence only extends as far as the funded programs.
In contrast to ALPHA therefore, the findings suggest that SIGMA as an
organization faces strong government influence and control given its high dependence on
USG funding. The same is true for BETA, though to a limited extent – given that almost
50 percent of the INGO‟s programs are funded by the USG. In addition, should the USG
support of INGOs cease for any reason, BETA‟s organizational size and programs would
therefore be reduced by almost half, while SIGMA would cease to exist altogether –
assuming that no replacement funding is secured.
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There are however, positive spillover effects that can derive from an exchange
relationship with government and with corporate and foundation funders. The findings
suggest that the high accountability demands placed upon INGOs can compel them to
improve their capacity to self-examine. This has been accomplished through the demand
for INGOs to create and maintain good business integrity through establishing strong
recordkeeping measures, as a condition for establishing one‟s eligibility to receive USG
funding. In addition, INGOs internal controls may have been strengthened especially, in
light of the required annual A133 Audit.
It could therefore be argued that these accountability demands have improved the
professionalism of INGOs as they are increasingly compelled to formally consider the
efficiency and effectiveness of their programs through accounting for their spending and
the impact of their funded programs. In a sense, ex post monitoring and evaluation
requirements may have fostered a formalization of the process of evaluation within
INGOs. These externalities therefore are applicable to all three INGOs and perhaps to
USG-funded direct relief and development INGOs. As shown in Table 8 (in Chapter 4)
18 of the 19 participants from all three INGOs drew a positive link between USG funding
and INGOs‟ professionalism.
Finally, the findings in this research also suggest that INGOs are not without
avenues to exercise some of their autonomy. After all, INGOs choose which funded
relationship to enter into; they also design the programs to be implemented, and they can
also suggest deviations from those plans. However, this exercise of “autonomy” is done
in consideration of program guidelines and objectives, and in consultation with the
funding agencies.
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CHAPTER 6
CROSS-CASE FINDINGS: A TOOL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the cross-case findings based on an analysis of data pooled
from all three cases. Designed to expound on the influence of funding tools on the
INGOs‟ behavior with respect to operational and managerial autonomy, this chapter
compares the cross-case findings to the tool choice hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.
Demonstrated in this section is that different funding tools exert varying degrees of
control on INGOs‟ decision making capacity, thus weakening the organizations‟ capacity
for making independent decisions about programs and their operations.
Viewing the government funding-INGO autonomy discourse from the tool choice
perspective therefore helps explicate some of the nuances inherent in this relationship. As
a result, this perspective is instrumental in bringing clarity to the influence USG funding
can have on INGOs‟ decision making competencies and activities. This is especially
essential since grants, cooperative agreements and contracts represent key funding
mechanisms employed by government to finance INGO activities (Kerlin 2006a).

6.2 Do Funding Tools Matter?
Figure 7 demonstrates the perceived impact of each funding tool on INGOs‟
autonomy dimensions. The decision to place each tool on a particular position on the
continuum was also informed by information gathered from participants‟ experiences
with each of the tools. As such, while the researcher judgment played a role in the
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construction of these continuums, this was largely informed by the data. Additional
evidence to support these illustrations was gathered from the different funding tools
examined for this research, as well as from the descriptions of funding tools provided by
documents such as the Automated Directives System, Acquisition and Assistance
Chapter 303 from the USAID. Examples of the statements instrumental in the
construction of these continuums are provided in Appendix 4.
This research finds that all participants who contributed to the discussion on
funding tools recognized the signals each tool sends to the INGO, as well as how each
funding tool is designed to operate. Consequently, the participants were able to provide
insight into how each funding tool influences their operational and managerial decisions.
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Fig1: Influence on INGOs‟ Operational Autonomy

Low

Unrestricted

Cooperative
Agreements
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Fig3: Influence on INGOs‟ Managerial Autonomy: Financial
Management
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Contracts
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Fig4: Influence of INGOs‟ Managerial Autonomy: HR
Management

Figure 7: Relationship between Funding Tools and INGO Autonomy, by Dimension

This analysis concludes that different funding tools do indeed transmit different
signals to INGOs about the funder‟s policy position, objectives, requirements and
expectations. At the same time, and also consistent with Salamon (2002a; 2002b), each
tool defines the operating environment INGOs work in and hence constricts INGOs‟
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ability to make independent decisions. As a result, funding tools weaken INGO‟s
autonomy dimensions in distinctive ways as exemplified by statements like the following.
Different tools are subject to different kinds of regulations. (BETA‟s
Internal Auditor)
…the grants are a little easier and especially if they are from the private
sector and from the private sector, there is more understanding of what
goes on… Contracts are more kind of more controlled – you need more….
monitoring on a contract for compliance; both (grants and contracts) need
certain controls and compliance but it‟s a little more –under a contract I
would say. (CEO, SIGMA)
Contracts are the difficult ones because, contracts are almost business
documents and everything is set out very clearly and we have very little
leeway in terms of how we can influence that. (Director of Global
Support, BETA)
And as pointed out by ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Compliance and also
consistent across all three INGOs is the understanding that contracts simply signal that,
We want to hire you for your expertise to do this thing that we want
done…. In this case, the USG knows what they want done and the INGO
is simply the contractor or “the hired gun.”
ALPHA‟s Program Director echoed the same observation as he contrasted
contracts to cooperative agreements;
… the USG has several ways of allocating money, one is contracts, they
know what they want and they want you to just do what they want (So the
NGO is a contractor)… They want you to do this, they give the money and
they pay you for what they want you to do. The other one is (a cooperative
agreement); they have an idea about the ultimate goal they want to
achieve… were they know what they want, but they leave it up to you the
expert to make suggestions about how you are going to achieve it.
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Similar to an observation by ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Compliance,
BETA‟s Director of Competitive Bids pointed out that grants and cooperative agreements
indicate that,
…we (USG) have an idea of this thing we want done and we are not sure
of the best way to accomplish it, so why don‟t you tell us how best to do it
and whether that is all we need to be doing…. Well, (with contracts)…
you have to be willing to pretty much take whatever direction that they are
going to give you; whereas with a cooperative agreement, it is understood
that you have your own mission, you have your own way of seeing the
world, you have your own commitment and dedication to the communities
you are working in and the USG is asking for your thoughts on how it‟s to
spend money and then approving it and giving you that money but it
remains more your money to embark on your program. When you have a
contract, you don‟t own the program, they still own the program – you are
the service provider, you know if they say jump you say, how high?

In light of the above, I compare the cross-case findings to three tool choice-based
hypotheses in the next section.

6.2.1

Coercive Funding Tools

Hypothesis 5: Greater dependence on highly coercive funding instruments
surrenders less autonomy to INGOs.
This research supports this hypothesis given that contracts, unlike unrestricted
funding and grants and to a lesser extent, cooperative agreements, constrain INGOs‟
autonomy by spelling out the scope of work that INGOs must undertake. In contrast to
cooperative agreements and grants, contracts clearly yield less operational autonomy. As
shown in Table 10 (in Chapter 4), 9 participants across all three INGOs, expressed
discomfort with contracts. The following statements outline how contracts operate,
relative to other tools.
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A cooperative agreement is much easier to work through, contracts are the
difficult ones because, contracts are almost business documents and
everything is set out very clearly and we have very little leeway in terms
of how we can influence that. I mean, the steps are there, you just have to
follow them 1, 2 and 3; while a cooperative agreement is much looser, and
we have a chance to influence it and modify it a bit if needed. Grants and
cooperative agreements are very similar. BETA prefers cooperative
agreements or grants; unfortunately the USG is going much more towards
contracts and it is much harder for us because it doesn‟t give us the leeway
that we would prefer to have. (BETA‟s VP of Global Support)
Contracts are more controlled; you need more monitoring on a contract for
compliance; both (grants and contracts) need certain controls and
compliance but it‟s a little more under a contract. (SIGMA‟s CEO)
We are not government, we are non-sectarian and we are non-political, we
are not supporting any political cause or any specific special interests. For
instance, the USG has started putting in some of their solicitations that if
we win the bid, we have to be promoting the U.S. foreign policy overseas
and we will not go for those types of contracts because we don‟t want to
be seen as an arm with the USG. So our independence and our impartiality
are key to all that; we don‟t want accept any money that jeopardizes our
impartiality and our independence… Unfortunately, the USG is going
much more towards contracts and it is much harder for us because it
doesn‟t give us the leeway that would prefer to have. (BETA‟s VP of
Global Support)

Consequently, SIGMA may be surrendering most of its organizational autonomy
not only because the INGO is almost 100 percent-USG funded, but also because a
significant share of that funding is and has been channeled through contracts in the past
(62 percent in FY2002 and 48 percent in FY2006 as shown in Table 13). This suggests
that 62 percent of SIGMA‟s total revenue came with high use and output specifications
and controls in 2002 alone and 48 percent of that in 2006. As such, SIGMA could be
described as “contractor” of government, one that is implementing USG programs 62 or
48 percent of the time. And since nearly half of its funding has come through the contract
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mechanism, one can draw the conclusion that the INGO is increasingly “subject to
government‟s direct instruction and control” (Shaikh and Casablanca 2008).
In contrast, cooperative agreements allow room for INGOs to exercise their
autonomy as they design the programs and implementation plans, albeit in direct
consultation with the USG given the “substantial involvement and participation”
specified in the funding tool. As a result, cooperative agreements do yield some
operational autonomy to INGOs; however, the environment within which INGOs make
those decisions remains highly controlled in light of the USG‟s substantial involvement
and participation in all major program decisions. The statements also suggest that INGOs
are able to incorporate some of their own preferences, interests, and priorities into the
design of the programs.
ALPHA‟s Program Director confirms that a major constraint inherent in
cooperative agreements is that the USG expects to be involved in all major decisions
INGOs make. In particular, the USG expects to be involved in determining the nature of
the programs to be implemented, how they are implemented, and in approving INGOs‟
choice of key personnel for those funded programs. Such involvement can constrain
INGOs‟ capacity to make independent operational and managerial decisions pertaining to
the funded program.
Similar to an observation by ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Compliance,
BETA‟s Government Grants Expert points out that grants and cooperative agreements
indicate that,
…we (USG) have an idea of this thing we want done and we are not sure
of the best way to accomplish it, so why don‟t you tell us how best to do it
and whether that is all we need to be doing…. Well, (with contracts)…
you have to be willing to pretty much take whatever direction that they are
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going to give you; whereas with a cooperative agreement, it is understood
that you have your own mission, you have your own way of seeing the
world, you have your own commitment and dedication to the communities
you are working in and the USG is asking for your thoughts on how it‟s to
spend money and then approving it and giving you that money but it
remains more your money to embark on your program. When you have a
contract, you don‟t own the program, they still own the program – you are
the service provider, you know if they say jump you say, how high?

This statement gives the impression that the money transferred through grants and
cooperative agreements essentially becomes the INGOs‟ money to embark on their own
programs. However, as noted above in the case of cooperative agreements, the USG
remains substantially involved in how the provided resources are allocated and utilized
and they do so by approving the grantees‟ program designs, annual implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation plans; and by reviewing INGOs‟ budgets, workplans, and key
personnel.
In actuality, the existence of these ex ante approval requirements weaken INGOs‟
independent decision making capacity by requiring that their implementation plans,
workplans, and budget allocations and changes undergo government scrutiny and
approval. It is here that INGOs‟ operational autonomy and managerial autonomy with
respect to both financial and human resources management are weakened. This paradox
is evident in the following statement by ALPHA‟s Program Director – a view shared by
BETA‟s Directors of Food Programs, Competitive Bids, and Humanitarian Assistance;
First of all, one of the things cooperative agreements state clearly is that
there will be USAID substantial involvement – it is clearly spelled out. So
in that process, there are deliverables that we have to meet … For
example, the first thing we have to do is what is called a “Detailed
Implementation Plan,” (it details) how are we going to do it. We submit it
to them and they approve it. And during the course of the project
implementation, there are deliverables in terms of the reporting we have to
do and the detailed implementation plan will spell out in detail step by
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step what we are going to do. And they are very, very demanding in terms
of details. Then there is somebody at the USAID office who is the
Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO), who… oversee(s) the implementation
of that project, so… we have to feed him with information on a regular
basis (about) how we are doing. They will come to see the project, we
send them the quarterly reports, we send in the financial reports and they
will give us money in installments, they call it “obligation.”

Cooperative agreements are therefore associated with a high degree of ex ante,
mid-course and ex post controls, and monitoring and reporting.
Though an INGO may respond to a grant announcement, in an effort to retain
some measure of operation autonomy; should the USG agency decide to remain
substantially and engaged in the program implementation process, the award would
therefore be funded through a cooperative agreement. Perhaps this explains why the
participants seemed to regard grants and cooperative agreements as being quite similar
with the difference in the degree of substantial involvement.
It is also possible therefore that the lines between the two have become blurred
and that they are equally subject to the same amount ex ante, mid-course and ex post
control, monitoring and reporting. Perhaps this blurring of funding tools is symbolized by
the following statement from a RFA announced by the USAID on July 29, 2008, for a
project intended to support civil society and the rule of law in Iran issued.
“Under this 2008 Annual Program Statement (APS), the term “Grant” is
synonymous with “Cooperative Agreement;” “Grantee” is synonymous
with “Recipient…”

This announcement seems to suggest that indeed compared to contracts, grants
and cooperative agreements seem to allow some room for INGOs to exercise their
autonomy. While the RFA emphasized that USG funds could not be used for activities
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involving the Iranian government, it allowed sufficient room for INGOs to design
programs around one or all three outlined program objectives. The RFA also provided
illustrative examples of activities to be included in the proposals without necessarily
limiting the INGOs to the activities.
Although INGOs have the “liberty” to design programs as they see fit, the
embedded “general” program summary, objectives, and examples of activities, provide
INGOs with key clues about the USG preferences. Such preferences and indicators could
potentially influence and channel INGOs‟ decision making in directions that will likely
improve their propensity to win the award. However, it is probable that INGOs are able
to exercise high levels of operational autonomy when they are designing the detailed
monthly implementation plans, given the detail required in showing the proposed
activities and timelines for the first year of the program.
However, as illustrated about, it is important to remember RFAs may be quite
vague about the nature of the funding tool that is eventually used to channel funding to
INGOs in support of the funded programs. As a result, should the USG decide to be
substantially involved in the program design and implementation, this award would thus
be provided as a cooperative agreement rather than a grant, thus undermining the very
autonomy that an INGO may have hoped to retain had the award been channeled through
a grant.
As a result, in contrast to unrestricted funding, grants and cooperative agreements;
contracts constrain INGOs‟ autonomy disproportionately more due to their coercive
nature. And because highly coercive tools are associated with high degrees of ex ante,
mid-course and ex post controls; this translates into more control from the funder, thus
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restricting INGOs‟ operational and managerial autonomy. Grants and cooperative
agreements however, provide INGOs with some degree of operational autonomy or “say”
in defining and designing how a desired output is produced. However, the ultimate
degree of “say” undeniably comes through unrestricted funding.

6.2.2

Restrictive Funding Tools

Hypothesis 6: Greater dependence on highly restrictive sources of funding is likely to
limit the autonomy of INGOs.
This analysis also finds that government funding in general, due to its restrictive
nature, constrains INGOs‟ operational autonomy. Out of the 19 participants interviewed,
13 participants expressed discomfort with the presence of conditionalities attached to
USG funding (shown in Table 10 in Chapter 4).
In addition, all three funding tools obtained from BETA included an attachment
of various USG rules and regulations codified in the Mandatory Standard Provisions for
U.S. Non-governmental Recipients. Included in this attachment are regulations pertaining
International Air Travel and Transportation (e.g., The Fly America Act), and USAID
Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services, a section that outlines ineligible goods and
services and restricted goods that INGOs cannot procure with USG funding. As noted,
other USG funding conditionalities include regulations such as, the Anti-Prostitution
Pledge, Branding, and the Mexico City Policy. Some conditions preclude the use of USG
funding in particular countries (e.g., the ineligible countries clause). As BETA‟s Director
of Competitive Bids pointed out,
There are certainly examples of countries were we do not get USG
funding – Myanmar is one; we were in Myanmar when the USG was not.
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Same thing in Laos, I don‟t think the USG was giving any funding to
Laos.
In light of the USG‟s stipulation of where INGOs can and cannot operate using
USG funding for instance may pose challenges on INGOs‟ credibility. In addition, these
rules, and regulations confine also INGOs‟ scope of work by establishing what INGOs
can and cannot do. These funding restrictions therefore constrain INGOs‟ operations,
innovation, and to some extent, the effectiveness of their programming by diminishing
INGOs‟ responsiveness.
Notice that these conditions are attached to USG federal funding in general, the
tool of choice simply appends additional ex ante and ex post controls, over and above
these policy conditions. Recognizing the influence restrictive funding tools may have on
BETA‟s operational autonomy, BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance pointed out
that what INGOs do and do not do is spelt out exactly in the funding tools. The a priori
set parameters therefore compel INGOs to deliver immediate relief in accordance with
the stipulations of agreements. The director pointed out that,
emergent issues and needs cannot be met within the confines of those very
closed projects….we lose the opportunity and perhaps the appropriateness
of the intervention by not being as timely as we would want.

This suggests that by imposing contractual conditions or parameters, USG
funding tools impose limitations upon INGOs‟ activities by confining their scope of work
and program operations, thus oppressing INGOs‟ innovation, flexibility and
responsiveness. As a result, USG funding appears to be restrictive in light of the presence
of explicit conditionalities attached to it, and the degree of specificity and narrowness of
the scope of the funding tools.
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6.2.3

Direct Funding Tools

Hypothesis 7: Greater dependence on highly direct funding instruments is likely to
result in lower levels of INGO autonomy
Evidence from the interview data and funding tools supports this hypothesis in
that government agencies do get involved in the implementation process of INGOs‟
funded programs. For instance, 3 out of 7 participants with USG funding experience
found USG funding to be highly direct, especially with contracts, and through the
substantial involvement associated with cooperative agreements. The direct involvement
and influence is also accomplished through ex ante and ex post controls by requiring
INGOs to submit detailed implementation plans and workplans for approval, as well as,
field audits, and direct program monitoring as illustrated in Table 14 (in Chapter 5).
Also noted earlier, government directly influences INGOs decisions through the
specificity engraved in contracts. Government therefore controls and provides direction
as to exactly how INGOs are to implement the funded programs, including the provision
of technical direction by the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) or Contracting Officer
of the funding source (e.g., resolving logistical problems or performing technical
inspection where changes would affect the scope of the funded work). And because
contracts spell out that INGOs are implementing USG programs and would be subject to
the direct instruction and control of the funding government, this suggests the likelihood
of SIGMA losing its autonomy through this direct influence. Aside from occasional field
visits, and the direct ongoing monitoring, the direction and controlling at times is actually
done remotely, through the ex ante, and ex post rules and requirements.
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As BETA‟s VP of Global Support elucidated, unlike cooperative agreements,
contracts are almost like business documents, where everything is precisely set out
leaving very little latitude in terms of how INGOs can influence their contents. In
contrast, cooperative agreements are “much looser,” as a result; INGOs have a better
chance of influencing what goes into agreements, as well as modify them if needed.
This research has also indicated that, unless implementation and workplans are
approved by the USG, program implementation will not take place, suggesting strong
influence, control and direction on the part of government. INGOs are thus bound by
these agreements such that they are required to implement the funded program in
accordance with approved detailed implementation and workplans. Additional approval is
required prior to the incorporation of any amendments or deviations to the
implementation plans even if there is no cost associated with the deviations (Section
226.25 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations). The requirement for prior approvals for
changes is illustrated in the following statement by BETA‟s VP of Global Support. This
view was also shared by ALPHA‟s Program Director, Director of Government Grants
and Compliance, and the VP of International Programs; BETA‟s Director of Competitive
Bids and the SIGMA‟s CEO and Program Coordinator.
With the cooperative agreement(s) or grant(s), you can go back to them
and say, well, we didn‟t actually do it this way, we had to do it this way –
if you have a good reason and particularly if you let them know ahead of
time and not afterwards, they are ok with that.

And also noted in preceding discussions, when a program is funded through a
cooperative agreement, the USAID reserve the right to be substantially involved in
identified elements of an INGO‟s program, that is “during the performance of the award”
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(USAID‟s ADS Chapter 303; Cooperative Agreement from BETA) Substantial
involvement entails the USAID‟s direct involvement in the approval of BETA‟s
implementation plans and key personnel – that is, “only those positions that are essential
to the successful implementation of the award.
Under the substantial involvement and participation proviso, the USAID would
also approves an INGO‟s decisions to collaborate, should the INGO decide to jointly
implement the award with another agency. The USAID approves this decision only
“when satisfied that there is sufficient reason” for collaboration. In addition, should a
collaborative effort form an advisory committee, the USAID may also participate as a
member of such a committee, especially since advisory committees of this nature “must
only deal with technical or programmatic issues and not routine administrative matters”
(USAID‟s ADS Chapter 303). Clearly, cooperative agreements do undermine INGOs‟
operational autonomy.
And also pointed out in earlier discussions, while INGOs can make changes to
their program implementation plans and budgets with the approval of the USG funding
agency, the arrangement poses potential operational delays in program implementation as
INGOs await government‟s decision.
You can make a change but you have to request an amendment and that
can be quite lengthy, I mean, there are very often changes, for instance, we
sell USDA commodities overseas and particularly in Africa, we very often
get more money than we originally proposed. And if you get more money,
you have to have an amendment approved, which will allow you to spend
the money where you desire to put it. So yes, and the amendments can
take 6 months, sometimes longer; they are very, very slow, with the
USDA, very slow. (SIGMA‟s Program Coordinator)
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This arrangement also suggests the existence of red tape, which can be regarded
as a type of ex ante control on INGOs‟ decision making. As a result, such ex ante and
mid-course approvals seem to be put in place as checks to ensure INGO compliance.
In summary, those familiar with cooperative agreements and grants from all three
INGOs agree that these tools essentially operate the same way, with the exception of the
substantial involvement of the USG in INGOs‟ decision making process through ex ante
and mid-course approvals of INGOs‟ implementation plans, workplans, monitoring, and
evaluation plans, as well as their key personnel. Therefore, as a way of steering, directing
and controlling INGOs‟ decisions and activities, the USG approves these plans prior to
implementation within cooperative agreements, and to a very limited extent with grants.
And since substantial government involvement is not anticipated in grant
agreements, government would prefer to transfer funds through far less coercive
instruments, especially in situations where the objectives of government strongly overlap
with the existing programs or objectives of the implementing partners (Shaikh and
Casablanca 2008), suggesting less control and more operational autonomy to INGOs.
Such an approach indicates that government is strategic in its tool choice. This also
explains why the USG can unilaterally opt not to finance INGOs activities through
grants, and channel funding through cooperative agreements and contracts instead. By so
doing, government retains more control over INGOs‟ decisions and activities while
allowing itself sufficient room to make its preferences, interests and priorities known,
especially within contracts and cooperative agreements.
Based on the preceding discussions, the sentiments attached to the liberty and
freedom that unrestricted funding provides to INGOs cannot be understated. The findings
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suggest that compared to other funding tools, unrestricted funding is without too many
restrictions, rules, direction and control; therefore it culminates into more autonomy to
INGOs, across all autonomy dimensions. A fundamental practical task INGOs may need
to undertake therefore is to assess and evaluate the degree to which the funding tools
differentially impact their autonomy dimensions. By so doing, INGOs empower
themselves to make informed decisions about the types of INGO-government
relationships to engage in, that is, those exchange relationships that might maximize their
autonomy.

209

CHAPTER 7
STRATEGIES FOR AUTONOMY RETENTION

7.1

Introduction
The second research question addressed in this research is concerned with the

strategies INGOs employ to militate against adverse autonomy loss. This study implicitly
assumes that INGOs are losing their autonomy as a result of the conditions embedded in
the exchange relationships they enter into with different funding sources. Since this
research did not posit any hypotheses with respect to this research question, the findings
presented below were inductively generated from the pooled data analysis conducted.
Therefore the findings in this section represent common themes emerging from all three
INGOs recruited for this study. Table 8 (shown in Chapter 4) shows the counts related to
these common themes.

7.2

Autonomy Retention: Some Practical Considerations
When asked if autonomy was a concern for their organizations, a significant

number of the participants (5 out of 9 participants) reported that it autonomy loss was
certainly not a concern to the organization. The following statements highlight some of
these views.
No absolutely not. We are not dependent on any one funder. We are
influenced in terms of program decisions by any one funder – by direction,
or strategy…. We pick things that fit our programming; we don‟t organize
the work of ALPHA around any one funder. (ALPHA‟s Board Chair)
Well, nobody is trying to takes us over, I mean, we just follow the rules
and regulations, I mean when you go into an agreement with the USG, you
have to agree to do it the way they want it done, as far as the projects, the
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staff and everything else, but we are an independent organization… a lot
of INGOs… are all independent, they all do their own thing and none of
them do it exactly the same. No, we have no problem with autonomy.
(SIGMA‟s Program Coordinator)

These statements however illuminate a paradox that exists in the relationship
between funding and INGOs‟ autonomy. While INGOs are able to choose the funded
relationships to enter into, this does not necessarily purge the constraints and controls
inherent in those exchanges, nor does it reduce the likely impact such constraints have on
INGOs‟ decision making competencies pertaining to budgets, aid recipients, outputs and
program implementation. As BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director pointed out,
An organization is always going to face some loss of autonomy when
getting funding from donors, and so it is a matter of managing that risk.

When asked to talk about some of the measures they were taking to retain their
autonomy however, participants including the 5 noted above indicated the following
strategies articulated below. These strategies range from revenue diversification to
INGOs simply choosing to walk away from particular funding sources in order to reestablish their autonomy. This section of the report therefore outlines some practical
considerations INGOs can employ to shield their organizations from too much influence
and direction from funders.

7.2.1

Revenue Diversification
Table 8 (in Chapter 4) shows that 13 out of 19 participants (6 participants from

ALPHA; 5 from BETA and 2 from SIGMA), identified revenue diversification as an
effective strategy for autonomy retention. This suggests that there is a general consensus
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among all three cases that revenue diversification helps minimize INGOs‟ external
dependence and control by any one funder. It was also clear from this analysis that all
three INGOs were very much aware that their revenue streams are highly concentrated.
Based on a calculation of the revenue concentration indices, BETA‟s funding streams are
the least concentrated, with a revenue concentration index of .272 compared to SIGMA‟s
.494. Perhaps BETA is one INGO that is showing success in its plans to minimize its
external dependence on USG funding given the degree to which the organization has cut
back on its dependence on USG funding as shown in the following statements.
We have actually been trying to diversify away from the USG funding for
past probably 7 years…. because we felt it was too large, we didn‟t have a
diversified portfolio and for risk management, it just seemed not to be the
wisest thing to do. So we have reached out to US professional foundations,
like Lorner Dowen and Leasten foundations and we have reached out to
other sources of revenue – just private individual fundraising and we are
going to look to continue to do that, to continue to expand sources of
funding other than the USG. (BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director)
If you look at BETA‟s dependence on USG over the year, it is down from
70 percent to about 45 percent nowadays. So we realized that to some
extent we needed to diversify our portfolio of funding; that is a fact. In
order to achieve our mission and vision we needed to diversify our
funding, not because the donor influenced what we did so much, but the
fact that there were restricted projects that didn‟t allow us to achieve the
full potential of our programs. (BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian
Assistance)
While the USG remains BETA‟s largest single donor, its decline is an
indication of steady progress towards the goal of diversifying the INGO‟s
funding sources. (BETA‟s Current Strategic Plan)
These indicators suggest that the more diverse an INGO‟s funding portfolio is, the
greater the likelihood that the INGO will have the capacity and freedom to fulfill its total
mission. This is attributed to an INGO‟s ability to make holistic policy or operational
decisions. The statement made by BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance

212

highlights the limitations funding tools can have on INGOs‟ programming decisions by
essentially restricting the scope within which funding is to be utilized. For instance, a
grant or funding agreement spells out the INGO‟s scope of work to the extent that it
prevent the organization from doing anything else other than that which is spelt out in the
agreement. As a result, INGOs lose windows of opportunity to respond to emergent
needs, which in turn weakens the appropriateness of their interventions due to a lack of
timeliness on the part of the INGOs.
In view of this observation, revenue diversification is therefore regarded as a
remedy for the program theory or ideological differences that may exist between donors
and grantees. The findings suggest that such differences undermine INGOs‟ operational
autonomy. For example, given the restrictions imposed by the Anti-Prostitution Clause
associated with HIV/AIDS USG funding, INGOs have had to soliciting funding from
sources that are not opposed to the work they do among the at-risk population of
prostitutes, thus allowing them the liberty to implement program strategies that they
believe in, as shown in the following statement.
We have some different point of views particularly in the best ways to
prevent HIV/AIDS. And so it is important for us to have other funding
sources and that the USG not have a dominant role in our funding, so that
we can also do things that perhaps may be the administration doesn‟t favor
but we would be allowed to do with other funding sources… (With) the
USG requiring us to (have) any partners that we use sign that (they) didn‟t
support prostitution; certainly BETA does not promote prostitution but we
recognize that that is an important group that we must work with in order
to curb HIV/AIDS. And so while on the one hand, the USG provided
funds for a lot of our HVI/AIDS programming, we had to stand on the
principle to say, you know, we still must work – so that‟s another place
where private funding comes in. (BETA‟s Secretary of the Board)
And in the words of the ALPHA‟s Board Chair,
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We believe it is healthier to have a diversified base of funding.
While commenting on the importance of individual contributions, ALPHA‟s CEO
announced the INGO‟s plans for reducing its high dependence on individual
contributions through revenue diversification. Note that based on a calculation of the
revenue concentration index, ALPHA‟s revenue streams are the least diversified, with a
revenue concentration index of .853. ALPHA has thus taken steps to diversify its revenue
streams by hiring a Foundations Expert to engage the foundations grantmaking
community. At the time of the interviews, the foundations expert had only been with
ALPHA for three weeks.
We are deliberately diversifying our resources; our core resource base is
ordinary Americans through sponsorship, which means we have a
constituency within the U.S. and then we are looking at government, we
are looking major gifts, corporations and foundations. (ALPHA‟s CEO)

ALPHA also expressed a desire to increase its share of USG funding, but only to
a “reasonable” level in order to preserve its autonomy. While the INGO would prefer not
to have more than 50 percent of its total revenue coming from USG, according to
ALPHA‟s CFO, the INGO “would still like to have at least 50 percent coming from
individuals” thus continuing to capitalize on the high level of autonomy unrestricted
funding provides. The CFO elaborates on this in the following statement.
We may have become too dependent on individuals (especially) when you
get into an economy like we are in now…. So we have for FY2008 which
we are just getting audited now, I would say probably 65 percent of our
total revenue is coming from individuals (compared to about 90 percent in
FY2006).
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Given its confederated structure, ALPHA could be considered highly diversified
at the international or country office (CO) level since each CO receives funding from all
16 of ALPHA‟s National Offices around the globe. These national offices solicit funding
from a varied pool of funding sources across the globe.
Perhaps the efficacy of revenue diversification in granting INGOs with significant
operational autonomy is exemplified more clearly in ineligible countries where INGOs
are not allowed to use USG funding. ALPHA‟s CEO like BETA‟s Competitive Bids
Director and the Director of Humanitarian recounted a situation where USG funding
could not be used in response to the cyclone that occurred in Myanmar in 2008, as well
as, a natural disaster in Laos. According to these participants, INGOs could not use USG
funding to respond to the disaster due to the “absence of democratic governance” in the
country. As a result, the INGOs could only use funding from sources that were not
opposed to responding in these countries. As such, how diversified INGOs‟ revenue
streams are can be a saving grace for the organizations by way of providing alternative
funding sources that allow them to exercise their cherished values of impartiality,
neutrality and independence.

7.2.2

Due Diligence
The preceding chapters have established that a loss in INGOs‟ operational

autonomy is largely achieved through ex ante and ex post controls funding sources
impose on their INGO grantees; controls which constrain the actual use of the decision
making competencies an organization actually possesses (Verhoest, Peters et al. 2004).
This suggests that, while an INGO may possess some operational autonomy over how a
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program is implemented, in actuality, that autonomy is undermined by the extent to
which the organization is controlled by the results of the implemented programs, that is,
by the burden of reporting. More and more, INGOs find themselves making decisions
that take into consideration the expectations and missions of their funding partners,
especially if they are going to be required to report on them. This research finds that 8 out
of the 19 participants interviewed, highlighted a need for INGOs to know what each
funding source is about and the expectations associated with them – a process they called
due diligence. Out of these 8 participants, 4 participants were from BETA and 3 from
ALPHA (shown in Table 8, in Chapter 4).
In light of the fact that the portrait of nonprofit financing has been shifting over
the years, some INGOs lament over the good old days where funders approached them
with handouts, literally begging INGOs to take their money and do something good with
it, in pursuit of INGO missions. The following statement by BETA‟s Director of Food
Programs illustrates recognition of this shift.
The budget levels have been reduced over the years. I mean, I started with
BETA in 1991 and there was a period where Food for Peace would say,
„oh please we would give you money, please take this money, take more,‟
but that‟s all changed since the late 1990s – 2000s, because the budget
levels are just dramatically low.

Today, in light of the inherent ex ante rules and regulations, funding conditions,
and ex post requirements, the funding environment demands that INGOs do their due
diligence by conducting rigorous researches of their donors. INGO participants strongly
recommend that INGOs ensure that they learn everything they need to know about their
funders, especially with respect to the spending rules and regulations, monitoring and
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evaluation reporting requirements. Rules and regulations therefore influence the types of
decisions INGOs make and the actions they take, thus constraining their autonomy.
In the case of USG funding, there is also a need to stay abreast of federal
spending regulations, and policies since these are subject to change. Learning one‟s
funding environment in an attempt to understand the nature and implications of the
“strings” attached to funding, as well as the reporting and other requirements and their
impact on the different dimensions of INGO decisions has thus become vital. This is also
crucial given that failure to abide by the budget and evaluation rules and regulations
could lead to a suspension of an INGO or a complete loss of funding support. Speaking
on the necessity of paying close attention to technicalities of the rules and regulations,
ALPHA‟s CFO pointed out the following.
There is a lot of technical things that some people prefer not to pay
attention to, as a result, our compliance people are the ones that are paid to
pay attention to that staff, and that‟s why part of the perception is that
there is red tape and that‟s why some of the countries don‟t want to work
with USG money. It could be from the ignorance of the rules…. (Why)
would we want to take on that burden when we can get money from some
other government who doesn‟t have as much red tape? But the
government does have so many strict rules and regulations that they are
asking auditors to audit (us) against

Ignorance of funding rules and regulations is not necessarily bliss when it comes
to USG funding. ALPHA‟s VP of International Program explains why it pays to pay due
diligence to each RFA or RFP before and during responding to one in the following
statement.
The more restrictions and requirements, the less interested we become. We
will take contracts, and but we watch and look at those contracts and the
specifications in them very carefully and we have turned down and we
will turn down contracts…. that are either ill-defined in terms of the
actions that you are going to bring forward or it states that the USG
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official…. will tell you what to do with these monies. We usually say, no,
thanks, but no thanks on those because they are defined in a way that we
are not comfortable with to move forward.

As noted earlier, BETA and ALPHA have also responded to the need for due
diligence by setting up formal Grants and Compliance Units whose primary function is to
comb through grants and contracts to ensure that their organizations enter into financial
arrangements with the full understanding of the roles they are expected to play. These
units are also designed to ensure that INGOs are in full compliance with USG funding
rules and regulations, that is, during the application process, the implementation phase
and after the implementation phase. As suggested in this research, while rules and
regulations inhibit INGOs from taking actions that funders deem undesirable, they can
also hinder desirable actions on the part of INGOs. Reminiscing on having been
suspended for a year, the following statement by SIGMA‟s CEO illustrates the need for
due diligence on the part of INGOs.
That‟s why we pay a lawyer more and more. We have a lawyer that is
looking at all these contracts now… the onsite lawyer does most of that.

7.2.3

Goal Congruence and Fit
There is also strong recognition of the need for due diligence among INGOs

especially to ensure strong goal congruence of the funders‟ and those of the INGOs.
Table 8 shows that 15 participants talked about this strategy, with the majority of the
participants coming from ALPHA (N=8). Shaikh and Casablanca (2008) observed that,
the closer one ties development assistance to U.S. foreign policy, the more desirable it
becomes for the USG to establish or retain control over how the money is spent. It is
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therefore incumbent upon INGOs to be cognizant of the funding environments they find
themselves in and the implications therein. Failure to consciously and strategically seek
after goal congruence and fit is likely to result in INGOs implementing funders‟ projects,
thus positioning INGOs as mere appendages of their funding partners.
A statement by BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance draws our attention
to not only the proactive exercise of due diligence, but also to the need for an INGO to
have clarity, with each funding opportunity, about what it is the INGO is trying to
achieve. This allows the INGO to verify the congruency and fit of funding opportunities
with its own priorities and overall mission. This strategy calls for a process where INGOs
are brutally honest with themselves in their assessments of whether each funding
opportunity is aligned with their strategic intent and overall mission.
We have been a little bit more proactive in understanding what the
regulations are; in going out to trainings… We have clear strategies, again,
I think that the main thing is whether we have a clear understanding of
what we want to achieve and if, through any of those three mechanisms
(grants, cooperative agreements and contracts), we will be able to achieve
those strategic goals in terms of emergency, in food security, (and in other
units) we have clarity on what we want to achieve…. (We are at) least
strict on our part because we want to achieve certain things and not be
destructed by implementing objectives that donors would like to meet, that
have no bearing on what BETA would like to do. So at least I think that
we are being a lot more thoughtful on that. I think that other units…. and
operations are doing the same thing. So across the board, I think that
BETA is a lot more conscious of meeting its mandate. (BETA‟s Director
of Humanitarian Assistance)

And reflecting on a recent decision that led to the organization turning down some
USG funding, BETA‟s Food Programs Director raised some critical questions;
The difference is we made a decision on how we were going to use their
resource or not and that was our decision. Ultimately, it sort of came down
to “What is an INGO looking at in terms of looking for resource support
from any donor? Are you looking for resource support to basically fill
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your cash pipelines and even though it may not be optimally what you
would like to do? I‟m still going to do it because I need the cash to run my
program? Or if the organization says we are going to program this way,
and you know, if some of that resource support doesn‟t match the way we
would like to program – you say ok, thank you, but we can‟t do this
anymore?

The strategy of verifying the goal congruence and fit for every funding
opportunity demands that as INGOs evaluate the funders‟ goals against their own, that
they also evaluate their own capacity to meet the funders‟ requirements and expectations.
The following statement by ALPHA‟s VP of International Programs illustrates how the
INGO utilizes both due diligence and the goal congruence checks as strategies for
maximizing their operational autonomy;
Clearly ALPHA has its own vision of what and how development should
move forward and we are strident and arduous in protecting that vision.
(There are checks and balances) to ensure that, number one, we don‟t take
money (just) because it is available from a contract or grant…. We have
the management checks and balances as any organization, when very large
grants are put in place; they have to be signed by CEO of ALPHA (at the
International level)…. The larger the grant, the more scrutiny it receives.
And we develop strategic plans within our COs with the specific purposes
that we are not going to do knee-jerk reactions to funding opportunities;
we will base our development strategies on what people (COs) tell us are
their primary needs and what we believe we are most capable of
delivering…. So there is everything – from policies and practices to
management of those systems – all are there to ensure that the wants and
needs are those communities we serve are well met.

As pointed out in the literature, the presence or absence of goal or project overlap
with those of INGOs‟ may determine the funding tool government employs. And given
that grants are specifically designed for situations were substantial government
involvement is not anticipated; it would make good sense to issue grants “when a public
purpose strongly coincides with a grantee‟s existing program or objectives” (Shaikh and

220

Casablanca 2008). This suggests that, in as much as tool choice decisions are strategically
made by government, INGOs should equally enter into contractual and grants agreements
with similar prudence and savoir-faire.

7.2.4

INGO Collaborations and Partnerships
As indicated above, autonomy maximization can be achieved through INGOs‟

ability to conduct honest assessments of their own capacity and expertise before
embarking on a quest for funding. Such self-evaluation may lead INGOs to consider
taking on a different role within funding arrangements, such as, subcontracting with a
larger INGO or forming a consortium with peer-INGOs that possess complementary
comparative advantages. For example, an INGO could maximize it operational autonomy
by subcontracting with a prime that is, another larger INGO that is in a direct contract
relationship with the USG. Within this type of arrangement, an INGO would assume a
much smaller role within the larger contract and would be thus be accountable to the
prime and not directly to the USG.
However, while this increases the distance between an INGO and USG, the USG
still reserves the right to approve the prime‟s choice of subcontractors, including the subgrantees‟ key personnel and implementations plan, though not directly. Unfortunately,
the subcontractor remains subject to whatever conditions may be embedded in the
contract or in USG funding. Perhaps the silver lining here is that, subcontracting
increases the distance between the INGO and government. The following statement by
BETA‟s Humanitarian Assistance Director illustrates this reservation and its impact on
BETA‟s operational autonomy.
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Indefinite Quantity Contracts are a mechanism were we have not seen a lot
of benefit from because again, it‟s a prime that is actually controlling how
you access task quotas and whether BETA is aggressive enough in
designing those task quotas at the country level goes a long way to
determine whether we will get involved in that task quota or not. So, to
me, it also doesn‟t play well to our strengths. Grants – we understand them
better, we feel a lot more comfortable with them.
From a financial autonomy perspective however, ALPHA‟s VP of International
Programs regards such partnerships as funding opportunities that can boost the financial
viability of an INGO.
We also build strong relationships with… peer organizations within the
US so that we are seen as a good partner and as technically capable of
delivering the services that we bring forward. So we want good partners in
technical fields and would be a contractual partner who may win a large
proposal…. It is a large contractual organization that does health projects
and it‟s really good, so they will often be the winner of a prime and we
seek to be their partner (as a sub-contractor).

Perhaps a more effective strategy for autonomy retention for an INGO is to enter
into funding exchanges with the USG, but within the collaborative confines of a
consortium. This strategy has the potential of changing the dynamics of the funding
relationship in that, an INGO responds to an RFA or RFP as part of a consortium of
INGOs with complementary comparative advantages, thus taking advantage of the
concept of “power in numbers.” In a sense, this allows the INGO to seek after funding
within the folds and perhaps, security and bargaining power of the group, thus improving
its operational autonomy.
While being a part of consortia may improve the operational autonomy and
financial viability of INGOs, it also allows INGOs to share the risk associated with
increased accountability demands. However, a secondary autonomy loss may occur in

222

that, the INGOs would have to resign some of their own autonomy to the members of the
consortium. Speaking on the efficacy of this strategy, ALPHA Program Directors stated;
First of all, there is a realization that no one can do it all. And we also
realized that to be strong, we need to work together – we need to
complement each other. In a given country, we usually have geographic
complementarity, sometimes we have technical expertise complementarity
– we have different things we bring together, so when there is an
opportunity like this, we try to seek like-minded orgs which can work
together….
(For instance we are in a consortium with BETA). We know they have the
expertise of education in the country – they are recognized for that and
BETA has expertise in the country and geographically, we are in
differently areas and this program is covering certain regions, we made
sure of that in forming this consortium. We are (therefore) representing the
region in which we will have a presence in the place; we are already
operating there so that we can demonstrate to the donor that we know
what we are talking about…. Often we take money only for the area where
we are already present, in a way when the donor money ends, we can
continue supporting that community; so that‟s another way we shield
ourselves from the influence of the donor (trying to influence) how we
implement our programs.

This statement also speaks to a couple of things, one being the operational
autonomy that comes out of a consortium since each INGO operates as the expert in a
particular field of expertise. It also speaks to the power a consortium may be able to
acquire in preserving or even increasing INGOs‟ operational autonomy by using the
geographical presence of its members, to not only demonstrate the consortium‟s presence
in a region of interest to the donor, but also to demonstrate the INGOs‟ operational
experience in a geographical region. Such demonstration of experience and expertise may
translate into donors giving INGOs a free hand in the development, design and
implementation of funded programs with little influence from the funders. In other words,
having experience and unique expertise can be utilized as a bargaining chip with
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government or any funder, in order to negotiate favorable contractual conditions for the
group, thus maximizing INGOs‟ autonomy. As BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director
highlighted,
Having an area of unique expertise could help shield an organization from
needing to bend to its donor‟s whims.

At the same time, INGOs get to work with peers that share similar values.

7.2.5

Contract Negotiation: The Art of Pushing the Envelope
Another practical consideration at INGOs‟ disposal could be described as “the art

of pushing the envelope,” that is, the art of contract negotiation. This strategy has the
potential of allowing INGOs to make inroads in fulfilling their missions in full. Evident
from the interview data, is that, there is room for negotiation between INGOs and the
USG (as well as other funding sources), thus improving INGOs‟ autonomy. As noted by
BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director, her unit helps country offices negotiate proposals
with the USG. Negotiations thus hold potential for maximizing INGOs‟ operational
autonomy given some donors‟ willingness to enter into dialogues with INGOs.
As a donor (Department of State), they tend to be a tiny bit more flexible
in some respects, and less flexible in others. They are more flexible in the
process because they will talk to us throughout the process. So when they
issue a call for proposals, they actually encourage you to talk to them. So
after they have issued their call for proposals, you can call them up with
your idea and they will say, yes that sounds good, or no, that doesn‟t
sound good and if they don‟t like what you are proposing, they will tell
you what they think they would like you to do; that‟s actually very
refreshing. But the USAID does not operate that way at all! USAID is
much more formal; so once they issue a proposal, the process of asking
questions and answering those questions is very formal. They will give
you a deadline, you have to submit in writing, they publish all the
answers; they will not talk to anyone outside of that framework.
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The efficacy of such an approach however, rests in INGOs‟ cognizance of their
individual comparative advantage and uniqueness. Funders do not have the operational
capacity to implement their own programs, which is why they need INGOs as
implementing partners. Pushing the envelope however, involves investing in negotiation
and collaborative skills on the part of INGOs, as well as understanding the nature of the
symbiotic relationship between INGOs and funders, especially if the INGOs have clear
comparative advantages in some particular area. Such an approach can counteract the
power and resource asymmetry between INGOs and funding sources. The following
statement by the Director of Food Programs at BETA illustrates this point.
With Title II Programs… like any grantee, you can try and push the
envelope a bit, but at some point, you can‟t go over the line. So I wouldn‟t
call it necessarily autonomy as much as flexibility and I think we have had
a fair amount of flexibility as programs have been evolving.

7.2.6

INGO Advocacy
Yet another proactive strategy INGOs could use to retain their autonomy lies in

the INGOs‟ advocacy role that is, when an INGO joins other INGOs in advocating for
effective ways to provide aid and development assistance. This strategy includes simply
challenging those funding arrangements (e.g., monetization and funding conditionalities)
that undermine INGOs‟ autonomy and the effectiveness of their work, preferably, within
the folds of workgroups such as InterAction‟s Humanitarian Policy and Practice
Committee and USAID‟s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA)7.

7

According to the USAID website, The Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) was
established as part of a post-WWII Presidential directive to serve as a link between the USG and the
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Such workgroups provide INGOs with a safe medium to influence government‟s relief
and development-related policies. As BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director elaborated,
There are different stakeholder-working groups, USAID has something
called the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Assistance and they
have 5 different working groups and some of those provide feedback on
the type of issues that implementing partners encounter including the
regulatory environment. In addition, USAID has an outreach, what they
call Partners‟ Day that they offer to key implementing partner
representatives and that happens every 6 sometimes every 3 months, but
usually every 6 months. And at that point the partners and USAID –
USAID talks about their challenges and some of their major new
initiatives and we provide feedback on any issues that we see or any things
that we would like to request. And there is usually some positive outcomes
from that. In addition, there is a formal process that‟s managed by the US
OMB – Office of Management and Budgeting for the regulatory
environment. So when USAID wants to propose a major new rule, they
usually have to publish it in the Federal Register and there is a formal
period of comment and so that process also allows for feedback.

INGOs therefore have several avenues to voice their concerns, as well as
influence USG‟s policy decisions pertaining to relief assistance and development. It is
important to recognize a dilemma associated with this strategy, as highlighted in the
following statement from BETA‟s Secretary of the Board.
On the one hand, you are fighting them over some policies and principles;
(on the other), you are also receiving funding from them.

7.2.7

“Walk Away”
And finally and perhaps a highly potent strategy for INGOs‟ autonomy retention

is to simply walk away from funding sources that weaken one‟s autonomy as CARE,

humanitarian assistance and development private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The Advisory
Committee is mandated with the task of consulting with, providing information to, and advising the USAID
and other USG agencies on development issues related to foreign assistance, inter alias.
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Counterpart International and OXFAM have done. Of the 19 participants interviewed for
this study, only 9 participants identified this as a strategy that INGOs could take.
According to BETA‟s Secretary of the Board,
We have had explicit discussions about… the importance for BETA to
maintain its independence and be willing to walk away from funding if
that‟s necessarily and we have walked away from funding when you
know, something with the USG would have wanted us to do was not in
line with our values and principles. So an explicit strategy, certainly the
board will encourage us and support us in holding aligned against any
funder and we are not afraid to walk away from that funding if we need to.

However, in order for an INGO to undertake such a decision, it is imperative that
alternative funding sources be identified and secured.
This chapter has therefore articulated some of the strategies INGOs are currently
employing or intend to exploit in order to shield their organizations from autonomy loss
or at least minimize the risk of autonomy loss. The strategies however seem to be geared
toward the preservation of financial and operational autonomy to the exclusion of
managerial autonomy with respect to both financial and human resource management.
This confirms that the concept of autonomy has been regarded in a myopic, onedimensional fashion not only by researchers, but also by the nonprofit community. As a
result, there is a clear need for INGOs to recognize the multi-faceted nature of autonomy
and develop strategies to minimize the loss of each.
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CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction
Organizational autonomy is a complex concept, a complexity that is confounded
by the multi-faceted nature of the concept. In the context of this research, the complexity
of the concept of organizational autonomy is further complicated by the nature of INGO
funding. INGOs not only have multiple funding sources, they are also funded through
different funding tools, all of which constitute unique funding environments for INGOs.
As a result, approaching this analysis from resource dependence and tool choice
perspectives provide insight into the nature of the funding environment INGOs operate
in. The findings from this study indicate that different funding sources and mechanisms
influence INGOs‟ actual decision making competencies in variant degrees. This influence
and control is largely limited to the donor-funded programs.
However, INGOs also have various opportunities to make “autonomous”
decisions, albeit, in “consultation” with the USG funding agencies. This chapter therefore
summarizes and discusses the main findings emanating from this research. The chapter
then concludes with a discussion of the implications for policy, practice and research.

8.2 Summary of the Main Findings
The complexity of the concept of organizational autonomy has been completely
overshadowed by INGOs‟ one-dimensional reference and approach to autonomy. For the
most part, organizational autonomy has been referred to in terms of independence,
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flexibility or being donor-driven. This research concludes that this concept is indeed
multi-dimensional and it is crucial that both INGOs and nonprofit scholars view and treat
it as such.
Table 15 summarizes the findings in this report by illustrating the impact different
funding sources and mechanisms are perceived to have on INGOs‟ autonomy
dimensions. The construction of this cross-tabulation was largely informed by an analysis
of the data, based on participants‟ experiences. In a sense, the table demonstrates the
overall impact of funding, based on a cross-case summary of the key findings. Examples
of statements instrumental in the construction this table (as well as Figures 6 and 7
presented in Chapter 5 and 6), are shown in Appendix 4.

Table 15: Perceived INGO Autonomy, by Funding Source & Tool Choice
FUNDING SOURCE OR
MECHANISM

AUTONOMY DIMENSIONS
Managerial
(FM)
Very Low

Low-to-Medium

Operational

GOVERNMENT (USG)

(HRM)
Low

FUNDING MECHANISMS
Contracts
Grants
Cooperative Agreements

Very Low
Medium
Low

Very Low
Low
Low

Very Low
Medium-to-High
Low-to-Medium

CORPORATIONS

None

Medium

High

FOUNDATIONS
Newer and Larger
Older and Larger

None
None

Very Low
Medium

Medium
Medium-to-High

Overall, the findings from this research indicate that different funding sources and
tools influence INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions in varying degrees. Government funding in
general, yield very low managerial autonomy with respect to financial management,
suggesting high control on INGOs‟ decisions pertaining to resource allocation and use.
Table 15 also demonstrates that newer larger foundations and to a lesser extent, corporate

229

funders, demonstrate similar patterns. Therefore, due to the ex ante and ex post controls
different funders employ, as well as the different USG funding tools, INGOs are mostly
likely to retain varying levels of operational and managerial autonomy.
However, these findings need to be interpreted in context – that funder or donor
influence and control are largely limited to the funded programs. Therefore, the donorINGO autonomy discourse presented in this research needs to be referenced in the
context of the funded programs and not the organization as whole, unless an INGO is 100
percent funded by a particular as is almost the case with SIGMA.

The key findings from this research are as follows:
Government funding is associated with much lower levels of autonomy for
INGOs, more so than foundation grants and corporate funding, and this is with
respect to INGOs‟ operational autonomy and managerial autonomy with respect
to financial and human resources management.
As a result, a high dependence on USG funding – as in the case of SIGMA; has
the likelihood of yielding low operational autonomy, as well as some measure of
managerial autonomy with respect to human resources management. This is in contrast to
an INGO like ALPHA whose dependence on USG funding is low. This loss in autonomy
is likely to occur through various ex ante rules and regulations and the performancebased controls codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.
For instance, as expressed in Section 266.25 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
INGOs “are required to report deviations from budget and program plans, and request
prior approval for budget and program plan revisions.” Such rules and regulations have
the power to constrain INGOs‟ capacity to make independent decisions about funded
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programs, by controlling and directing INGOs‟ decisions and actions. As a result,
attaching rules, regulations and conditions to funding, establish the confines in which
INGOs‟ decision making takes place.
And consistent with Kerlin (2002a), INGOs encounter several factors that weaken
their autonomy. These include the imposition of government‟s ideologies, direction, and
control as conditions of funding (e.g., the Anti-Prostitution Pledge or Fly America Act)
and government‟s pursuit of foreign policy agendas that are usually misaligned with the
relief assistance and development agendas and values that INGOs carry.

Larger newer foundations like the Google Foundation or the Melinda and Bill
Gates Foundation appear to act like government by constraining INGOs‟
operational autonomy through rigid ex ante budget and performance controls. It is
these controls that weaken INGOs‟ operational and managerial autonomy with
respect to financial management, as INGOs seek donors‟ approval for their
resource allocation and inputs use decisions
The above can also be attributed to the adoption of a venture capital model of
philanthropy by newer foundations and corporations which treats philanthropy as some
type of “investment” with an expected social rate of return (Brainerd 1999; Herman
2004; Grobman 2007). As such, foundations ask that INGOs follow strict budget rules, as
well as show evidence of impact, something they share with corporate funders, though at
a much greater impact compared to corporate funders.

A third finding is that, all funding sources, i.e., government, foundations, and
corporations, greatly influence and control INGOs through interventional
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constraints or ex post controls. These are largely used to hold INGOs accountable
for the promises they would have made during the contract negotiation phase.
This is influence on INGOs is therefore accomplished through various levels of
reporting requirements, and the monitoring, evaluation and audit provisions attached to
funding. Reporting requirements and audit provisions are largely attributed to the
increasing demand for INGO accountability by the donor community. However, the
impact each of the funders‟ requirements may have on an INGO‟s behavior largely rests
on the degree to which the funders‟ requirements are deemed onerous by INGOs, as well
as the degree to which such requirements are attached to a threat of sanctions or some
penalty system. With government funding for instance, an award to an INGO can be
suspended or terminated for failure “to comply with the terms and conditions of an
award” (Sections 226.60 – 226.62 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
Overall, participants expressed that USG funding is more arduous compared to
corporate funding and foundations grants. And this is attributed to participants‟
experience with government‟s expanded reporting and audit obligations (e.g., the
extensive A133 audit; direct monitoring and field audits where possible).

Pertaining to government funding, this analysis finds that over and above the
restrictive nature of USG funding in general, INGOs‟ autonomy also varies by
funding mechanism or tool choice.
This is consistent with Salamon‟s (2002b) assertion that government‟s use of
funding tools is strategic and political given the characteristics of each funding tools. As
a result, this study finds that government‟s funding tools also confine and constrain
INGOs‟ decisions and activities, by constricting the environments within which those
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decisions are made and by stipulating the conditions under which the activities are
implemented. As illustrated in Table 15, the findings suggest that in light of their
coercive character, contracts constrain INGO‟s operational autonomy more than
cooperative agreements and grants, respectively. Since contracts imply that INGOs are
essentially implementing the USG‟s programs, they are subject to more government
instruction and control and therefore do not only negatively impacting INGOs‟
operational autonomy, but also exhibit high interventional controls given the high degree
of control, scrutiny and reporting obligations.
Consistent with Schneider and Ingram (1990) and Salamon (2002b) therefore, this
analysis finds that funding tools signal strong messages to INGOs in terms of the type of
relationships that will emerge from each instrument. In a contract relationship, an INGO
is simply regarded as a “contractor” of government and thus enters into a very controlled
relationship requiring specified outputs. On the other hand, a cooperative agreement,
owing to the substantial government involvement is also quite controlled, given the
USG‟s desire to be involved in all major decisions INGOs make. This translates into
lower levels of operational and managerial autonomy with respect to human resources
and financial management.
However, grants outside of a cooperative agreement yield more operational
autonomy and managerial autonomy compared to contracts and cooperative agreements.
Grants allow INGOs room to design and implement funded programs in a way they see
fit, with limited involvement from the USG. Although implementation plans are
submitted to the USG, there is no expectation to await government approvals (USAID‟s
ADS 303).

233

However, the grant funding mechanism does not necessarily reduce the impact of
government control of INGOs‟ resource allocation and use. Such tight control on how the
provided resources are used has the power to diminish INGOs‟ operational autonomy and
their managerial autonomy with respect to financial autonomy. This may be attributed to
the observation that INGOs are expected to comply with the federal budget rules and
regulations in spite of the funding tool utilized. In additional, grants do not necessarily
provide INGOs with an escape from complying with the reporting requirements either,
though the degree of enforcement may be milder, compared to cooperative agreements
and contracts, given government‟s stake in these.
That being said, it is important to point out another crucial observation emerging
from this research,
INGOs have various opportunities to exercise their operational autonomy and
managerial autonomy, especially with respect to financial management.
First of all, INGOs choose which government projects they want to engage in,
based not only on the degree of goal alignment, but also based on their own assessments
of their own capacity to respond to the rules, regulations and compliance requirements
associated with each funding opportunity.
INGOs can also exercise their influence as they design programs in response to
funding announcements, however specific they are. In other words, the actual specifics of
a funded program, including the implementation plans, usually originate with the INGOs,
especially with respect to cooperative agreements and grants. However, the USG
provides INGOs with guidelines describing the program to be implemented and the
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objectives that have to be focus of the designed program. In essence, INGOs make these
“autonomous” decisions in “consultation” with the USG funding agencies.
A third avenue available to INGOs to exercise their influence is by suggesting
deviations from the original plans mid-course. However, there is always the probability
that the program designs and implementation plans, as well as the suggested deviations
can be vetoed by the funding agencies by way of approving or rejecting them. As such,
the requirement for prior approvals, highlight the degree to which USG in particular, has
been referred to as a more exacting funding source. This suggests that INGOs operate in
highly controlled environments. And such conditions can stifle INGOs‟ innovation and
flexibility, thus affecting the quality of their work and the timeliness of their responses.
Overall, the findings in this research suggest that, all funding sources i.e.,
government, corporations, and foundations, steer, direct, and control INGOs,
by providing them with guidelines to guide their proposal designs,
by regulating their resource allocation decisions and inputs use, and
through ex post constraints such as reporting, evaluation requirements and audit
provisions with respect to INGOs‟ a priori set program decisions and outcomes.
Such controls compel INGOs to include the funders‟ a priori set goals and norms
and in some instances, as with government, adopt whole strategies altogether, resulting in
limited operational autonomy. Again, donor influence only extends as far as the donorfunded programs.
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Autonomy Retention Strategies
While it is clear that INGOs‟ autonomy is compromised in some way, this
research illuminates some strategies INGOs have at their disposal to protect or at least
minimize the risk of autonomy. These strategies include;
Revenue Diversification: While participants from all three INGOs felt positive
about the strategy‟s potential for improving the operational autonomy of INGOs,
especially when they rely on less exacting funding sources; the findings suggest
that the strategy is also likely to result in an increase in the extra-organizational
control and influence of INGOs through interventional constraints emanating
from multiple funding sources, who may ask for different things.
Due Diligence: The findings also reveal a need for INGOs to do their due
diligence in researching and learning about each grantor, their rules, regulations
and monitoring and evaluation requirements and controls. This is critical given
that INGOs are expected to comply with the different rules and regulations, as
well as conditionalities attached to funding, mechanisms that can have powerful
effect on INGOs‟ decisions and action, thus undermining their autonomy.
Assessments of INGOs’ Capacity: While appreciating that funding sources help
improve INGOs‟ capacity to fulfill their missions, it is important for INGOs to
assess their own internal capacities (e.g., financial systems, staff, expertise, and
experience) to verify that they have the necessary competence and capacity to
comply and fulfill the funders‟ expectations, rules and regulations.
Congruence and Fit: It is also necessary for INGOs to assess and evaluate
whether there is strong congruence and fit between their goals and objectives and
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those of each funding opportunity. Failure to do so may result in INGOs
implementing their funding sources‟ priorities and programs at the expense of
their own.
INGOs’ Collaborations and Partnerships: The findings also show that seeking
after funding opportunities within the protection and confines of partnerships and
collaborations with other INGOs may improve the bargaining and negotiation
power of INGOs, thereby shielding INGOs from high autonomy loss.

The findings also suggest that INGOs can always seek after less directed and
controlled funding sources. And finally, INGOs can also choose to walk away from
funding sources and tools that have a high propensity to weaken their autonomy across all
dimensions. Overall, INGOs may need to seek solutions that help them retain some
measure of distance between them and their funding sources.

8.3 Implications & Recommendations for Policy, Practice and Research
From a policy perspective, it is evident that INGOs‟ humanitarian mandate of
neutrality, impartiality and independence exemplify the critical values INGOs continue to
espouse. These values also stand to be lost as a result of a loss of INGOs‟ operational
autonomy, especially when funding is too exacting or too restrictive in nature. From this
analysis, we find that revenue diversification becomes critical to INGOs‟ operational
autonomy, especially in cases where government prohibits INGOs to operate or respond
in certain “ineligible countries” using USG funding, as exemplified by ALPHA and
BETA‟s the inability to utilize federal funds to response to the cyclone in Myanmar in
2008.
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Other conditionalities include the anti-prostitution ideologies embedded in
HIV/AIDS funds, some of which ran contrary to scientific evidence on condom use as a
method for reducing HIV transmission. Such conditions simply tie the hands of INGOs
by constraining their innovation and responsiveness – a situation that does nothing to
inspire confidence in INGOs as experts at what they do.
In terms of policy implications, this study emphasizes the need for policymakers
to appreciate the values, passions and views that we cherish about the third sector,
especially, in order to help establish and maintain the sectors‟ uniqueness, role, function,
and impact in the political economy. While government is an important source of funding
for INGOs; that funding need not come at the cost of their independence, neutrality and
impartiality and above, all, their flexibility, innovation and responsiveness. After all, it is
these very qualities that attracted policymakers to INGOs in the first place (Nikolic and
Koontz 2007). Therefore, while subsuming INGOs under the U.S. foreign policy
objectives positions INGOs to produce services that meet government expectations; such
a strategy occurs at the expense of INGOs‟ identity and credibility.
In light of INGOs‟ role as the official implementing partners of government, a
decline in INGOs‟ autonomy, innovation and responsiveness also raises critical
questions as to whether such a state would be in the best interest of the USG in the longrun. And while different funding tools, as well as the presence of ex ante and ex post
controls are being utilized to increase INGO accountability, a choke-hold approach to
accountability stands to further weaken INGOs‟ innovation and effectiveness overall.
At a practical level, especially, in light of the presence of rules and regulations
attached to government funding, the significance of unrestricted funding to an INGO
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cannot be understated. Clearly, INGOs cannot escape the high interventional controls
associated with increased accountability demands. However, there is a financial cost
associated with meeting the ex post requirements of INGO funders. As BETA‟s acting
CFO observed with respect to government funding, “anybody is cheaper than
government,” given that “financial statements audits (such as the A133 Audit)… cost
about a million dollars and that comes out of unrestricted dollars.” This statement
emphasizes the importance of generating unrestricted funding to maximize INGOs‟
autonomy by allowing them sufficient room to undertake activities that are near and dear
to their missions, as well as finance activities restricted funding will not.
A positive externality emanating from the high ex post controls (accountability
demands) associated with funding include the increased professionalization of INGOs.
For istance, the A133 audit has helped INGOs improve their internal controls. 18 out of
the 19 participants in this study viewed INGO professionalism as a direct result of the
INGO interactions with USG funding, as well as other funding sources.
In addition, it is plausible that the high accountability demands donors have
placed on INGOs have helped formalize INGOs‟ evaluation processes, especially when
INGOs are required to adopt common indicators or measures of success. Such an
approach will help establish some degree of consistency in establishing common
measurable indicators of impact or effectiveness, thus improving the capacity to trace the
effectiveness of INGOs‟ programs over time.
This research has also shown that, different funding sources impact INGOs‟
autonomy dimensions in varying degrees. This calls for a need for INGOs to be cognizant
of the multi-dimensions nature of organizational autonomy. An understanding of this
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would help INGOs consider which autonomy dimensions are vital to their organizations,
as they ponder over which funding sources and funding tools to seek after and the impact
each one has on the autonomy dimensions. In as much as, the USG is strategic in its tool
choice based on the kinds of relationships it wants to have with INGOs, it is incumbent
upon INGOs to become equally savvy and prudent in their approach to funding choices
and contract negotiation.
From a research perspective, Kerlin (2002a) observed that the real impact of
government funding on autonomy remains elusive. While this research does not provide a
quantitative measure of impact, it does provide insights as to the degree to which
government funding influences INGO autonomy, relative to other funding sources, by
confirming the direction of the relationship and by suggesting the general magnitude of
the impact. A utility of these continuums is that, they provide future quantitative research
with potentially testable hypotheses about the influence of USG funding, relative to other
funding sources, and the influence of funding tools on INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions.
The findings also provide insights as to the mechanism responsible for weakening
INGOs‟ autonomy, i.e., the ex ante and ex post controls, funding conditionalities, as well
as differences in ideological approaches to development work between funding sources
and INGOs. However, quantitative research is needed to supply sufficient evidence in
order to be able to speak to the impact of government funding on INGOs‟ autonomy
dimensions, relative to other funding sources, in quantitative terms. Adopting an
alternative methodology beyond the qualitative multiple-case study approach adopted in
this study would help confirm the findings in this study. Hence, we would understand the
exchange relationships between INGOs and their funders in a new light.
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The findings have shown that autonomy need not be treated as a one-dimensional
concept; instead researchers need to incorporate and approach autonomy from a multidimensional level in order to fully capture and understand the influence funding sources
have on nonprofit organizations‟ autonomy, across different dimensions. This analysis
also recommends that future research recognize that, not only is organizational autonomy
a multi-dimensional concept, it is also a latent variable, one that is unobservable. The
variable is observed through other observable indicators such as the existence of ex ante
and ex post controls and conditionalities attached to funding, among other indicators.
That being said, this research encountered tautological challenges while applying
Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004) dual characterization of autonomy as the possession of
actual decision making competencies and also as the presence of autonomy constraints.
Arising from these challenges however, was an opportunity to advance alternative ways
of conceptualizing autonomy. The findings from this research suggest that the present
characterization of autonomy as both the decision making competencies and constraints
may create model specification problems. As a result, if we are to understand the nuances
of organizational autonomy, it may be pre-emptive to be very clear about the separation
between organizational autonomy as the possession of actual decision making
competencies, and the mechanisms that constrain those decision making competencies. In
other words, we need to explicitly establishing the premise that one leads to the other.
Given the exclusion of INGOs country offices in this study, future qualitative and
quantitative research might extend the government-INGO autonomy discourse to include
INGOs‟ country offices since these are the official implementing arms of U.S.-based
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INGOs. Extending research to focus in this implementation environment or context
would provide further insight on how funding and tools impacts INGOs‟ autonomy.
This analysis also finds some evidence to suggest a negative link between
funding, INGO autonomy, and the effectiveness of their programming operations. In
other words, INGOs‟ autonomy could be regarded as intervening variables between
funding and INGOs‟ effectiveness. Future research therefore might need to extend the
question of INGO autonomy to include questions about INGO effectiveness, as a
function of their funded relationships.

8.4 Conclusions
What do these findings mean for understanding INGO-government exchange
relations, as well as for understanding INGO autonomy?
First, the findings suggest that funding can be used as a conduit to transmit
preferences, priorities and values that are of importance to a donor. As such, INGO
grantees need to be cognizant of the controls and signals inherent in different funding
sources and funding tools, as well as understand what that means for their work. As the
relief and development experts, INGOs need to be cognizant of the extent to which
different funding sources and tools yield or undermine their actual decision making
powers pertaining to program designs and implementation. Such awareness would help
INGOs assess the value of their exchange relationships, vis-à-vis, the degree to which
they remain innovative, responsive and are able to maintain their credibility in the
political economy; or the degree to which each unique funding environment embodies
and promotes these values.
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Given the strong foreign policy orientation of USG funding, the findings also
suggest a need to maintain some “distance” between funders, in particular, government
and INGOs. As long as INGOs continue to be recognized as the official implementing
partners of USG policy objectives, a careful assessment of the “development” integrity of
the policy objectives INGOs implement is therefore necessary. Failure to do so on the
part of INGOs might seal their fate as mere appendages of government, thus undermining
their credibility as entities that are separate from government.
In the words of Carol Lancaster as she commented on the USAID‟s
reorganization under the Department of State, “distance is important to retain some
degree of autonomy for development mission,” as well as for the credibility of that
mission. From resource dependence perspective, a high dependence on government
funding or any one funder may indicate a reduction in this distance as INGOs adapt
themselves to the providers of the particular resources they seek.
The findings also suggest a need for INGOs to be savvy and prudent in their
choice of funding tools and contract negotiations. Each funding mechanism utilized by
government influences INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions in some way. As a result, the
debate can no longer be about who should implement foreign assistance programs, but
about understanding the types of implementing instruments INGOs should be accepting
(Shaikh and Casablanca 2008) and the implications of each of these instruments on
INGOs‟ capacity to make autonomous decisions.
To emphasize the purposiveness of tool choices, a 2007 HELP Commission (a
bipartisan collaboration of foreign assistance experts appointed by President Bush and
Congress), found that the use of grants where contracts would have been appropriate,
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actually weakened program effectiveness (Shaikh and Casablanca 2008). This suggests
that the tool of choice employed by the USG also has major implications for the
effectiveness of INGO operations and programs. However, it is important to know how
“effectiveness” is being defined and assessed in this case, lest this argument is used to
support government‟s adoption of contracts as the key funding mechanism, in place of far
less coercive tools like grants.
In conclusion, in the words of BETA‟s VP of Global Support,
Organizational autonomy should be a concern for any organization
because what allows us to do our work; to go into communities where we
work, particularly in difficult situations where there is conflict… it is our
autonomy and… our impartiality (that allow us access). And if we are
seen to be too closely aligned with any government or any faction, then we
are going to be targeted, we are going to be seen as political or having an
agenda outside of poverty reduction, helping the poor, which we don‟t
want. Our agenda is poverty alleviation and therefore our autonomy is
essential for us to achieve that.
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APPENDIX 1
U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY TIMELINE
TIME

ADMINISTRATI
ON

Before the 19th
Century
End of the 19th
Century

Prior to WWII
Post-1945

U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY EVENTS & CHANGES
Congress viewed foreign aid as inappropriate & unconstitutional

Pres. Truman &
Marshall (Sec. of
State)

1950s – 1960s

Post-1960

John F. Kennedy

1963 – 1975

Johnson, Nixon, &
Ford

Assistance to improve public health, public works, education to U.S. military occupied
countries (e.g., Cuba – after the Spanish-American War; Haiti; Dominican Republic;
Nicaragua);
Public aid for relief widely accepted & provided
Small amounts of Technical Assistance to Latin American countries
1947: Foreign aid as a diplomatic tool – initiated in response to the nascent Cold War in
Europe
U.S. offered aid to Greece & Turkey to resist the Soviet Union
Result: (1) $400 million for Greece & Turkey; (2) Marshall Plan - $13 billion, 4-yr
program to heal spur economic stabilization & recovery in Europe
Motivation: Diplomatic concerns vs. the threat of Communism & humanitarian and
commercial concerns – latter would have been insufficient to convince Congress
1949: Truman‟s “Point Four” program of technical assistance (small, temporary, justified
by diplomatic reasons – to stop the spread of communism
Two Events: Communist revolution in China (1949) & North Korea invasion of S. Korea
(1950) – led to prolongation & geographical spread of U.S. Foreign Aid
1950s: A Reorientation of U.S. Aid
1953: Pres. Dwight Eisenhower‟s agenda to curtail foreign aid BUT aid too useful to
eliminate
Other trends: the efficacy of aid to “buy” Cold War alliance questioned by Congress (both
sides)
1954: new initiatives added to a Food Aid Program (Public Law 480 or PL480) – transfer
of US agricultural surplus abroad – these proved uncontroversial; INGOs managed food aid
programs
1957: separation of economic from military assistance – creation of Development Loan
Fund (DLF) – provides concessional credit to development countries (those in proximity to
Soviet influence); 1958: International Development Association (IDA) created - a World
Bank soft loan window; InterAmerican Development Bank – for Central & S. American
Influential Trends:
(1) Increasing importance of developing countries; (2) growing view among US policy
makers – support economic & social programs to shape outcome of Cold war vs. aid to
stabilize their economies; (3) Growing Soviet‟s positive view of the importance of poor
countries – offer aid and technical assistance to Afghanistan, Burma, the 1957 successful
launch of the Sputnik –caused alarm in Washington
Walter Rostow’s (MIT) Theory of Development & Modernization: like Senator
Fulbright promoted the use of aid for LT development to prevent the support of radical
doctrines such as communism (Rostow‟s access to senior officials in the Eisenhower
administration – enabled him to influence aid policies)
1961: JF Kennedy– vision for economic assistance to less-developed nations; launch a
“Decade of Development”
Motivation: Development as Diplomacy - promotion of development as an establish US
Foreign priority
Outcomes: (1) Alliance for Progress for Latin America (a product of fear of the Marxist
regime of Fidel Castro & communism into the Western Hemisphere) – to promote
modernization, development, democracy; 1960: $157 million (5% of US aid), 1964: $989
million (25% of US aid);
(2) Initiatives in Africa (much of Sub-Saharan Africa gained independence – 1960: $38 m,
1964: $220 m); pressured W. Europe and Japan to promote aid development abroad;
Creation of Peace Corps – to send to developing countries to help with technical assistance,
training and management of small projects; active role in Development Assistance
Committee (DAC); proposed that the UN proclaim the 1960s as first Decade of
Development; Unification of the Development Loan Fund & the International Cooperation
Agency into a single new agency: Agency for International Development (USAID)
1963-67: Johnson – continued criticism of foreign aid; decline of threat of communism &
Soviet Influence to L. America & Sub-Saharan Africa; a rise in aid to Cambodia, Vietnam,
Laos as a result of war; Owing to criticisms of aid, “Perkins Committee” formed – as the
General Advisory Committee on Foreign Aid to study foreign aid; Recommendation – to
channel funds through multilateral development banks, as a means of reducing the
diplomatic element in aid allocations
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1977 – 1980s

Carter–to–Regan

1990s

Bush & Clinton

2000s

W. Bush

1970: Nixon – (per Congress‟ request) requested the “Peterson Report” –
Recommendation: US multilateral institutions become the major channel for development
assistance. Nixon‟s plan to increase distance between development and diplomatic purposes
of aid – proposed the elimination of USAID, the formation of 3 separate agencies (an
International Development (ID) Bank to manage aid loans; ID Institute for research and
technical assistance; ID Council to coordinate trade, finance, and investment policies) –
Congress decline proposal as too radical; “emphasized the humanitarian aspect of foreign
aid” in 1969 – thus elevating the development purpose of aid as an important end; increase
in amount of aid to multilateral aid agencies – such as the WB
1974: Ford (1) Sahelian Drought- suffering in Ethiopia, floods in Bangladesh widely
reported in US media – 1974-75 US food aid doubled & tripled in Bangladesh. Several
INGOs e.g. Bread for the World became advocates for aid to help the hungry;
(2) 1973: Yom Kippur War – Egypt & Syria‟s attack of Israel, threat of Soviet to aid Egypt,
aid for “peacemaking” diplomacy
1970s: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Polls – 1974: 8% viewed world
hunger as an important issue, 18% thought cutting foreign aid was a high priority, 1978:
59% thought combating hunger should be among US foreign policy goals; 1979: 16%
thought hunger an important issue, 1% viewed cutting foreign aid as a priority
1977: Carter – brought 2 things: (1) emphasis on human rights & (2) negotiation of the
Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt – formalized peace agreement; Human
Rights – a fundamental tenet of U.S. Foreign policy- aid through international financial
institutions – WB – conditioned on Human rights performance. Approx. $2 billion/year in
aid for Israel & Egypt; US dualistic aid program had strong diplomatic orientation (evident
in major US aid recipients) combined with significant development purposes (esp. SubSaharan Africa). Development purposes: played the key role in decisions on the use of aid
in both diplomatically and developmentally important countries
1981: Reagan – most ideologically conservative regimes – expected to reduce US aid;
Director of new Office of Management & Budget, proposed to terminate US contributions
to IDA; (1) Ethiopian Famine 1984-5 met with public outcry for US to act – increase in aid
to Sub-Saharan Africa; (2) Marxist-oriented Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua & civil war
in El Salvador – aid used to fortify existing government
Result: increase in the volume of US aid in Africa, C. America in the 1980s (1989: US aid
= $10 billion, 30% higher than it was in 1980)
1990s: End of Cold War & hence end of rationale for foreign aid; development purpose
also weakened as a result of the erosion of the confidence of the effectiveness of aid in
furthering development; the emergent of new purposes for aid
1989: G.H.W. Bush: Aid for Political & Economic Transitions in response to new
noncommunist governments forming in Poland, constitutional changes in Hungary, Fall of
the Berlin Wall, Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia & the execution of Rumanian
Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu & his wife. Aid to help nations in transition for new
countries emerging from the former Soviet Union
Early 1990s: Aid for Democracy Promotion as demand for multiparty elections and
greater democracy spread in Sub-Saharan Africa – Dept of State & USAID developed
democratic centers/bureaus; Aid to Address Global Problems – USAID‟s Global Affairs
Bureau – attention on environment, international health – esp. impact of HIV/AIDS – US
funding prevention and research programs; Civil Conflicts – resulted in post-recovery
support (Balkans, Haiti, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Angola,
East Timor)
Clinton Administration: efforts to cut the federal budget & republicans‟ efforts to cut the
size of government; reaction from the development-oriented INGOs, some business groups
& elements in the Foreign policy community – led to an ease in the budget cuts; Mrs.
Clinton supported development purpose. 1997: InterAction “Just 1%” campaign to inform
the American public & persuade Congress
21st Century Aid: Several dramatic changes to the US foreign aid: March 2002: Pres. Bush announced a $5B annual increase in aid for development to be
achieved by 2006 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) – specifically for development,
aid linked to greater accountability demands & funds managed by new aid agency:
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) & were provided to democratic governments;
Sept 2002: White House published a National Security Strategy for the United States of
America: - asserted that the US would use force to counter threats to its security & also
elevation of development as one of 3 priorities of US foreign policy (along with defense &
promotion of democracy);
Early 2003: additional $15B boost in aid over 3 years announced to fight HIV/AIDS;
Bush Administration – US aid risen as one of the fastest rates in the history of US aidgiving (40% (01-05)), not counting aid for emergencies to Iraq & Afghanistan; This driven
by 9/11 events; increased pressure from Christian groups to increase aid for humanitarian
purposes abroad; A “compassionate conservative” president
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APPENDIX 2
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Georgia State University
Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies
Informed Consent
Title: Government Funding and NGO Autonomy: From Resource Dependence and Tool Choice
Perspectives
Principal Investigator(s):

Professor. Dennis R. Young (Principal Investigator)
Grace Lyness Chikoto (Student PI)

Sponsor: N/A
I.

Purpose:

You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to investigate the
relationship between government funding and NGO autonomy, in hope to understand the extent
to which a funder can influence the ways in which NGOs behave. The study also hopes to
understand the strategies NGOs use to retain their autonomy. You are invited to participate in this
study because of your experience in and knowledge of the NGO environment. A total of 30
participants will be recruited for this study. Participation will require approximately 45 to 60
minutes of your time for a one-time, in-person interview, unless a follow-up telephone interview
is required.
II.

Procedures:

If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed in-person. The interviews will be taped and
listened to later by the interviewer. The tape however will not be shared with anyone outside of
the study and will be destroyed at the end of the study. In the case that some of the information
we gather from you during the in-person interviews turns out not be clear, there is a possibility
that we may follow up with a telephone interview in order to clarify some information with you.
Please be advised that by signing this consent form, you are agreeing to have us ask you for a
follow-up telephone interview, in case one is needed.
III.

Risks:

In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would have in a normal day.
IV.

Benefits:

Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information
about the nature of the relationship between funding and the autonomy of NGOs, as well as, the
strategies that NGOs employ to retain their autonomy.
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V.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:

Participation in this research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be
in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip
questions or stop participating at any time.

VI.

Confidentiality:

We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will also use pseudonyms
rather than your name on study records. Only Dr Dennis Young and Grace Chikoto will have
access to the information you provide. The tapes will be stored at Grace Chikoto‟s home
office in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed at the end of the study. The transcribed
information will be stored on a Georgia State University-assigned private drive, on a secure,
password and firewall-protected computer. Your name and other facts that might point to you
will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be
summarized and reported in group form.
VII.

Contact Persons:

Call Professor. Dennis Young at (404) 413-0126 or paddry@langate.gsu.edu and Grace L. Chikoto
at 404-918-2420 or padglcx@langate.gsu.edu, if you have any questions about this study: If you have
questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan
Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu.
VIII.

Copy of Consent Form to Subject:

We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep.
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio taped, please sign below.
__________________________________________________
Participant

_______________
Date

________________________ ________________________
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent

________________
Date
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APPENDIX 3
INTERVIEW GUIDE
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The dynamic between funding and how non-governmental organizations (INGOs) behave
is not fully understood, especially as it relates to the autonomy of INGOs. I am investigating the
complex relationship between government funding and the autonomy of U.S. based relief INGOs
operating outside of the U.S. In particular, the questions asked in this interview hope to flesh out
the multi-dimensional concept of “autonomy,” (BY THIS I MEAN INDEPENDENCE TO
PURSUE THE SERVICE MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION) as well as understand the link
between different autonomy dimensions and funding. Overall, this interview will help understand
the extent to which government funding influences what INGOs do and how they operate?
While your responses are crucial to the understanding of this funded relationship, your
responses are entirely confidential, and as such, no individuals will be identified and any
organizational identifiers will be deleted at the close of the study. Note that, any comments
generated from this interview will not be associated to you personally unless you so choose.
Participation in this interview is voluntary and you may choose not to respond, or choose to skip
questions you are not comfortable with. I will also share the findings emanating from this
investigation with you, if you so wish. Your honest responses, however, are greatly appreciated.

INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS
1. Could you tell me a little about your position and role with this organization?
2. Tell me a little about the history of your program/organization?
3. What are your organization‟s (or program‟s) sources of funding? PROBE  Meaning of
“Other Sources”

I.

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
1. Which of your funding sources do you consider to be important to the organization?
2. How would your organization (or program) survive without this funding source

(SPECIFY: USG; Corporations; Foundations; Other Sources)?
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

What kinds of government funding does your organization/program get?
How is important is government funding to your organization?
To what extent would your organization survive without government funding?
Do you have any new funding sources your organization is currently looking to access?
Are there factors that limit you from soliciting funding from particular sources?
To what extent do you compete for funding with other INGOs? (How would you
characterize the degree of competition?)
9. Who would you consider as your competitors?
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II.

AUTONOMY OF THE ORGANIZATION

A. Strategic and Operational Personnel Management Autonomy:
1. To what extent does the funding source (SPECIFY: USG; Corporations; Foundations;
Other Sources) influence who you hire for a particular funded project?

2. PROBE In what ways do funding sources try to influence your hiring choices? (E.g.,
influencing the appointment; the salaries of personnel implementing funded program; and how
they are evaluated)

[The above questions were not to Executive Staff]

B. Financial Management Autonomy:
3. How does each of the following funding sources (SPECIFY: USG; Corporations;
Foundations; Other Sources) try to influence your organization‟s allocation and use of
funds?
PROBE  In what ways do they try to influence resource allocation and utilizations?
OPTIONAL FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS 

4. To what extent does your organization or funded program influence how funds are
allocated and used? (E.g., the organization/program makes the determination without
interference from funding source; or the funding source makes the determination and you have no
say; or the funding source and your agency jointly makes the determination)

5. To what extent can your organization or funded program make changes to the budget or
reallocate funds once the contract agreement is made? (SPECIFY: USG, Corporations,
Foundations, Other sources) (E.g., shift budget or decide how funds are to be allocated or make
alterations to the budget allocation after decisions about how funds are to spent or allocated have
been made)

C. Policy Autonomy:
Involvement of funders in the decision making about how programs are implemented

6. How do funders try to influence how your organization operates? (SPECIFY: USG;
Corporations; Foundations; Other Sources)
7. In what ways do funders try to exert that influence?
PROBES  To what extent does your organization (or you): 8. make independent decisions about the type of programs and program activities (policy
instruments) to be implemented and used (i.e., the way in which a policy is implemented –
e.g., provide free HIV mobile testing)?

9. make independent decisions about how many people to serve or reach (desired outputs)
for funded programs (i.e., the number of people to be served by the program; the number of
services provided; or „units of service‟)?

10. make independent decisions about who you serve (desired target groups) (i.e., those
groups for whom the policy is intended to address – e.g., HIV-positive women)?

250

11. To what extent does the funding source make these decisions in collaboration with you?
(E.g., the agency makes the decisions with no involvement from the funding source; or slight
involvement; or after having explicitly consulted the funding source; does so under explicit
conditions or under restrictions set by the funding source; or the funding source makes the
decisions after having consulted the organization or makes decisions independent of the
organization or funded program?)

III.

STEERING AND CONTROL OF THE ORGANIZATION BY DONOR

A. Ex post Control:
Document in which goals of the organization are specified [CONDITION OF RD]

1. In what ways do funders/donors influence the goals of your organization/programs?
2. How are these goals for the funded program communicated? (e.g., through specific
documentation or through the grants, contracts or cooperative agreement or via a budget
allocation or letter of allocation from the funding source?)

Involvement of the organization in the setting of goals (other than purely financial)

3. Who determines the goals that your organization or funded programs pursue?
(e.g., Your organization or program determines the goals after consulting the funding source, or the
funding source sets the goals by a process of negotiation or cooperation, or the funding source sets the
goals after consulting the organization or program or that the funding source sets the goals independent of
your organization?)

4. What part do you or your organization play in determining the goals of funded programs?
5. Once a contract is drawn, how much say do you have in changing the set goals?

IV. PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE RED TAPE
Administrative burden resulting from complying with evaluation or performance
requirements:
1. Is there any Red Tape (“Rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a
compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules’ functional object”
(Bozeman 1993) or burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have negative effects on
your organization’s effectiveness (Rainey, Pandey & Bozeman 1995) ) associated with the

funding your organization receives from any of your funding sources? If yes, would you
describe it?
2. PROBE  To what extent do you feel that the resources available for implementation
are constrained by the assessment and reporting requirements of the funder? (SPECIFY:
USG, Corporations, Foundations, Other sources)
3. To what extent do you feel that your organization is being watched or the organization‟s
contractual compliance is being monitored by any of your funding sources (SPECIFY:
USG, Corporations, Foundations, Other sources)
4. What limitations do you face when trying to comply with the rules and regulations of
your different funding agreements?
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V. INFLUENCE OF GRANTS, CONTRACTS, & COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS
1. Does the tool or mechanism through which funding is provided influence how a funded
program is implemented? If yes, in what ways? (SPECIFY: Grants, Contracts,
Cooperative Agreements)

2. How do corporations and foundations transfer funding to your organization or program?
(e.g., through contracts, cooperative agreements, or grants?). If through contracts or grants,

how different are these tools from those used by government?
3. Which of these tools do you find most restricting? If so, in what ways?
4. Does the degree of restrictiveness vary with different funding sources?
5. Which of the following funding tools/mechanisms do your prefer and why? (SPECIFY:
Grants, Contracts, Cooperative Agreements)

[Questions in Section V above were not asked to Executive Staff; with the exception of
Question 5.]

VI.

STRATEGIES FOR RETAINING AUTONOMY
1. What factors do you consider when deciding to solicit funding from different sources?
(How do you determine which RTF to respond to? Walk me through the process?)
2. Can you walk me through the process of soliciting funding from (1) USG; (2)
CORPORATIONS; (3) FOUNDATIONS; (4) OTHER SOURCES?
3. How many RTFs have you turned down and why?
4. What strategies do you employ to retain autonomy within the organization/program?
(SPECIFY: USG; CORPORATIONS; FOUNDATIONS) PROBE

VII. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR HIGH LEVEL STAFF
A. Structural Control
[Qs on Presence of governing board; Who appoints board members; Composition of board; Appointment
of CEO; Type of contract of CEO; Who evaluates the CEO; Basis of accountability for CEO]

1. How would you characterize the BOD‟s relationship with the different funding sources?
(SPECIFY: USG, Corporations, Foundations, Other sources)
PROBES 
2. Does the BOD influence which funding sources you solicit? PROBE How much
influence does the board have in selecting the funding sources the organization solicits?
3. Does the BOD have any influence when it comes to the organization‟s relationship with
each funder?
4. Is the BOD engaged in the evaluation of funded programs in any way?
5. Do any of the funding sources exert any influence through the decision-making bodies
(e.g., Board of Directors, CEO). If so, in what ways?
6. How much influence do you have in selecting funding sources to solicit?
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APPENDIX 4
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPACT CONTINUUMS

In order to illustrate the perceived impact of funding on INGOs‟ autonomy, by
funding source and tool, this research constructed different continuums (shown in Figures
6 and 7) and a cross-tabulation of the perceived influence of different funding sources
and tools on INGOs‟ operational and managerial autonomy dimensions (shown in Table
15). The general idea here was to provide a visual illustration of the magnitude and
direction of the influence of USG funding on INGOs‟ autonomy relative to other funding
sources, as well as the influence of funding tools. While the continuums and crosstabulations provide a visual for the reader, it is important to articulate how these were
constructed.
Since this study is framed within the resource dependence and tool choice
approaches; the interview questions used were generated with these theoretical
frameworks in mind. As shown in Appendix 3, the interview guide included questions on
INGOs‟ autonomy steering and control of the INGO by donors and the influence of
grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements. The responses to these questions helped to
gauge INGO‟s experiences with different funding sources and tools, thus providing the
information used to construct these continuums and cross-tabulation.
While the researcher‟s judgment plays a role in selecting points of placement for
each of the funding sources relative to others, the general direction and magnitude of the
relationships were guided by various statements from participants across all three INGOs.
For example, in trying to confirm the relationship between funding tools and INGO
autonomy, I conducted a text search for the word “contracts.” NVIVO highlighted every
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time the word “contracts” was used. By so doing, I was able to understand under what
contexts and conditions the term was used and what was uttered pertaining to contracts.
I was also able to identify when comparisons were made between contracts and
other tools. I conducted similar searches for grants and cooperative agreements in order
to fully understand their relationships with one another and their link to the autonomy
dimensions, as well as text searches for each of the funding sources. As a result, the
graphical illustrations and cross-tabulation were constructed based on participants‟
experiences with each of the funding sources and funding tools. The following are
examples of statements that were instrumental in the construction of Figure 6, Figure 7
and Table 15. The statements typically expressed participants‟ experience with either
USG funding relative to other funding sources or contracts, relative to other funding
tools.

COMPARISON OF FUNDING SOURCES

COMPARISON OF FUNDING TOOLS

The USG tries to influence, sure they do, and other donors may –
(but) mainly the USG. More and more, there is a great deal of
bureaucracy in the government. Years ago, it used to be you
address the needs of the people and if you can show that the food
or the cash went to the people or this looks very good – it was
considered a success, if you achieved your goal. Today it‟s a lot
of paperwork, it‟s more and more paperwork instead of the 20page, it‟s a 100-pages in proposal; it‟s just become onerous and a
lot of people don‟t want to touch food aid anymore, they don‟t
want to touch some of the other kinds of aid that the government
gives. (CEO, SIGMA)
I think that donors, in particular, governments have specific
policies interests that they want to pursue and we need to be
conscious about those. (Dir. Humanitarian Assistance, BETA)
Foundations are the highest (more restrictive); I would say the
government is the highest, then Foundations, then Corporations,
and then private individuals…. I can tell you that from a
foundations side, it really is to me, like the blend of working
with government and working with the private individual or
corporation because you have – foundations have to give their
money away, but you also working across the table with other
program experts. (VP External Relations, BETA)
Compare(d)… to a corporation where with a corporation you
might be working with a head of a foundation, but the
corporation doesn‟t understand our work as much – there is this
huge educational background, just really educating them about
the work that we do… With an individual, it‟s a private thing;

But contracts are more kind of more controlled – you need
more probably more monitoring on a contract for compliance;
both need certain controls and compliance but it‟s a little more
– necessarily under a contract I would say. (CEO, ALPHA)
Probably the contracts (are more restrictive), the grants are a
little easier and especially if they are from the private sector
and from the private sector, there is more understanding of
what goes on. For example, if you have two organizations
funding the same project in the private sector (of an)
organization, (both of them would) say just extend the
program, add to it or so, with government, this is not possible
– (it‟s just the one) source basically. I don‟t know, I would say
that contracts are a little more difficult. (CEO, SIGMA)
If it‟s a contract, it‟s no different than you hiring a plumber to
put a sink in your house. The plumber may come to you and
say, well here is the kind of sink – here is the model that you
should use and you go well, ok or you go – no I want that sink.
But the contract is basically saying that you do it this way no
matter what so that is certainly the difference. (Dir. of Food
Programs, BETA)
A grant is an instrument that denotes it is given to an
implementing partner to support a program for a public
purpose. A contract is an acquisition instrument where the
USG purchases goods or services and when you sign a
contract with the USG, you enter a client-service provider
relationship. So we have to take the USG as our client and our
number one responsibility is to provide service to them. A
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people are inspired personally to give to CARE; it‟s not like a
foundation were they have to give it away or like a Corporation
were they kind of what to be socially responsible. (VP External
Relations, BETA)

contract is a different type of relationship – BETA is not
completely comfortable with that relationship so we are very
careful about the types of circumstances under which we will
get into that. (Dir. of Competitive Bids, BETA)

(With corporate funding), most of their rules and regulations is
how we spend that funding… a lot of times it‟s the expectation
of how we spend down the grant. It‟s spending and impact. (VP
External Relations, BETA)

We will take contracts, and but we watch and look at those
contracts and the specifications in them very carefully and we
have turned and we will turn down contracts that say, you
must do – that are either ill-defined in terms of the actions that
you are going to bring forward or it states that the USG
official at the level will tell you what to do with these monies
and we usually say, no, thanks, but no thanks on those because
they define in a way that we are not comfortable with the
actions to move forward. (VP of International Programs,
ALPHA)

Corporate funding… I can tell you that, we have had in some
cases, just an exchange of letters, we‟ve had in other cases, a
one-page contract, and other times maybe a 3-page, maybe 4page contract. It‟s mixed, but it‟s really interesting because you
don‟t have all the paperwork usually that you do with the
government. (CEO, SIGMA)
The former director of USAID… said to the NGOs that if you
are going to get USAID funds and get government money, then
increasingly your objectives are going to have to be consistent
with the objectives of US Foreign Policy – and I think it was less
so in the past – so it‟s kind of looking at USG funding as an
instrument of US foreign policy. (Internal Auditor, BETA)
More and more the government is issuing RFP (contracts)
saying, “this is what we want done, do you want to do it?
(Secretary of the Board, BETA)
The ABC concept of HIV/AIDS – you can‟t use PEPFAR money
to buy condoms…. we went to the country director for Uganda
and said that we know there is money for Uganda for
HIV/AIDS… and the country director said, frankly, I cannot
promote the no use of condom, I just cannot do it. (Program
Director, ALPHA)

Right now Plan does not do any government contracts, only
grants and cooperative agreements… you have Contracts –
when the government contracts someone to do something,
they are essentially given them a task – for a certain
price…(Dir. of Grants and Compliance, ALPHA)
Also contracts tend to be larger; and sometime we feel we
don‟t have the capacity to handle $200 million project in a
little country. And there are a lot of stricter requirements such
as the way you pay people and all sort of staff.
Then you have… grants – whereas grants really are just
“conditional gifts” – we want to give you some money, yeah
of course, we want you to tell us what you are going to do
with it but we are not really going to have any oversight or
anything (Dir. of Grants and Compliance, ALPHA)

Figure 6, 7 and Table 15, are therefore designed to showcase of the presumed
impact of USG funding on INGOs‟ autonomy, relative to other funding sources, and the
presumed impact of contracts, relative to cooperative agreements and grants. Aside from
the visual aesthetics of these figures and table, an additional utility to the continuums is
that they provide future quantitative research with potentially testable hypotheses about
the influence of USG funding relative to other funding sources and the influence of
funding tools on INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions.
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